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ABSTRACT
My dissertation focuses on two crucial issues that face developing economies how polit-
ical and institutional features affect the public provisioning of electricity; and how major
life transitions affect decision-making and behavior amongst the poor. My job market
paper uses confidential electricity administrative data and satellite nighttime lights data,
in conjunction with a close-election regression discontinuity design, to causally identify
widespread political corruption in the Indian electricity sector, and quantify the net wel-
fare implications for the economy. In other work, I study how electricity sector reforms
in India, aimed at greater efficiency, affected the productivity of the manufacturing sec-
tor. I find that the structure of the distribution network in a state whether there is a single
or multiple distribution companies is significant in determining the success of these re-
forms. My other work, with Catalina Franco, studies how transitioning from student life
at university in Colombia, to working can affect economic decision making.
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CHAPTER 1
1
The Price of Power: Costs of Political
Corruption in Indian Electricity
Political capture of public electricity provision may benefit targeted consumers through informal
subsidies. However, this causes leakages in utility revenues, inhibiting their ability to reliably
supply electricity to the broader consumer base. Using a close-election regression discontinuity
design, and a confidential dataset on the universe of geo-coded electricity bills from a large state
in India, I show that billed electricity consumption is lower for constituencies of the winning party
after an election. However, actual consumption, as measured by satellite nighttime lights, is higher
for these regions. I find new evidence to explain this discrepancy – politicians illicitly subsidize
their constituents by systematically allowing the manipulation of electricity bills. To address this
corruption through policy, it is important to measure the size of the welfare losses, and compute
demand elasticities. I develop a method to estimate elasticities in the presence of data manipulation
by leveraging exogenous variation from policy-led price changes and predictive analytics. The net
deadweight loss I estimate is large enough to power 3.7 million rural households over an electoral
term.
1
1.1 Introduction
Electricity is critical for the production of goods and the functioning of households. Despite its
economic significance, supply in developing countries is plagued with poor infrastructure (Ryan,
2014), a lack of investment (McRae, 2015), frequent blackouts, and voltage fluctuations (Allcott
et al., 2016). Generation has increased exponentially in countries like India (Central Electricity
Authority, 2018), but state-owned providers continue to lose almost 23% of generated electricity to
technical and commercial (billing) leakages (Ministry of Power, 2018). In democracies, politicians
may contribute to these leakages by selectively rewarding constituents with subsidized electricity.
While low prices or reduced supply shortages benefit targeted consumers, the losses to utilities
may lead to future outages and intermittent supply to the detriment of many. In what ways do
politicians systematically cause market distortions in public electricity provision, and how do such
interventions affect the welfare of consumers? That is the focus of this paper.
It is challenging to rigorously verify the anecdotal evidence and press reports on political corrup-
tion. Many reports show that politicians turn a blind eye to energy theft committed by voters or
allies (The Telegraph, 2014; The Washington Post, 2012), tacitly support violence against officials
who clamp down on energy theft (The Times of India, 2017), and are directly involved in violent
retaliation against such officials (Hindustan Times, 2016).1 A clear understanding of the mecha-
nisms and magnitudes of corruption is crucial to designing future policy in electricity provision.
Yet, in order to systematically investigate these allegations, and obtain a sense of the magnitudes
involved, we need to derive well-identified relationships from administrative data.
I overcome each of these challenges in my work. First, I use satellite nighttime lights, and con-
fidential quarterly billing records for 17 million accounts from an electricity utility, to identify
whether electricity is used as a tool to garner votes. Next, leveraging a close election Regression
Discontinuity Design (RDD), I show causal evidence that regions aligned with the governing party
receive indirect electricity subsidies. Third, I identify the mechanisms of corruption through which
politicians use electricity supply and prices as a form of patronage. Importantly, I use the micro
data to investigate how the distribution of reported consumption changes systematically with polit-
ical alignment. Finally, I estimate the magnitudes of the welfare consequences both for consumers
and providers, this time by exploiting exogenous changes in prices to estimate the elasticity of
electricity demand.
I causally identify widespread corruption in electricity billing practices. I highlight efforts by
1“Vote-hungry local politicians protect the thieves....At its worst, Indias power sector is the perfect example of
populism and patronage trumping sound economics, analysts say.” The Washington Post (2012) Power Thieves Prosper
in Indias Patronage-based Democracy.
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incumbent politicians to favor their voters post-election, by under-reporting their consumption in
electricity bills. I find that shortly after a state-level election, there is an increase in electricity
consumption, as measured by satellite nighttime lights data, for regions that voted for the winning
party. Alone, this evidence appears to indicate selectively higher levels of electricity access for
these regions, possibly owing to politicians redirecting electricity. These same regions, however,
have discontinuously lower levels of billed consumption, as reported by the electricity provider.
This billing evidence alone, may suggest that politicians instead redirect electricity to regions
where they lost elections, possibly in a bid to win over voters. Together, however, the evidence
from the nighttime lights and billing data paint a different picture: Politicians engage in patronage
towards their constituencies by under-reporting electricity consumption, even as their constituents
consume higher actual amounts of power. The magnitude of under-reporting is large, constituting
a discount greater than 40% of billed consumption for consumers at the cutoff.
Yet, the mere existence of corrupt practices does not inform the types of policy regulations required
to stem them if there is little understanding of the mechanisms. I highlight the mechanisms behind
under-reported bills by identifying how anomalies in the consumption distribution change at the
RD cutoff. I show evidence that billing data is more likely to be manipulated in areas aligned
with the ruling party. First, there is a greater divergence in the observed distribution from what
would be expected, as predicted by Benford’s (1938) Law, which is commonly used to detect data
fraud.2 Secondly, I observe that a discontinuously higher number of bills in the winning party’s
constituencies are multiples of ten, reporting consumption amounts such as 20, 30, and 40 units.
These results are consistent with a patronage hypothesis where local, incumbent politicians reward
voters post-election and consolidate power by allowing the manipulation of actual consumption to
appear lower than what was consumed.
These corrupt practices, however, tell us little about the size of the economic losses. The mag-
nitudes of the welfare gains to consumers, and the deadweight loss are important to measure as
they determine the distributive consequences and policy urgency of the problem. To identify the
welfare implications on each of the parties involved, I measure both the gains in consumer surplus
from receiving subsidized electricity, and the lost revenue to the provider due to under-reported
bills. I estimate the size of the loss in producer surplus from RD estimates of under-reported bills.
The magnitude of change in consumer surplus, however, requires computing the price elasticity of
electricity demand. The estimation of these elasticities for all consumers is challenging as there
is clear evidence of data manipulation in the bills. I, therefore, develop a method for calculating
price elasticities of electricity demand in the presence of data manipulation.
2Benford’s (1938) Law predicts a frequency distribution of the first digit of naturally occurring, unmanipulated sets
of numerical data, such as consumption data.
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I leverage policy-changes in tariffs and predictive analytic techniques in order to estimate price
elasticites of demand. I first divide the data into two sets – the set of regions where the data
is plausibly unmanipulated by political influence, and the set that contains under-reported bills.
The regions for which I reject the hypothesis of data manipulation span both constituencies of
the winning party as well as those that voted for the opposition. I estimate the price elasticity
of electricity demand for the regions with unmanipulated data, exploiting exogenous variation
in policy-led electricity prices as instrumental variables, similar to Ito (2014). To elaborate, I
use variation in the electricity price schedule (set by independent regulators) over time, across
consumer categories, and across different tiers of the price schedule, to determine consumption
responses to changes in the marginal price. One advantage over previous studies is that with
micro-level data, I can do this for each consumer category while still having sufficient statistical
power to estimate demand elasticities.
I then use machine learning methods, specifically the post-double-selection Ordinary Least Squares
(PDS OLS) procedure (Ahrens et al., 2018; Belloni et al., 2016), to build a predictive model of
regional elasticities based on census village-level demographics. Using OLS alone may lead to
biases arising from overfitting or omitted-variables. Compared to previous work, I show that ig-
noring data manipulation, using aggregated data, or not leveraging policy instruments, leads to
biased estimates of demand elasticities.
Using the estimated under-reporting in consumption, and elasticities, I find that the loss to the
electricity provider ($57 million) outweighs the gain in consumer surplus ($22 million) for regions
near the RD cutoff.3 Simple calculations show that the net welfare loss of almost $34 million
is sufficient to power 3.7 million rural households. Yet, this may not capture the full extent of
the welfare costs, as such political favoritism could exacerbate inequalities as well (Asher and
Novosad, 2017; Burgess et al., 2015; Fisman, 2001).
I develop a political patronage model based on a combination of features present in Stromberg
(2004), and include consumer decisions to highlight the importance of price elasticities in such
a setup. Consistent with the model I find that politicians target consumer categories that have
inelastic demand, and groups with greater access to electricity-using infrastructure. Indeed, there
is little targeting for commercial rural consumers who have both sufficiently elastic demand and
less electricity-using infrastructure.4
3Even a figure as high as $57 million is ultimately an underestimate of the overall losses as I restrict the analysis to
constituencies within the RD bandwidth. While the RDD provides a causal claim of political patronage for constituen-
cies near the cutoff, it does not rule out the possibility of patronage in constituencies where the ruling party won with
a larger margin. My estimates are about 40% of the losses to the provider in 2016 as measured by the Comptroller and
Auditor General of India. (Business Standard, 2018) reports that the provider “suffered a revenue loss of Rs 175.85
crore owing to delay in raising bills, theft of electricity and unauthorised use.”
4Politicians may also target consumers with greater influence politically, and urban consumers are more likely to
4
In theory, politicians may be able to target basic services to their voters who need it the most,
increasing their consumer surplus (Brender and Drazen, 2005). Indeed, democracy could play an
important role in ensuring the efficient allocation of government inputs in an effort to garner votes
(Burgess et al., 2015). However, it could also result in misallocation (Khwaja and Mian, 2005),
electoral cycles (Cole, 2009) or preferential access (Asher and Novosad, 2017). Such politically-
motivated market distortions impose a burden on the provider and other consumer groups, simply
exacerbating the already poor quality of electricity supply in several regions. The welfare effect
of political involvement in electricity is therefore, theoretically ambiguous. A contribution of my
work is to resolve this ambiguity by estimating the magnitude of the welfare costs and benefits.
I find that in the case of Indian electricity, the producer loss outweighs the gains in consumer
surplus by more than 2:1. This speaks to current debates in several parts of the world about the
privatization of electricity provision, the merits of better metering and questions of equitable ac-
cess. Furthermore, such political favoritism is not only limited to developing countries (Albouy,
2013; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2007). Given its wide prevalence, it is important to understand the
features that allow political patronage to take place, in order to design policies to counter it.
Importantly, I identify mechanisms of political patronage, such as manipulation of billing records,
through which patronage can occur despite the lack of direct political control over electricity prices.
Prior research finds suggestive evidence that politicians increase electricity supply before elections,
to sway voters (Baskaran et al., 2015; Min and Golden, 2014), and they pressure authorities to keep
tariffs low (Chatterjee, 2018; Millennium Post, 2017; The Economic Times, 2015). However, due
to the unavailability of micro-level electricity consumption data, past studies often rely on satellite
lights or regional aggregates as proxies for electricity consumption and leakages. Such macro-
level aggregates, while informative, conceal the underlying corrupt practices, and are limited in
identifying the net consequences of such actions. For instance, I show evidence of higher electric-
ity consumption in regions supporting the ruling party, based on satellite data. However, this is
only half the story. By uncovering widespread corruption in the micro-data, my findings stress the
importance of having both measures of actual electricity consumption (satellite nighttime lights)
and reported electricity consumption (billing data), to reveal the method of corruption. The mech-
anisms of corruption are now revealed to be through billing-data manipulation, which constitutes
an indirect subsidy and may lead to over-consumption.
I take advantage of the monthly or quarterly billing data to study corruption in a way that was not
feasible in previous work. First, it allows me to estimate price elasticities after accounting for an
individual’s consumption tier, and intra-year changes in tariffs. This was not feasible in previous
have such influence. This is consistent with studies such as Badiani et al. (2012) who show evidence of politicians
wooing rich and influential farmers by guaranteeing free or cheap electricity.
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studies relying on aggregated data at year level (Saha and Bhattacharya, 2018). Second, and more
importantly, it allows me to estimate the entire consumption distribution at the regional level to test
for data manipulation – a feature absent from analyses that rely on aggregate data. I can therefore
directly measure under-reporting and estimate the corresponding shortfall in the revenues of the
electricity provider. This would not be possible with satellite data alone, and helps me elicit the
true welfare costs and benefits of political interference.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. Section 1.2 provides background information on the
Indian electricity sector, and the surrounding institutional and political structures. Section 1.3 dis-
cusses the empirical strategy for identifying evidence of political corruption in electricity billing.
The next section, Section 1.4, describes the data sets used in this analysis. I show evidence of cor-
ruption in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 discusses the welfare implications of corruption by politicians,
and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The Electricity Sector in India
Electricity supply is a critical issue in India, where 55% of surveyed firms experienced electrical
outages and more than half the firms reported being required to provide a ‘gift’ in exchange for
an electricity connection (The World Bank, 2014). A third of the Indian population does not have
access to electricity, and even those who do, often experience long and frequent blackouts (Pargal
and Banerjee, 2014). Poor electricity supply is a major constraint to manufacturing, and both the
price and quality remain important election issues.
In this paper, I focus on West Bengal, a large Indian state where the transmission and distribution
sectors are state-owned. This is with the exception of one privately owned firm which distributes
electricity only to the city of Kolkata. 55% of the consumers in the state (and most residential and
commercial establishments) are supplied by the state-owned West Bengal State Electricity Dis-
tribution Company Limited (WBSEDCL) covering a population of about 72 million individuals,
through almost 17 millions accounts. In 2003, the central Electricity Act reforms led to a state
regulatory commission, which is responsible for setting electricity tariffs and overseeing the func-
tioning of the utility. This particular provision was made specifically to separate the control of
the electricity sector from increasing political influence. In my analysis, I explore whether such
mandates are sufficient to enforce political separation in reality, given weak enforcement and au-
diting mechanisms. This institutional setup is ubiquitous across states in India, so my findings
can be extended to other states, and indeed other countries having similar institutions (e.g. Brazil,
Bangladesh, Mexico, Sri Lanka and Kenya). Like these countries, electricity is a heavily subsi-
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dized commodity for households and small commercial establishments, with most state electricity
utilities unable to recover their costs.
Whether political interference in electricity occurs or not depends on the incentives faced by politi-
cians, as well as whether such influence is feasible. There are number of reasons why politicians
may want to control electricity supply. Election surveys, particularly in India have often found
that electricity remains an important factor in election platforms (Chhibber et al., 2004). Politi-
cians may try to win over new voters by offering cheaper or better access to electricity. However,
there is a well documented pattern of patronage politics (Min, 2015; Nagavarapu and Sekhri, 2014;
Sadanandan, 2012) that is favored in India, with politicians exerting greater effort in consolidating
existing votes.
Chatterjee (2018) presents evidence that is consistent with the way I model politicians exerting
effort to provide cheaper electricity. Interviews with regulatory officials show pressure from politi-
cians in the ruling party to delay or avoid upward revisions in tariffs. Regulators report resisting
these attempts, demonstrating the difficulty faced by politicians in directly influencing the price of
electricity. This arguably leads them to explore other, more indirect means of affecting electricity
access and tariffs. Examples of such methods include politicians implicitly allowing energy theft
among their constituents (The Telegraph, 2014; The Times of India, 2018; The Washington Post,
2012).5 Golden and Min (2011) demonstrate how electricity bills are more likely to go unpaid in ar-
eas where criminals have political affiliations. Another possible channel is through the middle-men
involved in the bill collection process. External inspectors are hired on contract basis to conduct
manual meter readings. Rains and Abraham (2018) highlights the often overlooked policy issue of
low revenue collection, due to poor incentives for these contractors. Another channel of influence
that politicians could have is to selectively encourage lower enforcement of revenue collection in
their constituencies, allowing billing centers to make lower bill imputations and under-charge their
constituents.
One factor helping governing parties is that while the electricity provider remains state-owned, the
politicians themselves are not held accountable for its functioning. In several states, electricity
distributors have faced mounting losses for several years. This cycle of losses is virtually sys-
tematized by the setup of a centrally managed bailout program, Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojna
(UDAY), launched in 2015 to help loss-making electricity utilities recover financially. In practice,
politicians do not pay any penalty for their state utility making such losses, whereas checks-and-
balances that would prevent them from interfering with utility functioning are minimal. In such
an environment, state politicians have an incentive to ‘informally’ provide their voters with access
5“A [local politician] .... has said that discom officials who penalise farmers for power theft or overloading should
be tied to trees”, (The Times of India, 2018).
7
to cheaper and more electricity, following a long tradition of patronage politics in India. The em-
pirical portion of this paper shows evidence of the mechanisms through which politicians provide
informal or indirect subsidies.
1.2.1 Theoretical Predictions
I develop a model in Appendix 1.8.1 to solidify my hypotheses, derive estimation equations, and
motivate my welfare analysis. First, I derive a standard equation for electricity demand given a
simple quasilinear utility function, increasing in electricity consumption with a constant elasticity
for demand. Access to electricity-using infrastructure also shifts out the demand for electricity,
and these consumers vote for politicians that give them higher utility. Second politicians exert
effort and influence over utility providers to maximize their probability of winning the next elec-
tion. Exerting effort comes at a cost, which prevents politicians from indiscriminately targeting all
voters. These costs are lower in areas where politicians are in power and aligned with the state
government.
This simple set-up allows me to derive testable implications. First, politicians exert more effort
and influence in areas where local leaders are aligned with the state government. I measure this
influence by looking at evidence on systemic under-reporting of consumption. Second, electricity
subsidies and actual consumption (as measured by satellite data) are higher in such areas. Third,
politicians target consumer bases with relatively more inelastic demand as they stand the most
to gain from informal subsidies. The model also allows me to reproduce standard equation for
estimating the price elasticity of demand for different types of consumers, and to test whether
politicians do indeed target more inelastic consumers. Fourth, politicians target consumers with
access to more electricity-using infrastructure, such as consumers in urban areas. Last, as in stan-
dard models, the change in consumer surplus is a simple function of the elasticity of demand. As
I show in Appendix 1.8.1 these predictions motivate using and are testable in a simple RD set
up.
1.3 Close-election Regression Discontinuity Design
I apply a close-election Regression Discontinuity (RD) framework (Calonico et al., 2015; Imbens
and Kalyanaraman, 2012; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) to identify whether politicians in West
Bengal informally subsidize electricity. In India, state elections occur every five years and fol-
low a parliamentary style format. States are composed of legislative assembly constituencies (in
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short, assemblies). The voting population elects constituency level representatives or Members
of Legislative Assembly (MLAs), and the political party with the majority of MLAs forms the
government. The head of the winning party becomes the Chief Minister of the State.
Figure 1.1: A timeline of the winners of the state elections in West Bengal from 1977 to 2016
Notes: CPI(M) is the Communist Party of India (Marxist), and Trinamool is the All India Trinamool
Congress (AITC) party. These are the two rival parties in West Bengal.
I use the winning margin percentage in assembly elections as the running variable for the RD. I
compare outcomes just above and below a zero winning margin RD cutoff to estimate the Local
Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of being in a constituency aligned with the ruling government.
The winning margin percentage is the fraction of votes by which an MLA from the ruling party
wins an assembly election. Asher and Novosad (2017); Bardhan and Mookherjee (2010) and
Nagavarapu and Sekhri (2014) use similar close election RDs in Indian contexts. Constituency
level elections in India are competitive, unpredictable and several factors affect their outcomes.
Therefore, despite widespread political patronage, the probability of a constituency lying near
the RD cutoff is randomly determined in an election. Given the unpredictability of these local
elections, particularly in regions close to the RD cutoff, the close election RD is especially valid in
this case (Eggers et al., 2015).
An important issue in practice when using the RD is the selection of a smoothing parameter. I run
local regressions to estimate the discontinuity in outcomes at the cutoff. In particular, I estimate
local linear regressions conducted with a rectangular kernel and employing the optimal data-driven
procedure and bandwidth selection suggested by Calonico et al. (2015). I present my results for
multiple bandwidths to highlight the robust nature of my estimates, varying them from below the
optimal bandwidths to larger bandwidths. Varying the size of the bandwidth and the polynomial
order do not affect the results presented in my analysis.
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In the 2011 state elections, the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) defeated the incumbent
Communist Party of India – Marxist (CPI(M)) in a landslide election (Figure 1.1). Prior to the
election, the CPI(M) had been in power in West Bengal since the 1970s. I use state assembly
election data from 2006 to 2017, covering elections in 2006, 2011 and 2016, and discuss my data
in greater detail in the next section.
Figure 1.2: McCrary Test – density of winning
margins at cutoff
Figure 1.3: Balance on PCA of age, gender
and caste
Notes: In the left panel, I test the smoothness of the density of the running variable (winning margin in the
state election (2011)) for discontinuities and find that it is smooth across the RD cutoff. In the right panel,
I test for discontinuities in demographic characteristics of assembly candidates on either side of the cutoff
and find that there are no significant discontinuities in the first principal component of age, sex and caste
of the candidates. I also show balance in terms of village characteristics across the cutoff in Appendix 1.9,
Figures 1.15 and 1.16.
In order to test the validity of the RD design, I run two main checks to ensure balance of the
running variable and other characteristics on either side of the cutoff. On running a McCrary test
(McCrary, 2008), I find no significant discontinuities in the density across the cutoff (Figure 1.2).
Similarly, when comparing candidate characteristics such as age, gender and caste, a measure of
the first principal component of the three also does not yield any significant discontinuities across
the cutoff (Figure 1.2). This strengthens any causal claims that I make using this RD.
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1.4 Data Description and Variable Definitions
1.4.1 Confidential data on Electricity Consumption and Billing
I obtain confidential data on the universe of electricity consumption and billing records from
the West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Corporation Limited (WBSEDCL). This is a state-
owned utility in West Bengal, serving a consumer base of approximately 17 million households, or
72 million customers. These data include consumption for residential, commercial and agricultural
users in both rural and urban areas between 2011 and mid-2017. For most consumers, billing is
done quarterly, with the exception of a few monthly users with commercial accounts. WBSEDCL
faces no competition from other electricity distributors within its purview, and the only area not
covered by WBSEDCL is the capital city of Kolkata.
The utility is controlled by an independent regulatory board, the West Bengal State Electricity
Regulatory Commission (WBERC). WBERC accepts proposals from WBSEDCL requesting tariff
increases to meet their rising marginal costs of providing electricity. After reviewing these reports,
WBERC sanctions a tariff revision, that can occur at any time within a year. I compile a dataset of
these tariff revisions that include changes across tiers in the pricing structure, as well as different
tariff schedules for different consumer categories.
In order to bill consumers, WBSEDCL sends inspectors to account holders’ homes to enter their
meter readings into the database. Electricity meters function akin to car odometers, where the
number on the meter represents the cumulative consumption of the account holder. To a large
extent, due to the absence of additional checks, reported consumption is up to the discretion of
these meter inspectors and the local Customer Care Centers (CCCs) they report to. Indeed, when I
plot the consumption distribution for residential and commercial consumers in Figure 1.4, I observe
a highly multi-modal distribution of consumption, with significant bunching at various points. The
peaks in the data often appear at round numbers such as 20, 30 or 40 KWh. While it is common for
meter inspectors to not conduct readings every billing cycle and make imputations for the periods
between their observations, the spikes observed in the data are quite large. Using the RD, I test
whether this occurs systematically more in certain areas based on political alignment.
1.4.2 Measures of Data Manipulation
Based on the multi-modal consumption distribution, I define two measures to characterize manip-
ulation of the underlying data. Benford’s (1938) Law lays out an expected distribution for the first
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Figure 1.4: Consumption Distribution for Residential Consumers
Notes: The consumption distributions above are for residential consumers in rural and urban areas. The
range of consumption extends from 1 KWh to more than 1000 KWh, but the bulk of distribution lies below
200 KWh, and largely has the shape of a chi-squared distribution. I restrict consumption to under 200 KWh
in these graphs. There are several spikes in the distribution particularly at multiples of ten and five.
digit of a naturally occurring set of numbers. I measure the normalized distance of the consump-
tion distribution for each assembly-year from the expected distribution. This metric, which is the
same as the chi-squared goodness-of-fit statistic provides me with the degree of manipulation in
the underlying data. The second measure I use is the fraction of consumers in an assembly, in any
given year, who have a reported consumption that is a multiple of ten. Because the consumption
data would be, in expectation, continuously and smoothly distributed, a multiple of ten should not
occur discontinuously more just above the RD cutoff.
I exploit additional billing items in the data that shed more light on the mechanisms of data ma-
nipulation. The electricity bills consists of two items, “arrears” and “subsidies” that have complex
formulas, leaving them open to manipulation that is hard to detect. Tariff increases are phased
into consumer bills over a five-year period, using a system of arrears. However, tariff revisions
occur every 1-2 years. Therefore the bill item “arrears” consists of components from multiple tar-
iff increases, and anomalies are hard to identify.6 The close-election RD provides a neat way of
identifying whether these billing items are systematically different in constituencies supporting the
majority party.
Given that central regulations do not allow political entities any direct control over electricity
tariffs, these measures would enable me to test whether they indirectly influence electricity tariffs
through the manipulation of the above measures. This may point towards a “patronage” political
6On speaking with the billing department at WBSEDCL, it was unclear to their IT officers how these variables
were calculated, suggesting room for manipulation.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for Outcomes in Winning and Losing Legislative As-
semblies
2011 2016
Winning Losing Winning Losing
Number of Constituencies 227 67 211 83
Chi-Sq. Square Distance 26.59 11.85 34.42 32.33
Fraction of consumers with whole
numbered KWH
0.15 0.16 0.13 0.13
Reported consumption (KWh) 260.55 174.39 270.96 181.27
Sum of all bill components (Rs.) 1533.27 979.10 1754.30 1117.91
Sum of all arrears (Rs.) 90.14 48.79 56.43 33.78
Average energy price per KWH (Rs.) 3.89 3.52 5.45 4.93
Average arrear per KWH (Rs.) 0.42 0.29 0.50 0.45
Total subsidies in Bill (Rs.) -153.56 -104.56 -109.25 -79.19
Connected Load (KVA) 1.08 0.81 1.13 0.81
Notes: Summary statistics based on confidential billing data. The above table shows the mean
level of the outcome variables by legislative assemblies that are aligned (‘Winning’) and not
aligned (‘Losing’) with the governing party, for each respective election. I show billing outcomes
from 2012, when my data begins, under the 2011 column. The ‘Chi-Sq Square Distance’ is
a measure of distance of the reported consumption distribution from the expected distribution.
Connected Load refers to a predetermined maximum demand based on the appliances used in a
household.
model of politicians in power wanting to reward their voters. If bills are manipulated to reflect
lower than actual consumption, that would amount to an indirect subsidy to constituents.
In the consumption dataset, each account holder is linked to a consumer care center (CCC). These
centers are the local administrative offices for WBSEDCL, in charge of billing. I geo-locate each of
these 510 CCCs and situate them within their respective legislative assemblies, ending up with 2-3
CCCs per assembly area. Through their CCCs, therefore, all account holders under WBSEDCL
are assigned to a particular legislative assembly and I use this setup to run an RD analysis. I
hypothesize that if politicians wanted to indirectly subsidize their voter base, they would do so
by influencing the local CCCs within their jurisdiction. One possible channel through which they
may operate is to selectively not enforce local contactors in charge of meter readings to record
observations regularly. Rains and Abraham (2018) identify this as a vulnerability in bill collections
due to low incentives of contractors collecting consumption meter readings. Not having regular
meter readings allows local billing centers to make their own imputations of consumption, and
could be made lower to appease the local MLA.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the main variables of interest by whether or not the con-
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stituency was aligned with the majority party, and also by years 2012 and 2016. In the RD analysis
using billing data, I make use of only the 2016 election, due to data availability. All results from
this analysis using billing and consumption data reveal political behavior post-elections.
1.4.3 Satellite Nighttime Luminosity Data
I use nighttime light density as a measure for actual electricity consumption in grid-connected
areas, and possible new electrification. This is an un-manipulable measure of consumption, and
serve as a barometer for the reported consumption measures from the electricity bills.
Satellites from the United States’ Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) collect im-
ages of the earth twice a day, and they make available annual composite images by averaging
these daily data. They use 30 arc second grids, spanning -180 to 180 degrees longitude and -65
to 75 degrees latitude and present the data using a 63-point luminosity scale. This data has also
been used in the economic literature to capture economic development (Chen and Nordhaus, 2011;
Donaldson and Storeygard, 2016; Henderson et al., 2012). Figure 1.13 in Appendix 1.9 shows a
map of West Bengal with both (state-level) assembly boundaries and (national level) parliamentary
constituencies. I intersperse these administrative boundaries with the luminosity data.
These luminosity measures are also effectively used as a proxy for electrification, often corrob-
orated by actual consumption measures. Min and Gaba (2014); Min et al. (2013) use this data
to examine electrification in Vietnam, Senegal and Mali, and validate nighttime lights as a good
proxy, particularly for rural electrification. Several papers have use this data in the Indian con-
text specifically to measure electrification rates (Burlig and Preonas, 2017; Mann et al., 2016; Min
and Golden, 2014). Mann et al. (2016) apply machine learning techniques to predict daytime
electrification, and show nighttime luminosity to be a good indicator of electricity consumption.
Min and Golden (2014) and Baskaran et al. (2015) show evidence of electoral cycles in electricity
supply using the DMSP data, and Burlig and Preonas (2017) are able to assess the development
effects of electrification using this data as a proxy for village electrification. Given the evidence of
electricity consumption data manipulation, this data also provides an unbiased measure of electri-
fication.
For this paper, I utilize the average density of lights within each legislative assembly boundary,
and test for a discontinuity at the RD cutoff. In the absence of any political manipulation of the
utility’s consumption data one would expect them to have information similar to lights data.
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1.5 Empirical Evidence of Political Patronage
I present results from the RD analysis using measures of possible informal control in the electricity
sector by political agents. I use average night lights density to capture whether the majority party
provided more electricity to assemblies that voted for them. Exploring mechanisms, I test whether
the party in power provided differentially cheaper electricity access to its voters. Given the mea-
sures I define, this translates to under-reporting of actual consumption, understating arrears owed,
lower energy prices, and overstating subsidies in areas that voted for the MLAs from the majority
party. In addition to that, I expect to observe a higher degree of deviation of the consumption
distribution from the chi-squared distribution in these areas.
1.5.1 Average Nighttime Lights Density
In order to test for discontinuous electricity consumption, I run the following regression specifica-
tion at assembly-level a, where vote-margin is represented by the net difference in the fraction of
votes received by the winning party:
Log(Lights)a = β 1(votemargin > 0)a + f(votemargin)a + a (1.1)
I test for discontinuities in average light-density around the cutoff of being above a zero vote mar-
gin, allowing for the slope of the vote margin to vary at the cutoff. β measures the RD coefficient.
Given that RD analyses result in an estimate of the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), I can
make causal claims for the sub-sample of assemblies close to the winning margin cutoff. This
includes swing areas – assemblies where the party in power narrowly won or lost, in which, as the
theory suggests in Appendix 1.8.1, parties concentrate their efforts as the expected payoff is the
highest.
Figure 1.5 demonstrates that there is discontinuously higher light density for assemblies where the
chief minister’s party narrowly won. Given that there was balance across the cutoff on character-
istics such as age, gender and caste of the candidates, this discontinuity in electrification points
towards favorable treatment by the politicians in power.
In order to further investigate this pattern, I use nighttime light density data from 2004-2016,
spanning the state elections in 2006, 2011 and 2016. The 2006 elections serve as a control to check
whether there was a trend towards selective electricity consumption in the wake of the previous
election as well, which was won by another party, the CPI(M). I run the following regression,
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Figure 1.5: RD analysis of average nighttime lights density on either side of the RD cutoff
Notes: Comparing legislative assemblies where the party in government narrowly won to those where it
narrowly lost (2012-15), I find a discontinuously higher density of nighttime lights in winning areas. I use
the Calonico et al. (2015) method to create optimal bins for observations on either side of the cutoff and a
linear specification to fit the data.
where βt is the regression coefficient across years.
Log(Lights)at =
∑
t
βt(1(votemargin > 0)a × γt) + γt + f(votemargin)a + at (1.2)
In Equation (1.2), I study how being above the 2011 winning margin cutoff affects light-density
both before the elections (2004-2010) and after (2012-2016). We should expect that the pre-
election years show no detectable discontinuity, and this is a meaningful falsification test. We
should further expect that after 2011, there is an increase in this discontinuity, allowing us to
measure the dynamics of this relationship. This regression specification amounts to a difference-
in-discontinuities set up, which includes year fixed effects γt.
On graphing these coefficients in Figure 1.6, I observe that there was no discontinuity or differential
electrification in years before the 2011 elections. Furthermore, after the 2011 elections, there is a
clear trend break, and I observe an increase in differential electrification in assemblies where the
chief minister’s party just won, demonstrating clear evidence that there was favoritism shown in
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Figure 1.6: Satellite Night Lights: Difference-in-discontinuities Analysis from 2004 to 2016
Notes: Using the optimal bandwidth and binning procedure described in Calonico et al. (2015), I plot the
RD coefficients, and confidence intervals of errors clustered at the assembly level. The dependent variable is
Log(light density). I plot coefficients over time and find a trend break after the 2011 election, with selectively
greater electrification in areas where the governing party narrowly won. For a figure showing the levels of
the RD coefficients over time, please refer to Figure 1.14 in Appendix 1.9
electricity provisioning in such areas.
Neither night-lights density data nor utility administrative and consumption data alone can provide
a complete picture of electricity use. However, a combination of both, like in this paper, is useful
to get a clearer sense of the patterns in the data. Given the stark increases in the RD coefficient
soon after 2011, it is more likely that the effects I observe for my state of interest do refer to
electrification outcomes, as opposed to development schemes which typically take longer to have
such strong effects.
1.5.2 Data Manipulation in Electricity Billing Records
With the help of the micro-level consumer data, I identify the ways in which politicians influence
electricity access. I show evidence in Figure 1.7 using consumption data on all consumer classes,
including households, commercial users, public works and agriculture and irrigation. The only
consumer class omitted from this dataset is industry, specifically high-tension consumers of elec-
tricity. This usually includes large factories. Therefore, aside from factories, which usually do
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not operate at night, the nighttime lights data closely corresponds to the consumers captured in
the billing dataset. I show evidence of data manipulation in electricity consumption records, in a
manner that favors assemblies that voted in the government representatives. I run the following
regression specification at the assembly level, where the left hand side includes various measures
of data manipulation:
ya = β 1(votemargin > 0)a + f(votemargin)a + a (1.3)
Figure 1.7: Lower reported consumption in regions where the majority party won (2012-15)
Notes: Using the optimal bandwidth and binning procedure described in Calonico et al. (2015), I plot
reported consumption of electricity on either side of the cutoff. The running variable for the RD is the
winning margin percentage. The left hand side panel uses 11,592 data points, for which I use a 2% sample
of the billing data for all consumer categories. In the right panel, I plot the RDD coefficients between 2012
and 2016, and find results robust to other bandwidths – both lower and higher than the optimal bandwidth.
Standard errors are clustered at the feeder level.
The first variable I study is simply the reported level of consumption in swing-assemblies. Given
that there is no observable discontinuity in baseline characteristics around the cutoff, there is no a
priori reason for discontinuities to appear in reported consumption. In Figure 1.7, I find evidence
that politicians in power did indeed selectively under-bill consumers in assemblies where the chief
minister narrowly won. Using the utility reported consumption data, I observe a discontinuously
lower level of average electricity consumption in assemblies that narrowly swung in the ruling
government’s favor. However, in the previous section, I observe a discontinuously higher level
of night lights density. The logical conclusion, is that the utility consumption understates actual
consumption. The magnitudes if this understatement are large, amounting to average discounts
to constituents of over 50% of their regular bills. I calculate this magnitudes based on rough
calculation using the large estimated effects of being in a constituency of the ruling party and the
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Table 1.2: Discontinuity in Reported Consumption
Unit consumption in KWH
Residential (Rural)
RD Estimate -124.1*** -126.0*** -143.2*** -157.9*** -139.5***
(24.33) (20.58) (21.08) (22.57) (23.70)
Observations 7,780 10,457 10,352 10,329 10,213
Bwidth 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Residential (Urban)
RD Estimate -311.4*** -366.2*** -382.9*** -401.8*** -433.1***
(95.28) (82.32) (77.72) (75.35) (71.69)
Observations 9,630 11,417 11,350 11,260 11,075
Bwidth 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Commercial (Rural)
RD Estimate 124.8 51.21 81.79 -16.16 107.4
(99.62) (78.51) (70.12) (80.87) (88.63)
Observations 3,023 4,120 4,044 4,018 4,010
Bwidth 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Commercial (Urban)
RD Estimate -473.4* -579.9** -555.3** -542.6** -582.3**
(273.20) (250.70) (234.50) (265.40) (291.80)
Observations 10,611 12,505 12,227 12,269 12,035
Bwidth 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Notes: Using the optimal bandwidth and binning procedure described in Calonico et al.
(2015), I report the RD coefficients across years for reported electricity consumption for
each consumer class, controlling for the size of the electorate in each assembly. These
results are robust across multiple regression specifications. The results in this table use a
bandwidth of 6,000 in terms of the the running variable, winning margin. This table shows
evidence of discontinuously lower reported consumption for residential (urban and rural)
consumers, as well as commercial (urban) users. Standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the feeder level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
19
average electricity consumption at the cutoff in assemblies aligned with the opposition.
A potential concern with using satellite data is that it may primarily capture an increase in the
extensive margin of electricity consumption, which billing records would not capture. Indeed, the
Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) in India, launched in 2005, sanctioned the
electrification of unelectrified villages all over the country. However, this scheme also included
increasing electricity access in villages that already had grid access. Looking at four assemblies
below and above the RD cutoff, the number of villages receiving some electrification through this
sceme is very similar (5944 compared to 6024 in constituencies of the ruling party).7 Given that a
marginally greater number of villages in constituencies supporting the ruling party received some
electrification through the scheme, it is all the more striking that their reported billed consumption
is discontinuously lower. Another concern with satellite nighttime lights data is that it captures
mainly rural electrification. If I focus on only rural consumers in the billing data, I still find
evidence of political manipulation for residential consumers (Table 1.2).
In Figure 1.8, I find that the measure of distance from the expected chi-squared distribution is
statistically significantly higher in winning swing assemblies. The degree of data manipulation
grows over time, and then the discontinuity falls by 2016, on the eve of the next election. It is
unclear if this occurs because there is a higher degree of data manipulation in losing assemblies
as well, or that politicians direct their efforts elsewhere in the run-up to the next election. These
results are presented for the optimal bandwidth and for bandwidths both smaller and larger.
Next I examine the trends in the RD coefficient for potential manipulation of price variables –
namely arrears and subsidy payments in Figure 1.9. I observe statistically significantly higher level
of subsidies in winning swing assemblies, accompanied by a lower level of arrears. Taken together
with the evidence of lower reported consumption, this provides a consistent story. However, under-
reporting consumption may translate mechanically to lower bills, with smaller arrears and higher
subsidies as well. By under-billling residential users, the politicians have effectively subsidized
their electricity consumption and increased equilibrium electricity consumption.
1.5.3 Mechanisms of Political Patronage
There are a few possible channels through which politicians reward their voters with cheaper elec-
tricity. Electricity meter readings provide one of the few manipulable margins on which to affect
electricity price, as the price and total bill estimates are computerized and harder to change without
detection. Among several vulnerabilities, Gulati and Rao (2007) identify the billing stage as sus-
7Author calculations from statistics by the Ministry of Power, India
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Figure 1.8: RD Coefficients for Manipulation Outcomes Across Bandwidths
Notes: Using the Calonico et al. (2015) optimal bandwidths and bias-correct RD methodology, I plot coef-
ficients across years for measures of data manipulation, and confidence intervals of robust standard errors
clustered at the electrical-feeder level. Specifically I study the distance of the observed distribution from
the expected distribution as per Benford’s Law and the fraction of consumers whose consumption was a
multiple of ten. I find these result robust across bandwidths. ‘BW’ indicates the bandwidth size. The three
bandwidths I use in these graphs are slightly lower and higher than the optimal bandwidth. These regressions
control for the total size of the electorate within each assembly.
ceptible to political interference, with billing consumers at lower rates as a specific example in In-
dian utilities. An auditing study carried out by an electricity utility in Uttar Pradesh, another Indian
state, identified significant political involvement in electricity distribution at local levels (Goenka,
2013). The inspectors who conduct meter readings are often external contractors. They report to a
local CCC, which enters their reported consumption figures into the digital database. Given that I
observe evidence of under-reporting of consumption, this appears a likely channel through which
under-reporting occurs. Rains and Abraham (2018) highlight the role of these inspectors in bill
collection and how redesigning incentives for them could lead to massive gains in utility revenue.
My findings are consistent with a selective lack of enforcement of inspector readings, in order to
allow local billing centers under the purview of MLAs from making low consumption imputations.
These billing centers are dispersed all over the state, and it is in in narrowly winning assemblies
that we observe statistically significantly lower levels of reported consumption.
Another possibility is that politicians selectively discourage utility action against energy theft,
tacitly allowing it. Even though I am unable to test this directly, there is a large amount of anecdotal
evidence supporting this channel (The Telegraph, 2014; The Times of India, 2017; The Washington
Post, 2012).8
8“ “Many people known to support the ruling party are allegedly involved in hooking and tapping”, a source said....
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Figure 1.9: Regression Discontinuity coefficients for outcomes across three bandwidths
Notes: Using the Calonico et al. (2015) optimal bandwidths and bias-correct RD methodology, I plot coef-
ficients across years for measures of data manipulation, and confidence intervals of robust standard errors
clustered at the electrical-feeder level. Specifically I study the bill items “total arrears” and “total subsidies”.
I find these result robust across bandwidths. ‘BW’ indicates the bandwidth size. The three bandwidths I use
in these graphs are slightly lower and higher than the optimal bandwidth. These regressions control for the
total size of the electorate within each assembly.
As a centrally mandated independent regulatory authority, it is hard to directly influence regulators
to reduce electricity prices. They set tariffs after approving requests by the utility to do so, in re-
sponse to the changing price of fuels that generate electricity, as well as changes to the composition
of the generation stations supplying them. Chatterjee (2017) discusses evidence from interviews
with regulators of pressure by politicians in government to delay these tariff revisions, but there is
little evidence that politicians were able to affect the setting of tariffs themselves.
An alternative explanation for the observed discontinuities is that the reported consumption in
swing assemblies where the majority party narrowly lost was over-stated. I cannot eliminate this
possibility, given that the RD analysis provides me with relative changes. Yet, it is unlikely that
politicians would expend effort in this way rather than favoring their own constituents. Over-stating
bills is easier to detect and may lead to widespread discontent and protests, and hurt the chances of
the ruling party from winning further elections in swing regions. Furthermore, the local MLA is
the most likely candidate to pressure local customer care centers, and in losing regions, the MLAs
are not aligned with the majority party.
Another possibility is that rather than manipulating data, electricity distributors actually provide
greater access to electricity for consumers in losing assemblies, in a bid by the ruling party to
The chief minister had accused WBSEDCL of “callousness” and questioned the efficacy of such [anti-theft] drives.”
The Telegraph, July 31st 2014: Power Theft Test for Mamata - State Utility to Seek CM’s nod to Relaunch Crackdown.
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win over voters in losing assemblies. However, this is at odds with the evidence from the night
lights data, which shows a discontinuously lower level of actual electrification in assemblies where
the governing party just lost (Figure 1.6 & Figure 1.7 ). Together, the evidence points towards
ex-post changes made in the reported consumption data, given that reported consumption is dis-
continuously lower in areas where the governing party narrowly won. Lastly, favoring voters in
losing assemblies is unlikely to win new votes if the beneficiaries credit the Members of Legisla-
tive Assembly (MLAs) from the losing party, who is in office in those areas with providing better
electricity access.
1.5.4 Falsification Tests and Robustness Checks
In order to test for the robustness of the results, I employ two main techniques. The first is to
use multiple bandwidths in the RD analysis to check whether the results are consistent across
bandwidths. I present these figures in Section 1.5.2 for the RD results on reported consumption,
distance from the chi-squared distribution and bill items which are consistent across different band-
widths.
Figure 1.10: Placebo test: studying discontinuities in reported consumption using the winning and
losing constituencies from the 2006 election
Notes: Using the optimal bandwidth and binning procedure described in Calonico et al. (2015), I plot RD
coefficients for the reported consumption. The winning margin here is defined on the basis of legislative
assemblies from the 2006 election, where the CPI(M) party won. This provides a falsification test for the
validity of the results using the 2011 election results. The results shown include multiple bandwidths (BW).
23
Then I conduct falsification tests where I use the winning margin and the set of winning and
losing assemblies from a previous election (the 2006 election where the CPI(M) party formed the
government). If the most likely narrative is that the current political party in power (that ascended
after the 2011 elections) induces discontinuities in the consumption and billing data, then I should
not observe such discontinuities for assemblies near the 2006 election cutoff in the years after
2011.
In Figure 1.10, I show the RD results analogous to those in Section 1.5.2. Using the 2006 election
winning margin, I do not observe any robust evidence of a discontinuity. Indeed, the figure shows
a slight discontinuity in 2012 only perhaps due to some persistence in corruption and manipulation
that was occurring between 2006-11 under the previous government. After 2012, however, there is
no detectable discontinuity.
Figure 1.11: Placebo test: studying discontinuities in bill items (arrears and subsidies) using the
winning and losing constituencies from the 2006 election
Notes: Using the optimal bandwidth and binning procedure described in Calonico et al. (2015), I plot RD
coefficients for billing items including arrears and subsidies. The winning margin here is defined on the basis
of legislative assemblies from the 2006 election, where the CPI(M) party won. This provides a placebo test
for the validity of the results using the 2011 election results. The results shown include multiple bandwidths.
In Figure 1.11, I observe a similar pattern of no discontinuities. Again, there is weak evidence
of a discontinuity in 2012, immediately post the 2011 elections, suggesting possible persistence
in manipulation from the previous winning governing party. This suggestively points towards
evidence that similar political influence in bill items occurred for assemblies where the previous
governing party won, and this effect peters out, as the actions of the current government take over.
These results provide a validity check for the main results of this paper, and also point to possible
evidence that all politicians in government engage in actions to favor their constituents in terms of
electricity access and price.
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1.6 Welfare Consequences of Political Patronage
In order to design policies that can address the widespread corruption in the electricity sector, it is
important to understand the magnitude of the problem, as well as the welfare costs that it imposes
on society. This paper has until now, shown causal evidence that politicians selectively manipulate
billing data to informally subsidize areas aligned with the ruling party. In this section, I quantify
the costs and benefits from these actions.
Figure 1.12: Market Distortions Due to Political Corruption
Notes: I simplify the indirect subsidies by politicians through under-reporting in billed data, by assuming
an average level of electricity subsidy for all electricity consumers in regions aligned with the ruling party.
Pefficient refers to the market clearing price of electricity, but this is not used in almost any electricity
markets. The most common pricing scheme is to cross-subsize residential, small commercial establishments
and agricultural consumers by charging high rates for large industrial users, so usually consumers face
prices lower than Pefficient. I assume that rather than an upward-sloping block-price schedule, consumers
face a flat rate of Ptariff . Politicians, through corruption, effectively lower this price even further for their
constituents, to Ptariff . I assume that the marginal cost (MC) curve facing producers is an upwards sloping
line, accounting for sourcing electricity from increasingly expensive thermal power plants or gas plants, as
the quantity supply increases. The shaded areas show the loss in producer surplus, gain in consumer surplus,
and overall deadweight loss. What is clear from the figure is that in order to calculate consumer surplus, I
need estimates of the price elasticity of demand.
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I rely on a simple demand and supply framework to provide an intuitive account of the welfare
implications of political patronage. I characterize the under-reporting in billing data as providing
an informal subsidy to constituents of the ruling party. This under-reporting of bills can be approx-
imated as an average price subsidy provided to all consumers in constituencies aligned with the
ruling party. In Figure 1.12, I describe this setup with a downward sloping consumer-demand curve
and an upward sloping provider-supply curve, based on the assumption that as supply increases the
electricity provider must purchase electricity from progressively more expensive sources. Under
an efficient market, the price charged for electricity would be Pefficient. However, in reality, most
electricity providers cross-subsidize residential and smaller commercial users by charging higher
prices for industrial users. It follows that the price paid per unit of electricity by consumers in my
data is lower than Pefficient, and I refer to this price as Ptariff . The price schedule facing residential
users in rural and urban areas, and commercial users in rural and urban areas are different. Figure
1.17 in Appendix 1.9 shows the price schedule for these four consumer groups between 2012 and
2016. I focus on these groups for the welfare analysis as they are the majority of consumers, but
the complete dataset also consists of agricultural users, irrigation, and publicly owned buildings.
It follows that Pefficient, and Ptariff vary across the four consumer groups I focus on. As a con-
sequence of political patronage, consumers in constituencies of the ruling party effectively face a
price of Pexpected.
Figure 1.12 shows the loss in producer surplus, gain in consumer surplus and deadweight loss to
society as a result of the informal subsidies provided by politicians to their constituents. These
effects are estimated based on the additional market distortions caused by moving from Ptariff to
Pexpected. In order to estimate the change in producer surplus, which refers to the entire shaded
area in the graph, we need a measure of the loss in revenue to producers. I use the regression
discontinuity estimates of the shortfall in consumption reporting at the cutoff, for each consumer
group (Table 1.2) to estimate the potential “unreported” consumption as (i.e. the difference be-
tween observed consumption of constituencies on either side of the RD cutoff). Using reported
estimates of the marginal cost of providing electricity, I compute the lost producer surplus due to
underreporting.
I then estimate the size of the gain in consumer surplus. The difference between the changes in
producer and consumer surplus provides the size of the deadweight loss to society. However, as is
evident from Figure 1.12, the change in consumer surplus depends on the price elasticity of demand
for electricity. Therefore, I first estimate price elasticities of demand across consumer categories. I
allow for the fact that the four consumer categories I focus on, residential rural, residential urban,
commercial rural, and commercial urban each have different elasticities, but that these elasticities
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do not change over the five-year period.9
However, estimating the price elasticities of demand from the consumption data is not straightfor-
ward due to evidence of data manipulation. I therefore develop a method of deriving elasticities that
accounts for anomalies. As the first step, I select assemblies where I statistically reject that the data
is manipulated. I then compute elasticities for each consumer category for this sub-sample using
an instrumental variable approach that leverages exogenous variation in policy-led tariff changes
over time. Figure 1.17 in Appendix 1.9 demonstrates the changes in prices over time, across tiers
and for the four consumer categories I focus on. These are plausibly exogenous to short-term fluc-
tuations in a consumer’s demand as prices are set by independent regulators, and an individual’s
electricity demand in isolation, cannot directly affect the changes in prices. I use an instrumental
variables approach that leverages variation in price tariff changes to estimate the consumption re-
sponse to changes in marginal price. I calculate elasticities for each consumer group at assembly
level, and each assembly is assigned a unique value of elasticity for each consumer group.
After computing elasticities for assemblies where bills were not manipulated, the second step in-
volves imputing elasticities for assemblies with data manipulation. I build a predictive model of
assembly-level elasticities (in the sub-sample of assemblies with unmanipulated data) on village-
level characteristics from the census.10 This model can be used to predict elasticities for constituen-
cies where political interference is detected. In order to estimate a model with higher predictive
power, I use a post-double selection OLS (Ahrens et al., 2018). This process uses machine learning
tools to select the best set of independent variables from the list of village characteristics that max-
imizes the predictive power of the model. This improves upon an OLS model which may suffer
from omitted-variable biases and overfitting.
The third step involves predicting the elasticities for the remaining constituencies where there is
evidence of data manipulation. I use the model selected in the second step, with a selected set
of village characteristics from the census to project the elasticities for the remaining assemblies.
The end result is a unique estimate for elasticity for four consumer groups in each assembly in the
dataset.
Finally, the fourth step uses the full set of estimated and predicted elasticities to calculate the con-
sumer surplus for each consumer class, as a result of the informal subsidy provided by politicians.
In order to demonstrate why these steps are necessary, I also derive welfare estimates without ac-
counting for the presence of data manipulation, and show that my estimates are more robust than
9It is important to note that these elasticities refer to the price elasticity of demand for grid-purchased electricity.
This is particularly relevant for commercial users who often own generators and substitute away to non-grid sources
of electricity when prices change (The World Bank, 2014).
10The Indian census was conducted in 2011 and consists of individual-level demographic information such as pop-
ulation, literacy status, occupation, age and sex.
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in prior work. This analysis is described in Appendix 1.8.2.
1.6.1 Step 1: Elasticities for Constituencies with no Data Anomalies
First, I restrict the data to only those assemblies where the distance from the expected chi-squared
distribution is not significantly different from 0, at 1% confidence. This is the same measure I use
to show evidence of data manipulation in 1.5.2. The micro-level billing data allows me to observe
the distribution of consumption for each assembly and I separate these assemblies into those where
there is evidence of data manipulation, and those where there is no detectable evidence. This results
in a dataset with 35 assemblies, for which I reject the hypothesis of data manipulation. For each
assembly, I estimate the price elasticity of demand for each of the four consumer categories. The
following specification, at the individual i and consumer category a level, is the simplest method
of estimating elasticity but produces biased elasticities.
log (Consumption)ia = δa log (MarginalPrice)ia + ia (1.4)
Given the increasing block price tariff in electricity markets, a higher level of consumption me-
chanically results in a higher marginal price for higher levels of consumption, resulting in the
estimate of δa suffering from a simultaneity bias.
In order to address the endogeneity problem arising from an OLS specification, I use an instru-
mental variable strategy, exploiting exogenous variation in the price schedules of electricity across
time and for different consumer categories. With micro-level consumption data, I can identify the
price-tier corresponding to the marginal level of electricity consumption of each particular con-
sumer, as well as their consumer category (rural/urban, domestic/ commercial). The period for
which I have consumption data (2011-2016) spans major tariff revisions, varying across tiers and
consumer categories, and this provides me with policy-led, exogenous variation in price (Figure
1.17 in Appendix 1.9).
For an individual i, in tier t, month m, year y, assembly constituency c, and consumer category
a, I use an instrumental variable approach to estimate elasticity. My specification is similar to Ito
(2014), but leverages heterogeneity across individuals, and differential changes across price tiers,
instead of creating a simulated IV.11 I instrument the observed level of marginal price faced by a
consumer with the policy-led change in marginal prices, in the spirit of (Arellano and Bond, 1991).
I have five major different price regime periods, approximately one for every year of the data. Con-
11The simulated IV method would be more appropriate with a longer time period in my panel dataset.
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ditional on individual fixed effects, tier-by-month fixed effects, and consumer-category-by-month
fixed effects, I instrument the marginal price log (MP ) with the change in tariffs ∆ log (Tariff)
across years. The first and second stage are respectively:
log (MP )iamtcy =
∑
a
γac∆ log (Tariff)amtcy + νmta + ζmac + ηi + εiamtcy ∀ a ∈ A (1.5)
log (Cons)iamtcy =
∑
a
βac ̂log (MP )iamtcy + τmta + µmac + ωi + iamtcy ∀ a ∈ A (1.6)
I estimate βac separately for all constituencies a that lie in the setA of assemblies for which I reject
the hypothesis of data manipulation. The four consumer categories c are RR (Residential Rural),
RU (Residential Urban), CR (Commercial Rural) and CU (Commercial Urban). The regressions
include individual fixed effects ωi, month-by-tier fixed effects τmta, and consumer-category-by-
month fixed effects µmac. The advantage of having individual fixed effects is that it accounts for
baseline consumption. The different month fixed effects allow for seasonality in consumption to
vary by tier and consumer category. Standard errors are clustered at the consumer level.
Table 1.3 presents results by running the specification in Equations (1.5) and (1.6) for all assem-
blies with unmanipulated data. This table serves only to provide consolidated elasticities for the
assemblies, but I use assembly level regressions in order to arrive at elasticity estimates for the
prediction exercise. Overall, therefore, in assemblies that do not show evidence of data manipu-
lation, residential consumers have less elastic demand, whereas commercial consumers (that may
substitute to alternative sources) have more elastic demand. The differences in elasticites between
residential and commercial consumers, for both rural and urban consumers, are statistically differ-
ent from zero. The first stage F-stat is high, demonstrating instrument validity.
1.6.2 Step 2: Predictive Model Selection Using Machine Learning
I use the estimates of assembly-level elasticities in the set A of non-manipulated assemblies, and
build a model of elasticity heterogeneity. The dependent variable in this model is assembly-level
elasticity and the right-hand-side variables include demographic characteristics of assemblies from
the 2011 Indian Census. These variables include the total population by gender, population of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (lower social classes and marginalized groups that are a
proxy for income levels) by gender, the female literacy rate, and the population of cultivators (a
proxy for occupation structures) in each village.
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Table 1.3: Demand Elasticity Estimates for Select Re-
gions
Ln (Cons kWh)
Ln(MP )RR × Residential Rural -0.240
(0.293)
Ln(MP )RU × Residential Urban -0.666**
(0.310)
Ln(MP )CR × Commercial Rural -3.158***
(0.585)
Ln(MP )CU × Commercial Urban -3.490***
(0.588)
Observations 83,787
Customers 21,581
R-squared 0.424
P-val test Rural 0.000
P-val test Urban 0.000
F-stat 579.8
Notes: Ln(MP) is the log of marginal price. ”Residential Rural”
is an indicator for being in the residential-rural sector. Instru-
ments are the change in Log(Marginal Price) for each of the four
categories (Residential-Commercial by Rural-Urban). Standard
errors clustered at the customer level. Controls include linear
year trend, customer fixed effects, customer-category-by-month
fixed effects, and tier-by-month fixed effects. P-val test Rural is
the p-value of the test of equivalence of coefficients for the Resi-
dential Rural and Commercial Rural elasticities. P-val test Urban
is the p-value of the test of coefficients for the Residential Urban
and Commercial Urban elasticities.
Each assembly has multiple Customer Care Centers (CCCs) set up by the utility and each individ-
ual is mapped to the CCC closest to them. As a first step, I map every single village in West Bengal,
and assign it to the geographically closest CCC. Following this, I calculate CCC-level means of
demographic variables by averaging the village-level aggregates assigned to each CCC. Therefore,
each assembly in the dataset consists of 2-3 CCC-level observations with heterogenous means for
various characteristics.
I use the post-double-selection (PDS) method (Belloni et al., 2016) for variable selection. In the
presence of several village-level characteristics, an issue with simply using OLS is that the predic-
tive power of the model is compromised if there is omitted variable bias or if the model is overfit.
For better out-of-sample predictions, an alternative model selection method is needed. I use the
PDS-OLS method discussed in Ahrens et al. (2018); Belloni et al. (2016), which applies the lasso
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(Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) twice in order to select the set of variables
that will maximize out-of-sample predictions. The lasso is based on a penalized regression form,
where shrinkage factors are applied to coefficients of independent variables based on relevance. It
is particularly useful in conditions of sparse data, but with many possible independent variables.
Applying the lasso the first time eliminates covariates with the least predictive power, and running
it a second time further strengthens model selection. Finally, this is followed by OLS using the
limited set of variables selected by the PDS process, as OLS provides the least unbiased coefficient
estimates.
In sum: the census provides several village-level demographic characteristics, the double-selection
process whittles down the number of variables needed for predictive power, and the OLS regression
is then run (separately for each consumer category) to predict elasticities for all assemblies. Table
1.8 in Appendix 1.9 shows the final model used in the prediction step.
1.6.3 Step 3: Predicting Elasticities for all Constituencies
Following the PDS OLS method, I predict elasticities for constituencies that showed evidence of
data manipulation. Table 1.4 shows the mean values of the resulting elasticities. These differ from
Table 1.3 because they represent the mean elaticity for each consumer category taking into account
all assemblies, those with unmanipulated as well as manipulated data.
Table 1.4: Average Demand Elasticities for Entire Consumer
Base
Consumer Category Elasticity of Electricity Demand
Residential (Rural) -0.56
Residential (Urban) -0.26
Commercial (Rural) -2.94
Commercial (Urban) -2.56
Notes: The price elasticities in this table are calculated using an in-
strumental variables strategy, prediction model selection procedure,
and linear prediction model. The demand elasticities for each con-
sumer class from Table 1.3 are regressed on CCC level characteris-
tics, as described in this section. The coefficients from this regression
are then used to predict the elasticities for all the regions where the
data is manipulated. These are then combined to produce an average
elasticity for each consumer category.
The elasticity estimates in Table 1.4 improve upon the previous literature as I have consumer-level
data. In most previous studies, estimates have been calculated from aggregate yearly consumption
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for an entire state, using averaged tariffs. With consumer level data I am able to observe the
marginal price paid by the consumer, and the price tier that they consume over in each month. Not
having to aggregate across tiers allows me to use differences in the change in marginal price by tier.
Aggregating prices and consumption across tiers may introduce measurement error, attenuating
results. Furthermore, tariffs change within the same year, and annual data would need to aggregate
tariff changes to the yearly level introducing further noise. This additional heterogeneity in tier
and intra-year changes allows me to estimate more accurate elasticities.
Importantly, data that is manipulated will also suffer from measurement error when aggregated. My
method allows me to estimate elasticities in regions where there was no evidence of manipulation,
providing more robust elasticities. As a counterfactual exercise, I estimate the elasticities of the
manipulated sample in Appendix Section 1.9 Table 1.6. The results in column 1 of Table 1.6
confirm that the estimates run on the manipulated sample may suffer from attenuation bias due to
classical measurement error. Lastly, the inclusion of individual fixed effects controls for baseline
consumption at the individual level.
Price elasticity estimates, using aggregated and annual data, for residential consumers from pre-
vious work in India have yielded a range from -0.25 to -0.65, while those for commercial users
have range from -0.26 to -0.49 (Bose and Shukla, 1999; Filippini and Pachauri, 2004; Saha and
Bhattacharya, 2018). The average of the elasticity estimates for residential (rural and urban) con-
sumers from my calculations yields -0.41, which is within this range, while my estimate for average
elasticity for commercial (rural and urban) is -2.75, higher than previous estimates (Table 1.4). By
estimating elasticities in only those regions where there was no evidence of manipulation, provides
more precision and removes the biases is elasticity estimates.
One primary reason why observing bill level data for Indian electricity consumers is important is
that tariff changes are applied at non-standard times across years. For instance, tariff changes were
applied to bills in May 2013, February 2015 and November 2016, even as the tariff order by the
regulator is usually released in December the previous year. However, the aggregate electricity
consumption published by the utility is calculated for every calendar year, and annual data then by
construction is less informative about when changes occur.
One of the contributions of this work is to reflect the high elasticity of demand for commercial
users in India. This is consistent with the fact that most commercial establishments in India have
a kerosene or diesel generator, and therefore can substitute away from electricity if prices rise.
Indeed, 46.5% of firms in India own a generator (The World Bank, 2014). The elasticity discussed
in this paper is then the price elasticity of grid-purchased electricity. Consequently, this is reflected
in their highly elastic demand response to price changes.
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1.6.3.1 Targeting Inelastic Consumers
My model (Appendix Section 1.8.1) predicts that politicians target consumer groups who have
inelastic demand, and also regions that have infrastructure conducive to electricity usage. These
results are intuitive. Consumers with inelastic demand are usually those who will benefit most
from reduction in billed electricity quantity. Therefore, if politicians intended their subsidies to
have large impacts, it follows that they would target those with inelastic demand. The model result
that politicians would target areas with greater access to infrastructure follows from the fact that
urban areas have more infrastructure, and are wealthier. Arguably living in such areas, in contrast
with rural areas that lack access, would also be correlated with greater political influence. This is
consistent with studies showing how politicians use electricity prices to target influential groups to
curry favor.12
When studying the effects of manipulation by consumer category in Table 1.2, I find no statistically
significant discontinuity in reported consumption for commercial users in rural areas. Commercial
rural areas have the most elastic demand, and also lack the infrastructure (a proxy for influence) to
use a constant supply of electricity. It follows that they do constitute the most attractive group for
politicians to expend effort targeting subsidies towards. I observe a large discontinuity in reported
consumption for residential (both urban and rural) consumers and commercial users in urban areas.
Given that the elasticity for residential users is quite low, on average, -0.41 (Table 1.4), it is not
surprising that politicians target them as they would be more affected by tariff increases.
The fact that there is a discontinuity for commercial (urban) consumers in Table 1.2 is consistent
with the model prediction that politicians also target consumers in regions with more infrastructure
and higher wealth levels. Commercial users in urban areas have the highest baseline consumption,
(a mean of 420 KWh/quarter as compared to 184 KWh/quarter for commercial users in rural areas).
The true estimate of electricity consumed for commercial urban accounts is likely higher, given
the evidence of under-reporting of bills for that group. Given their location and implied influence
based on being the the highest consumers, it follows that politicians justify under-reporting their
consumption or avoiding clamping down on energy theft for commercial urban users more so than
commercial rural consumers.
12(Badiani et al., 2012) show evidence of politicians wooing rich and influential farmers by guaranteeing free or
cheap electricity.
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1.6.4 Step 4: The Costs and Benefits of Political Patronage
In the absence of any political involvement in electricity provision, we would expect the electricity
markets to perform relatively efficiently. Yet, the evidence presented in this paper demonstrates
a combination of under-reporting of consumption and unchecked energy theft in areas where the
ruling party narrowly won. A government subsidy in a previously efficient market results in a
deadweight loss. However, the more inelastic the demand, the smaller this deadweight loss. If, as
I show, the government targets consumer bases with relatively inelastic demand, the deadweight
loss is minimized.
A direct advantage of having manipulated data is that I can measure the amount of under-reporting
at the cutoff, and thereby calculate the loss to the utility in regions around the cutoff. In simple
calculations for the loss in utility revenue caused by these political actions, I take a conservative
estimate of the under-reporting in bills. I only consider a narrow bandwidth of assemblies where
the majority party narrowly won (the first five closest to the cutoff) to calculate effects of political
action. Using Table 1.2, I calculate an average level of under-reporting of bills per year for each
consumer category. Applying this average level of under-reporting (details in Table 1.9), I calculate
the aggregate level of under-reporting for all consumers in the selected assemblies. Using this
information, I back out the total loss in revenue for the utility, using the 2015 level of marginal cost
of producing a single KWh of electricity in the state. This combination of consumption under-
reporting and allowing of energy theft produces a yearly loss to the electricity provider of $57
million.
To measure the benefits of such actions for consumers, I use the discontinuity in the lights data
to estimate the increase in consumption in response to the under-reporting (interpreted as an in-
formal subsidy). Figure 1.7 shows that on the one hand, there is a discontinuously lower reported
electricity consumption in areas where the majority party narrowly won, while on the other, using
nighttime lights as a proxy for electricity yields the opposite result in Figure 1.5. If the under-
reporting of consumption is indeed seen as an informal subsidy, the result with nighttime lights
may be interpreted as the consumption response to this subsidy.
I first need to find the elasticity between night-time lights and actual consumption. I do so by,
once again, restricting myself only to regions that did not show evidence of manipulation. To
estimate this elasticity I regress logLight Density on logConsumption at the assembly-by-year
level, with year fixed effects. This regression includes all consumer categories, as it is not possible
to separate the light density for each consumer class. Figure 1.18 in Appendix 1.9 shows this
relationship in graphical form. An advantage of having such geo-coded micro-data allows me to
estimate these elasticities, which may, in other contexts, be used to project electricity consumption
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Table 1.5: Utility Loss Calculations
Consumer Class Producer loss (Mil-
lion Rs./year)
Gain in surplus (Mil-
lion Rs./year)
Residential (Rural) Rs. 295.84 Rs. 101.27
Residential (Urban) Rs. 323.77 Rs. 177.80
Commercial (Urban) Rs. 111.41 Rs. 11.76
Total (Million Rs./year) Rs. 731.01 Rs. 290.83
Total (Million Rs./year) Rs. 3660.05 Rs. 2401.95
Total (Million $ for 5 years) $ 57.11 $ 22.72
Notes: To calculate producer losses, I use the estimates of lower reported consumption in areas sup-
porting the governing party from Appendix Section 1.9 Table 1.7. An average of these estimates for
each consumer category provides an estimate of the shortfall for producers in terms of how much elec-
tricity they supply and how much they get paid for. Multiplying these shortfall estimates with the total
consumer base in these regions and the difference between price paid and marginal cost of producing
electricity, gives me the final numbers for producer losses. I take the marginal cost of providing a
KWh of electricity for the utility as Rs. 3.97 based on 2015 spot market data. The consumer base is
restricted to twelve assemblies within the RD bandwidth of 12,000 votes from Appendix Section 1.9
Table 1.7. Commercial (Rural) consumers are excluded as there was no detectable change in reporting
or consumption for this sub-group. For consumer surplus, I find the product of the consumer surplus
per consumer and the total consumer base in the relevant regions. Each consumer’s change in surplus
is the found by multiplying the base level of their quarterly bill payment with the percentage increase
in consumer surplus and average household size. Finally, the percentage change in consumer surplus
is derived from the change in ∆ log(prices) ∗ (1 − 1/)/(1/).  refers to the elasticity estimates
I calculate in Table 1.4. ∆ log(prices) is ∆ log(consumption) in Appendix Section 1.9 Table 1.7
divided by elasticity .
in other parts of the world.
Based on the elasticity between night-lights and actual consumption, and the increase in night-
lights at the cutoff, I obtain a value for ∆ log (Consumption) at the cutoff, and my results indicate
that there was a 1.7% average increase in consumption at the cutoff.
Using the estimated increase in consumption, the elasticity estimates by consumer category allow
me to estimate the change in consumer surplus per person using Equation (1.21). I aggregate this
figure based on the consumer base of the selected assemblies in Table 1.9. The aggregate increase
in consumer surplus due to such informal subsidies is $22.72 million over the election term of the
ruling party.
The welfare losses from these political actions are more than twice the gains in consumer surplus.
As this estimate comes from a sub-set of constituencies within a bandwidth (in terms of winning
margin) of 12,000 votes, the true losses could be much higher. However, both measures are more
nuanced than these figures may indicate. Receiving greater electricity access is associated with
numerous benefits in terms of labor force participation (Dinkelman, 2011), economic development
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(Lipscomb et al., 2013; Rud, 2012) and health (Barron and Torero, 2017), among several others.
If consumers do not price these gains into their demand for electricity, then I would be under-
estimating the increase in consumer surplus.
In a similar fashion, producer losses have several other consequences, not measured in my esti-
mates. These include limited investment in maintaining and adding new infrastructure, leading to
increasing blackouts and other electricity quality problems which are not quantified here. Black-
outs and poor quality electricity-supply hinder manufacturing activity and other investments. As
described before, if states are not directly held responsible for electricity provider losses, and they
are bailed out by centrally funded schemes, there is not necessarily a direct negative consequence
within the state. Yet, the bailout will affect taxes paid from other parts of the country, and therefore
have distributional consequences.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper highlights an important fact: that regulation advocating a separation between politics
and service provision may not achieve the desired consequences in the face of poor auditing or
enforcement. The Electricity Act of 2003 mandated that state electricity utilities would be overseen
by independent regulatory authorities who would set prices for electricity provision and supervise
the running of the utilities. However, the incentive for politicians to favor their voters remains
strong in spite of this. There is a history of patronage politics that runs through the Indian system
(Baskaran et al., 2015)), and cheaper electricity access is often on election platforms, particularly
at the state and lower levels of governance. In the absence of detailed auditing and scrutiny of
consumption records, there may be channels through which politicians could still provide their
voters with cheaper electricity access.
A major advantage of having confidential billing data for 76 million customers is that I am able
to shed light on the consumption distributions for different categories of consumers, as well as for
regions with different political affiliations. Having information on this distribution allows me to
demonstrate evidence of data manipulation and to characterize these observations. While aggre-
gate data may be able to provide general trends, it cannot help identify data manipulation and its
implications.
I find evidence that politicians do favor their voters both in terms of providing electricity access,
and in subsidizing them. Using average nighttime light density data, I show that there is higher
electricity consumption in areas aligned with the party in power. Politicians provide their voters
with cheaper electricity access by indirectly subsidizing them through under-reporting their actual
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consumption. As a result, they are billed for consumption that is lower than what they actually
consume. Using a close-election RD analysis, I find a statistically significantly higher level of
subsidies, and lower level of arrears owed. Consistent with the hypothesis that political agents
may influence intermediaries to manipulate the data, I find that in swing assemblies where the
governing party narrowly won, there are greater anomalies in the consumption distribution. The
fraction of consumers whose consumption is reported to be a multiple of ten is also higher in
these assemblies. This explains the large number of modes in the consumption data at multiples of
ten.
These patterns are consistent with a model of patronage politics where the party in government
rewards its voters and consolidates its power in a very competitive setting. Using the micro-level
data, I estimate price elasticities of demand for various consumer classes, developing a method
to do so when faced with manipulated consumption data. I find that, consistent with previous
work, residential consumers are highly inelastic. In the case of commercial consumers, I am
able to provide a more accurate estimate than previous studies, and find that these groups have
a high price elasticity of electricity demand. This reflects the fact that large numbers of them
own generators and are able to substitute away from the grid. Consistent with the model, I find
that politicians target consumer bases that have less elastic demand and more electricity-using
infrastructure.
Using the estimates for under-reporting of consumption, I calculate the total loss to the electricity
provider (for the group of assemblies near the RD cutoff) as $57 million per year. With the help
of elasticities by sub-group, I find that the gain in consumer surplus is only $22 million per year.
The deadweight loss alone would be enough to power 3.7 million new consumers in rural areas.
The welfare consequences of these interventions, however, are more complex. Targeted voters in
winning constituencies may benefit from cheaper electricity, as demonstrated by the increase in
consumer surplus. Yet, the loss to the provider may be distributed widely to the tax base, and
indirectly hurt other voters elsewhere. As taxpayers are richer, there may be a redistribution to
poorer sections of society. However, if the funds used to bail out the utilities cut into the govern-
ment’s developmental budgets, then these bailouts may just be detrimental to poorer sections of
society.
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1.8 Model, Counterfactual Exercises, and Additional Tables and
Figures
1.8.1 Model of Consumer Utility and Political Patronage
I present a simple model to solidify my hypotheses, derive the necessary estimation equations, and
motivate the later welfare analysis. I create a political patronage model based on a combination of
features present in Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Stromberg (2004), and then include consumer
decisions to highlight the importance of price elasticities in such a setup. The model contains
decisions made by consumers or voters, and their political parties. It produces testable implications
and generates estimation equations that I investigate empirically, with implications for consumer
welfare.
1.8.1.1 Consumer and Voter Decisions
A household living in assembly a under the rule of party i has a utility that depends on the con-
sumption of electricity zia and a combination of other goods c. Political parties understand that
households derive utility in the following quasi-linear manner:
Uia = v(zia) + c ≡ exp
βxia
1−  z
1−
ia + c (1.7)
Here the consumer chooses zia amount of electricity given prices. expβxia is a taste-shifter, where
xia is a vector of consumer-base characteristics, like amenities, infrastructure and regional income
distributions.  > 0 will affect the price elasticity of demand, and thereby also the voters’ respon-
siveness to subsidies. Importantly, it is a sufficient statistic for changes to consumer welfare in
response to informal price subsidies.
The “effective” electricity price faced by households pia also varies under party rule and assem-
bly. The bundle of other goods is assumed to be the numeraire, and in equilibrium a household
always consumes a non-negative amount of the other good (i.e. basic food, shelter, etc.). From the
household’s first order conditions, under these assumption, it is straightforward to show that the
equilibrium demand curve is:
log zia =
β

xia − 1

log pia (1.8)
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In Equation (1.8), 1

determines the price elasticity of demand, but thereby also the responsiveness
of any subsidies. Furthermore, an increase in electricity-using infrastructure and wealth distribu-
tions (captured by xia) will increase the demand for electricity. For instance, urban areas have more
infrastructure conducive to using electricity, and therefore demand a higher amount of electricity
for a given price.
1.8.1.2 Decisions by Political Parties
Over and above the economic benefits, voters do care about which party is in power. While eco-
nomic preferences are common, voters differ on ideological grounds. Voter j has a ηija (positive or
negative) preference for the party that is the opposition at the state-level. Additionally, they credit
the party in power at their assembly level for their increase in utility from electricity. They attach
a weight expγDia to the electricity component of their utility, where γ > 1 and Dia = 1 if the party
in the majority party is in power at the assembly level. They reward the incumbent party in power
with a vote if:
vote =
1 if expγDiav(z∗ia) > ηija0 otherwise (1.9)
A party can allocate more electricity and more subsidies (directly affecting pia) by influencing the
utility at the assembly level. This influence comes at a cost eia, both in effort and resources, and
the cost function is given by:
eia = p
−α
ia , (1.10)
where α ≤ 1. Given the demand function, we can solve for the electricity component of utility as
a function of the effective price (including the subsidy):
via =
(
expβxia
)1+ 1

1−  p
−(1−)

ia =
(
expβxia
)1+ 1

1−  e
α(1−)

ia (1.11)
Equation (1.11) shows that consumer utility rises with greater effort made by the party to subsidize
consumption. Since voters reward the party for an increase in consumer surplus, the party is
motivated to provide more effort in subsidizing voters. The party can allocate resources and effort
subject to spending less than their total resources Ei. They wish to maximize their total vote share
subject to their resource constraint:
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max
ei1,...e1A
∑
a
Pr
(
expγDiav(z∗ia) > ηija
)
s.t.
∑
a
eia ≤ Ei (1.12)
Parties are unaware of a specific voter’s preferences, but they have learned over time that the
ideological preferences ηija are distributed uniformly with mean µia and density φa. Given this
assumption, the problem can be re-written as:
max
ei1,...e1A
∑
a
φa
(
expγDiav(z∗ia)− µa
)
s.t.
∑
a
eia ≤ Ei (1.13)
This set-up yields the following Nash equilibrium conditions (with respect to each cost eia) for a
given Lagrangian multiplier λ:
αφa

exp(β
+1

xia)expγDiae
α(1−)−

ia = λ ∀ a (1.14)
The optimal amount of effort in assembly a depends on whether or not the party is in power
there Dia, the density of voters φa, and other assembly level features xia, such as the amount of
electricity-using infrastructure:
log eia =

− α(1− )
[
log
α
λ
+ log φa + βxia + γDia
]
(1.15)
Since prices (and thereby subsidies) depend on the effort and resources made by the party to sub-
sidize consumption, we can derive expressions for both electricity prices and consumption:
log pia =
−
α (− α(1− ))
[
log
α
λ
+ log φa + βxia + γDia
]
(1.16)
log zia =
1
α (− α(1− ))
[
log
α
λ
+ log φa + βxia + γDia
]
+
β

xia (1.17)
1.8.1.3 Comparative Statics and Estimation Equations
Equations (1.15) through (1.17) produce some interesting comparative statics and testable equa-
tions. First, whether or not the the party increases effort in providing more subsidies in response to
various factors, and the responsiveness of demand to these subsidies depends on the price elasticity
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of demand 1

. Second, for sufficiently inelastic demand 1

< 1+α
α
the party will target areas with
more swing voters, represented by a higher density in the assembly φa.
Most importantly, however, the majority party increases their subsidization efforts in assemblies
in which it is in power Dia = 1. As voters reward the party in power in their assembly for
electricity supply, for sufficiently inelastic demand, the party increases efforts in winning over
such voters. This will be one primary equation of interest. To causally isolate this impact, it
is necessary to control for all the other factors in Equation (1.15), with the help of a standard
regression discontinuity equation:
log eia = δ0 + f(vote share of i in a) + τ0Dia + εia (1.18)
Here, δ0, captures all things constant across assemblies, like −α(1−) log
α
λ
. The term f(.) is
a polynomial in the vote share of party i in assembly a, flexibly varying across the RD cutoff.
This polynomial controls for all other assembly level features that may change continuously at the
cutoff (like the density of voters φa or other assembly level features xia). The error term εia is
uncorrelated with Dia conditional on the polynomial, and the coefficient of interest is τ0 which is
a function of  and γ.
The model predicts that for consumer bases with inelastic demand 1

< 1+α
α
, the estimate of t̂au0 >
0. To measure efforts log eia, I create measures of influence and manipulation that I discuss in
the empirical section below. These measures include the anomalous bunching of certain round
number values for reported consumption, and different non-standard distributions of consumption
amounts.
Similarly, Equations (1.16) and (1.17) motivate regression equations on the form below, where we
would expect τ̂1 < 0 and τ̂2 > 0:
log pia = δ1 + f(vote share of i in a) + τ1Dia + ωia (1.19)
log zia = δ2 + f(vote share of i in a) + τ2Dia + ξia (1.20)
To measure the changes in prices and subsidies pia, I use data on subsidies in the billed amounts
and the total amount of arrears. As actual consumption is systematically misreported on the bill, I
utilize night-time luminosity to measure changes in zia.
Additionally, the model details three other important equations. The first is Equation (1.8), the
demand equation, which I employ to estimate the price elasticity of demand 1

. Combining the
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measure of , with Equations (1.16) and (1.17), allows me to measure the credit that voters give to
local leaders for providing them cheaper electricity γ.
The second prediction is that politicians target areas that have higher electricity-using infrastructure
and amenities (captured by xia that shifts out the taste for electricity). As these would most likely
be urban areas, a testable implication is that urban areas are targeted more than rural areas.
The third equation of interest is Equation (1.11), which determines consumer welfare absent any
changes to taxation, where the elasticity is a sufficient statistic for welfare. Given changes in
observable prices and subsidies pia, along with an estimate of the demand elasticity , I can measure
changes to consumer utility based simply on either prices or consumption quantities:
∆log via = (1− )∆ log zia = −1− 

∆ log pia (1.21)
This measure of welfare, however, does not capture increases in utility losses, and perhaps the
corresponding increases in taxes used to bail out the utility. To measure the extent of utility losses,
I estimate the under-reporting of consumption at the RD cutoff using a similar set of equations. The
advantage of having two measures of consumption – one non-manipulable (nighttime lights), and
the other manipulated (reported consumption) – is that I can estimate under-reporting and thereby
the loss to the utilities.
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1.8.2 Estimating Elasticities - Counterfactual Exercise
Table 1.6: Alternative Ways of Calculating Price Elasticities
Log(Consumption Kwh/Quarter)
IV 2SLS OLS IV 2SLS IV 2SLS
Altered Unaltered Unaltered Aggregated
Sample Sample Sample to AC Level
Log Marginal Price 0.388* 1.609*** -0.240 -0.137
Residential Rural (0.228) (0.0596) (0.293) (0.0972)
Log Marginal Price 0.175 1.395*** -0.666** -0.019
Residential Urban (0.220) (0.0574) (0.310) (0.0916)
Log Marginal Price -1.364** 0.583*** -3.158*** 0.0628
Commercial Rural (0.535) (0.130) (0.585) (0.155)
Log Marginal Price -1.800*** 0.595*** -3.490*** -0.206
Commercial Urban (0.460) (0.111) (0.588) (0.136)
Observations 120,087 106,937 83,787 13,943
R-squared 0.475 0.450 0.424 0.946
No. of Customers 30,906 21,980 21,581
Fixed Effects Month-Class Month-Class Month-Class AC-Month
Tier-Acc. Tier-Acc. Tier-Acc. Tier-Class
IV F-stat 704.2 579.8 414.6
Notes: This table shows the importance of the four-step procedure to calculate welfare as in Section
1.6. Col 1 shows the elasticity estimates from the running the IV strategy in Table 1.3 on the ma-
nipulated sub-sample (Section 1.5.2). Col 3 follows Table 1.3, dealing only with the unmanipulated
sub-sample of data, as I do in my welfare analysis. For residential consumers, col 1 show positive
elasticities which go against theoretical foundations of demand. For commercial users, this column
shows much lower elasticities than column 3. This is possibly because of using aggregated data
that suffers from issues such as aggregation of price tariffs, using year-level consumption estimates,
and manipulation. Col 4 shows the estimates obtained using aggregated data, like previous studies
do. They are much lower than what I obtain even if I restrict the data to the unaltered sample.
43
1.9 Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 1.13: Lights density mapped with assembly boundaries
Notes: The figure shows boundaries of state legislative assemblies (in red), national-level parliamentary
constituencies (in yellow), and data on nighttime lights density. For each legislative assembly, I calculate
the mean value of light density to provide a measure of overall electricity consumption within that area.
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Table 1.7: Discontinuity in Reported Consumption (Bandwidth Winning Mar-
gin=12,000 votes)
Unit consumption in KWH
Bwidth 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Residential (Rural)
RD Estimate -94.50*** -97.16*** -113.1*** -128.4*** -108.4***
(25.00) (21.34) (22.22) (23.33) (24.32)
Observations 13,298 17,142 17,053 16,912 16,763
Residential (Urban)
RD Estimate -172.6 -231.6** -230.4** -253.0*** -275.2***
(108.3) (97.13) (95.67) (93.19) (90.51)
Observations 18,323 21,087 21,031 20,907 20,484
Commercial (Rural)
RD Estimate 83.51 38.08 58.04 -17.61 82.68
(87.86) (77.65) (61.97) (77.70) (83.38)
Observations 5,151 6,649 6,576 6,544 6,495
Commercial (Urban)
RD Estimate -334.3 -435.4* -367.9 -369.9 -443.3
(275.5) (249.8) (234.4) (262.4) (288.3)
Observations 18,178 20,990 20,616 20,737 20,287
Notes: Using the Calonico et al. (2015) RD methodology, I report the RD coefficients
across years for reported electricity consumption for each consumer class, controlling for
the size of the electorate in each assembly. These results are robust across multiple re-
gression specifications. The results in this table use a bandwidth of 12,000 votes in terms
of the the running variable, winning margin. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at
electrical-feeder level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1.14: Levels of Nighttime Light Density: Difference-in-discontinuities Analysis
Notes: Using the optimal bandwidth and binning procedure described in Calonico et al. (2015), I plot the
RD coefficients, and confidence intervals of errors clustered at the assembly level. The dependent variable is
Log(light density). I plot coefficients over time and find a trend break after the 2011 election, with selectively
greater electrification in areas where the governing party narrowly won.
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Figure 1.15: Balance Across RD Cutoff - Census Village-level Characteristics I
(a) Average Population (b) Avg. no. from Scheduled Castes
(c) Avg. no. from Scheduled Tribes (d) Extent of Literacy
(e) Avg. no. of Females (f) Avg. Population Under 6
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Figure 1.16: Balance Across RD Cutoff - Census Village-level Characteristics II
(a) Avg. No. of Agri. Workers (b) Avg. No. of Cultivators
(c) Avg. No. of Manual Laborers (d) Avg. No. of Other Workers
(e) Avg. No. of Female Workers (f) Avg. No. of Marginal Workers
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Figure 1.17: Change in Price Schedule Over Time
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Notes: The tables show the change in tariffs over time. These changes occurred in different months across
different years. The price changes took effect in January 2012, February 2013, May 2015 and November
2016. The choice of instrumental variable in the elasticity estimation step is also prompted by the fact that
prices sometimes changed uniformly across tiers. Therefore, instrumenting changes for levels leverages the
price variation to greater effect.
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Table 1.8: Predictive Model for Elasticity Projection
Independent Variables Elasticity
Avg. no. of males under 6 yrs -0.0122
(0.170)
Avg. no. of females under 6 yrs -0.000569
(0.172)
Avg. no. of households 0.0106
(0.0226)
Avg. no. of working males -0.0126
(0.0139)
Avg. no. of working females 0.0330**
(0.0140)
Avg. no. of scheduled caste females 0.210**
(0.0861)
Avg. no. of scheduled caste females -0.197**
(0.0814)
Avg. no. of scheduled tribe females 0.0153
(0.0117)
Avg. no. of male cultivators -0.0279**
(0.0127)
Avg. no. of female cultivators 0.0339
(0.0464)
Avg. no. of female workers (other) 0.00114
(0.0416)
Avg. no. of literate females -0.0156
(0.0113)
Sq. of avg. no. of literate females 7.93e-06*
(4.80e-06)
Constant -50.99**
(25.48)
Observations 43
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table shows results of the post-
double OLS (Belloni et al., 2016) discussed in Section 1.6
Sub-section 1.6.3. Census data provides several village-
level demographic characteristics which I use to build a
model in order to predict out-of-sample elasticities. The
double-selection process whittles down the number of
variables needed for predictive power. And the OLS re-
gression is run and then used to predict elasticities for all
assemblies.
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Table 1.9: Details for calculation of Welfare Loss and Gain in Consumer Surplus
Consumer Class Residential
(Rural)
Residential
(Urban)
Commercial
(Urban)
Winning Margin Band-
width=6,000
Consumer Base (winning
areas near cutoff)
295,982 150,515 37,473
Estimated under-reporting
(KWh/year/customer)
138 379 547
Winning Margin Band-
width=12,000
Consumer Base (winning
areas near cutoff)
688,008 329,441 72,917
Estimated under-reporting
(KWh/year/customer)
108 248 385
Notes: This table shows the total number of consumers in the sub-sample of assemblies located near the RD cutoff, using
two different bandwidths from the RD analysis, 6,000 votes on the lower end and 12,000 votes on the higher end. The
estimated under-reporting figures are taken from Table 1.2 and Appendix Section 1.9 Table 1.7 .
Figure 1.18: Regression of consumption (KWh) on nighttime lights density
Notes: This regression, with year fixed effects, yields a coefficient of 0.08. From Figure 1.5, I infer an
increase in consumption in response to the informal subsidy of 20%. Combined with the coefficient describ-
ing the relationship between nighttime lights and consumption, I conclude that the percentage increase in
electricity consumption is 1.7%. Finally, I use consumption data for all consumer categories to make these
calculations, as it is impossible to isolate the lights density for each consumer group individually.
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CHAPTER 2
2
Behavioral Dynamics in Transitions from
College to the Workforce
with Catalina Franco
We show the first estimates of changes in preferences and economic decision-making over major,
expected life transitions. We elicit preference measures and cognition from Colombian students on
the job market and those in lower years, and follow them across three stages: job search, receiving
a job offer, and receiving a paycheck . Using a difference-in-differences setup, we find that job-
market students become more altruistic, less impatient and perceive greater liquidity after receiving
a job offer, despite this being an expected outcome. These effects dissipate by the paycheck stage,
creating “windows of clarity”, which may improve long-term decisions about healthcare, pensions
or insurance. Furthermore, the results are driven by poorer students.
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2.1 Introduction
Transitions from college to the labor force are both widespread and an important event for many
across the world. Starting a first job involves making choices that impact an individual’s life
quality along the entire life cycle. Standard economic theory predicts that during the transition
students’ behavior, and their ability to make sound decisions, should not change in the absence of
liquidity constraints. Yet, empirical tests of standard consumption-smoothing hypotheses in other
contexts find that it not to hold (Shapiro and Slemrod, 1995; Stephens, 2003). How decision-
making changes around the time that agents make important life choices can have long lasting
impacts on lives. Importantly, standard models assume preferences to be constant Andersen et al.
(2008); Dasgupta et al. (2017); Harrison (2005); Roszkowski and Cordell (2009) except when in-
dividuals experience an unexpected shock or in response to events Cho et al. (2018); Necker and
Ziegelmeyer (2016). Yet, even though the transition from college to the labor force may involve
predictable outcomes for individuals, it may change the decision-making processes and underlying
preferences of economic agents. We are among the first to document changes in students’ behavior
along key stages of this transition with substantial implications for policy.
Given that several high-stakes decisions such as on health, retirement benefits and life insurance
are made after joining a first job, it is clear that understanding the changes in behavior and decision
making over this period is important. Despite this, there is very little work on understanding the
dynamics involved. To empirically assess whether there are behavioral changes in the transition
from college to the workforce, we compare experimentally-measured tasks for students in their last
semester at college and on the job market, to students in lower years at a university in Colombia.
This comparison takes place across three main stages: job search (baseline), receiving and accept-
ing a job offer, and receiving the first paycheck. A unique feature of our empirical design is the
fact that we can measure the effect of receiving a job offer alone, without conflating it with receiv-
ing a paycheck. We distinguish between these two stages to separate the effects of an increase in
liquidity from a paycheck and higher responsibilities from a job, with the resolution of uncertainty
that a job offer would entail. The effects we observe from the job offer stage therefore reflect
the resolution of uncertainty surrounding the details of the job, even as there is little uncertainty
about receiving a well-paying job, as 84.3% of engineering students graduating in 2014 from this
university were in formal jobs a year later.1
Our empirical strategy uses the fact that students on the job market are similar to students in
1Source: Ministry of Education, Colombia.
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previous years except in characteristics (such as age) that are unrelated to their performance on
economic decision-making tasks. We pick similar students in previous semesters (i.e. those
who are involved in day-to-day college life) to match the gender, major-choice and economic
background of last-semester students to most accurately mimic what would have happened to
last-semester students had they not finished college. With this comparison group, we perform
difference-in-differences (DID) analyses of our outcomes of interest. We compare the job-offer
and first-paycheck stages to the baseline to provide evidence on changes in decision-making along
these two important stages of the shift to the labor market.
The experimental measures we elicit include social preferences (measured via dictator and ulti-
matum games), time preferences Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), ambiguity aversion Tanaka et al.
(2014), risk aversion Eckel and Grossman (2002); Tanaka et al. (2010), and cognitive measures
(IQ test, cognitive reflection test, numerical Stroop task, Flanker task). We also measure perceived
financial situations, psychological factors, and credit and degree of independence from parents
through survey questions.
We first demonstrate how resolving uncertainty around the details of a highly likely event can
affect decision-making. Our main results show that subjects graduating from college, relative to
similar students in earlier years, become more altruistic, less impatient, and perceive greater fi-
nancial liquidity and psychological well-being after merely receiving a job offer, despite it being
an almost certain outcome of graduating from a prestigious university in Colombia. These effects
are observed before subjects receive their first paycheck, ruling out certain mechanisms, like the
easing of liquidity constraints. Moreover, these effects dissipate by the time subjects receive their
first paychecks, creating brief “windows of clarity”, which are ideally suited to make long term
decisions such as about healthcare, pensions, and life insurance.
Once these students receive a paycheck, they no longer give more in dictator and ultimatum games,
and perform worse on cognitive tasks relative to students in the comparison group. After being
paid, these students might have to undertake greater responsibilities and may have more factors to
juggle, leading to a greater cognitive load Mullainathan and Shafir (2013). Indeed, they are more
likely to report paying for most of their expenses in the after paycheck stage lending credence to
their added responsibilities. The feelings of less worry, tiredness, depression and frustration, as
well as the observed changes in economic preferences, dissipate by the time they start getting paid.
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Given the variation we have across our subjects in terms of socioeconomic status, we also provide
suggestive evidence on how poverty correlates with the results we find. Students who come from
relatively poorer backgrounds drive the results we observe during the after-offer stage - specif-
ically experiencing less depression and greater perception of liquidity. Comparable students in
lower years who do not have the benefit of a job offer and also come from poorer backgrounds are
found to be far more depressed and perceive less liquidity. Richer students appear to have similar
preferences whether or not they have a job offer. Interestingly, giving in dictator and ultimatum
games, and cognitive performance is not associated with socieconomic status.
Our findings open up avenues for future work focusing on these “windows of clarity” for people
from poorer financial backgrounds. Our findings on the correlation between poverty and behavior
are consistent with studies such as Spears (2011), who shows how poor participants found decision
making depleting, Mani et al. (2013), who show that poor participants perform worse in a cogni-
tive task, Haushofer et al. (2013), who find that experiencing a positive shock makes people more
patient. This result also fits in with the literature on the behavioral effects of positive affect such
as Erez and Isen (2003); Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011); Kirchsteiger et al. (2006); Oswald et al.
(2015). Our study is able to strengthen this analysis by using a real instance of a an expected posi-
tive affect as opposed to a lab induced mechanism, providing a realistic application of these results.
Rational models of economic agents treat preferences and decision-making ability as constant.
Yet, we highlight how external context substantially affects these factors. Knowing this can have
significant implications for policies that encourage the optimal timing of when decisions are made.
For instance, in our context, decisions on pension and retirement plans should be encouraged to be
made before the work actually begins.
Our results also highlight the implications of psychological factors as mediators in important eco-
nomic decision-making and in experimentally-elicited preferences. Experimental measures of time
and social preferences are used extensively in economics and are increasingly being added to large-
scale national surveys. Self-perceived emotions could act as important mediators to the experimen-
tally measured outcomes and not accounting for them could lead to erroneous conclusions about
some of their economic decision-making behavior. For instance, last-semester students appear to
become less risk averse when they get a job offer, but this effect disappears after controlling for
psychological factors. What is important to note is that while observed changes in risk behavior
were simply reflections of changes in these emotions, changes in social and time preferences stand
even after accounting for the change in these variables.
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We see three main contributions of our work. First, even though the transition from college to
the work force is an important and ubiquitous one, this paper is one of the few studying decision-
making and preferences along this path, and showing that they change substantial over the period.
Second, we speak to the few studies showing how risk, time and social preferences measured
through experimental games and survey measures can change in response to idiosyncratic shocks
(Chuang and Schechter, 2015), and show that such changes can occur even over expected life tran-
sitions. Finally, we highlight the importance of psychological factors as mediators in economic
decision-making.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the background of our setting
and the research design. Section 2.3 presents details about data collection and the experimental
measures we use. Section 2.4 discusses the difference-in-differences results. Section 2.6 con-
cludes.
2.2 Background and Research Design
We study economic decision making along the transition from college to the labor market with stu-
dents from a large public university in Colombia, recruited primarily from the Engineering School.
In general, students from this university, and engineering students specifically, have very good
prospects in the Colombian labor market, given the academic quality and prestige of the university
they attend. In other words, obtaining a job is a very likely outcome. According to Colombia’s
Ministry of Education Statistics, about 84% of engineering students from this university are in
formal jobs one year after graduation.
This context is unique in that we have similar subjects in terms of education level along with nat-
ural variation in socioeconomic status. This university admits students on a “need-blind” basis,
solely determined by an admissions exam, and admitted students are at the very top of the admis-
sion score distribution. This guarantees that our subjects will have similar cognitive ability, giving
us results that will presumably not be affected by big differences in baseline cognition or level of
education. Furthermore, students are charged tuition rates that are monotonically proportional to
their family income. We use self-reported tuition rates to determine the financial status of students.
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In order to study the transition from school to the labor market, we use the fact that students in
their last semester of college will experience certain changes as they go on the job market, while
comparison students not on the job market will not, but still serve to control for other factors re-
lated to being in college. We differentiate between the two groups by calling them “last-semester
students” and “comparison students”, respectively. In order to construct an appropriate comparison
group to isolate the differential effects on students on the job market, we use students from lower
years. Besides age and variables that are naturally different when one is farther along in college,
we expect that students about to graduate and in previous semesters are similar in most observed
and unobserved characteristics. More importantly, for our identification purposes, as we will show,
these students have similar baseline trends in preferences and measures of economic decision mak-
ing. Our group of comparison students is selected to closely match the last-semester students on
gender, major and economic background at baseline. In Table 2.1 we provide descriptive statistics
across these groups.
We invited engineering students at this university to participate in a research study about economic
decision making. Students signed up in April, 2016 using an online form with questions about
demographics, major, current semester in the major, GPA, tuition, socio-economic measures at the
household level, whether they work, and perceived probability of finding a job between April and
October, 2016 for those who plan to graduate in August. We selected students in lower semesters
to equal the number of students in their last semester who signed up. We did so by stratifying on
gender, major, and tuition above or below the median.2 Our resulting number of observations at
baseline is 363 of which 178 (or 49.1 percent of) students were in their last semester of college.
The different stages in the research design are summarized in Table 2.2. We collect data from five
waves of surveys taking place at the recruitment stage and at three points in time according to Table
2.2: (i) Sign-up survey; (ii) Two surveys at baseline (during the last semester before graduation
of last-semester students); (ii) One survey each approximately after receiving and accepting a job
offer3. We refer to this as “Round 2”; (iii) One survey approximately after starting in the new
job and receiving at least one paycheck. We refer to this as “Round 3”.4 Participants responded
to all surveys online on roughly the same dates between April, and December, 2016. All surveys
2The median tuition per semester in our sample is COP 600,000 which is equivalent to around US$200.
3 Notice that the timing of this survey does not coincide with graduation in August. Because all surveys were
conducted either well before or well after graduation, we do not think that our results are driven by the volatility in
emotions associated with graduation.
4Some last-semester students either received a paycheck by the time we administered the survey for Round 2 or
never reported a paycheck despite indicating having got a job offer. We move their survey responses from Round 2 to
Round 3 in the former case, and from Round 3 to Round 2 in the latter.
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except the sign-up questionnaire contained the same tasks, although in cognitive tests we varied
the questions or worded them differently every time to reduce the role of memory. For other tasks,
remembering would be harder because each task involved many choices.
A particular feature of this context is that, in general, students cannot perfectly smooth consump-
tion by taking loans that will help them keep their standard of living constant before and after
graduating from college. In our sample, only 6 percent of students have credit cards with a credit
limit above $1,000 (the equivalent of about 1.5 times the expected monthly salary in their first job
after graduation) and about 10 percent have loans over $5,000 at baseline. Not only is it difficult to
obtain a credit card, there is also a cultural lack of comfort with the use of credit cards. Therefore,
there are both administrative as well as cultural barriers to borrowing for consumption smooth-
ing. The effect of receiving a paycheck somewhat alleviates this credit constraint. The job-offer
stage, on the other hand, would not, and we investigate whether merely receiving an offer affects
decision-making performance.
2.3 Experimental tasks
2.3.1 Tasks and incentives
In order to measure economic decision-making, we administer a battery of tasks for students to
complete. Our online surveys contained three types of questions: economic decision-making tasks,
social preferences, cognitive tests, and questionnaires about socioeconomic situation, consumption
of durable goods, debt and credit, stress, and salary expectations. In addition, we ask last-semester
students about job offer and paycheck dates. We follow previous studies in the design of these
tasks and provide details below. In order to incentivize students, a task was picked at random,
and a payment was assigned as per the students’ choices or performance. For instance, if the task
chosen was risk aversion, the gamble picked by the student is played and they are paid accordingly.
If the chosen task is the Raven’s Matrices, students are rewarded based on the number of correct
answers. Such a payment structure incentivizes students to reveal their choices thruthfully and to
exert effort to maximize performance. Further details on the tasks can be found in the appendix.
The order in which tasks appeared to participants was random although they always came before
the questionnaire about psychological and stress measures, expenditures, salary expectations, and
relevant dates of job offer and paycheck. No feedback about performance after each survey was
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given to participants. At the end of the survey, one of the tasks was selected for payment. The
computer followed the instructions communicated to the participants regarding the selection of
task for the final payment. In each survey excluding the recruitment survey, prizes ranged from the
equivalent of US$7 to US$57. The mean prize across all three rounds of surveys was $30. To have
an idea of how much this represents to students, $30 is worth about 40 bus tickets or two weeks of
restaurant meals.
Social Preferences: We administer a set of dictator and ultimatum games, where subjects choose
to allocate a portion of an endowment of 20,000 pesos ($7) to other participants or to a foundation
that helps children in Bogota. In the ultimatum game, the recipient student can then choose to
accept or reject. See appendix 2.8.1 for more details.
Time Preferences: We adapt the elicitation task presented in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). Sub-
jects are given a pre-specified monetary amount and are required to allocate it between two dates:
earlier and later (see appendix 2.8.2.1). Unlike Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), subjects allocate
the endowment of 50,000 pesos ($17) in increments of 1,000 pesos. We study the number of
non-monotonic decisions made by a student 5, the “impatience” of students 6 and the present-
biasedness.7 See appendix 2.8.2 for more details.
Risk Preferences: We elicit risk aversion using the Eckel and Grossman (2002) measure. Students
pick one gamble to play from a list of 6 gambles, and their choice indicates their degree of risk-
aversion. To analyze risk choices we use the risk lotteries from Tanaka et al. (2010) (see example
and details in Appendix 2.8.3.1). We also use the risk lotteries task in order to understand consis-
tency in student choices and obtain Prospect Theory parameters. Commonly, in tasks designed as a
list of lotteries, subjects pick a particular column and then switch permanently to the other, and the
row where they switch provides information about their risk preferences. However, we allow them
to switch between columns more than once to understand if they make inconsistent risk choices.
See appendix 2.8.3 for more details.
Ambiguity Aversion: This is the preference for known risks relative to unknown risks Camerer
5Non-monotonocity in this case refers to allocating an increasing amount of money to an earlier period as the
interest rate for the later period payout goes up.
6We examine how many times out of 16 allocation choices students allocate the entire initial amount to the earlier
period.
7We calculate the probability of assigning a greater amount of money to the earlier period, and weighting it by the
interest rate in that particular choice.
59
and Weber (1992); Ellsberg (1961), and is measured using a task based on Tanaka et al. (2014) in
which subjects must choose between a gamble whose outcome objective probabilities are known
relative to one in which they are unknown. See appendix 2.8.4 for more details.
Cognitive Tests: In terms of cognition, the bandwidth theory proposed by Mullainathan, Shafir
and coauthors implies that scarcity (of time or resources) affects cognitive functioning which may
compromise decision making (Mani et al., 2013; Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013; Shah et al., 2012).
To measure different dimensions of cognition we use tasks such as a Raven’s matrices-type IQ
test, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), the Flanker’s task, and the numerical Stroop test. See
appendix 2.8.5 for more details.
2.3.2 Trends and Levels for Outcomes of Interest
For our difference-in-differences analysis it is necessary for both our last-semester students and
students in lower years to have similar trends in these measures; an assumption we provide empiri-
cal support for in the form of parallel pre-trends. However, we also show that the levels at baseline
are also similar, except in variables such as age and degree of independence. Table 2.1 presents the
means of variables collected at sign-up for the two groups. As expected, we see that last-semester
students are older, and more likely to be employed and to have accumulated more work experience
at the time of the survey (during their last semester of college). The two groups have very similar
means in their demographic and schooling variables, as well as in their salary expectations upon
graduation.
To construct our difference-in-differences (DID), we collected information from students over a
total three rounds. From the two surveys in the baseline period (round 1), we are able to establish
parallel trends. In Table 2.3 we show, for each variable of interest, the change in the means be-
tween survey 1 and 2 of the baseline, and the p-value of the point estimate from a DID regression
involving the two baseline surveys. Given that virtually all variables exhibit parallel trends in the
period before the changes associated with the transition to the labor market take place, we believe
that the difference-in-differences analysis is a valid method to analyze our data.
Round 2 refers to the survey administered to last-semester students after they obtain a job and this
may be interpreted as having one’s uncertainty about the job being resolved. Students in lower
years were also administered a survey to coincide with time, to generate a comparison group.
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Round 3 refers to the surveys administered to last-semester students after they receive their first
paycheck and this round captures the easing of the liquidity constraint because these students
would now be paid a salary, among other changes associated with starting a new job. Similar to
round 2, comparison students are also asked to fill in the surveys and solve the experimental tasks
to coinside with this timeline. In what follows and for clarity in what we are measuring, we refer
to these stages as: Baseline, after offer, and after paycheck.
2.4 Difference-in-Differences Results
In order to examine whether the economic and social preferences, cognitive performance and sur-
vey responses of these students change along the transition from college to the labor market, we
employ a difference-in-differences (DID) strategy. The two main periods of interest are Round 2,
when last-semester students receive a job offer, and Round 3, when they finally start working and
receive at least one paycheck. An important contribution of this paper is to separate out these two
periods in order to understand whether there are any changes in behavior along the transtition and
whether the changes in decision making accompany a mere resolution of uncertainty after getting
a job offer or whether there needs to be a real increase in their incomes. In order to tease out these
various changes, we run the following DID regression specification:
yit = α1 +α2Baseline 2 +α3After offer +α4After paycheck + β1Last sem. + β2Baseline 2×Last sem.
+ β3After offer× Last sem. + β4After paycheck× Last sem. + εit (2.1)
In the above specification, the dependent variables include social preferences, time preferences,
risk aversion, cognitive performance, personal finances and psychological factors. We collect four
measurements of these variables so the index t goes from 1 to 4. The constant in this regression
provides the mean of the comparison group in Baseline 1. The rest of the α coefficients provide
the difference in the means for the comparison groups across rounds. The coefficient β1 reflects
the difference in means between last-semester students and comparison group in baseline 1, β2
provides a test for the parallel trends assumption, and β3 and β4 are the DID coefficients in the
after offer and after paycheck stages, respectively. The standard errors are clustered at individual
level.
Our main hypothesis was that even though these students attend one of the most pretigious uni-
versities in Colombia, they still have considerable uncertainty about when and where they will get
their jobs. This uncertainty may be enough to affect their decision making behavior, in addition to
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when they receive their first paycheck and resolve a potential liquidity constraint.
2.4.1 Psychological Measures
One of the contributions of this paper is to highlight the role of psychological measures as me-
diators for economic decision making. For all of our regression specifications, we also control
for psychological measures in order to check if the observed effect on the decision making task
is simply a result of the subject’s current psychological state. There are some important patterns
within these psychological measures in the transition we analyze. As shown in Figure 2.1, last-
semester students who receive a job offer report being differentially less tired, worried, depressed
and frustrated. Further results are presented in Table 2.4. What is clear is that while last-semester
students report being less worried or tired in Round 2 after the resolution of job uncertainty, by
Round 3 after receiving a paycheck, these effects disappear, that is, there is not difference in psy-
chological measures between last-semester and comparison. Part of this may be related to the
additional responsibilities they have to take care of as they become more independent and pay for
most of their expenses (Table 2.12). In Appendix 2.8.7, we report specifications adding controls
for psychological factors and degree of independence.
2.4.2 Social Preferences
Dictator and ultimatum games have long been used in economics to provide important insight
about the social preferences of people, more specifically, the importance of fairness, equity and
reciprocity in their lives Henrich et al. (2004). We use these games to measure our subjects’ social
preferences. For the dictator games, we ask students to donate to both, another student as well as
a foundation, from their endowment of 20,000 pesos. Unlike some of the versions of this task in
earlier papers, where students were asked to make a hypothetical choice Kahneman et al. (1986),
the game we set has real consequences for subjects’ payoffs.
We show that under changes in people’s conditions like when transitioning from college to the
workforce, there may be temporary changes in social preferences. A number of studies have
shown the remarkable stability of social preferences Carlsson et al. (2014), and our finding pro-
vides further nuance to that view. Comparing the first and last periods, there are no significant
changes to the level of altruism towards other students and to a charitable foundation. However,
on receiving a job offer, there is a temporary rise in altruism. This shows how a period that is also
marked by a positive effect on psychological measures, such as perceptions of happiness, can have
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a statistically significant effect on altruism.
In Table 2.5, we see that students’ generosity towards other individuals and towards the charitable
foundation after job uncertainty is resolved is higher compared to lower-year students. On average,
students allocate a far higher share to a foundation than to a student in the dictator game, donat-
ing more than half of their endowment to a foundation versus around 30 percent to a student in a
dictator game. This is a very high share compared to the 20 percent allocation to other students
observed in the literature List (2007). The increase in altruism observed in the post-job-offer stage
ranges from 12 to 17 percentage points. In the dictator games, this translates to donating more than
half one’s endowment to other students, and about two-thirds of one’s endowment to a foundation.
The ultimatum game, where the recipient has a chance to respond to a donation, has an even higher
level of average donation to another student, almost half of one’s endowment. This further climbs
to almost 60 percent for students who have received a job-offer.
Interestingly, after receiving a paycheck, subjects differentially give less in the dictator and ultima-
tum games relative to students in the comparison group. However, their donations to a foundation
do not differ from those made by comparison students. We hypothesize that this behavior could
respond to the fact that they already graduated and do not care as much for fellow students as when
they were students themselves. Another explanation could be that their increased responsibilities
as they are now more independent makes them want to keep more money for themselves. In fact,
we see that after controlling for a dummy indicating that they pay for most of they expenses, the
negative coefficient in dictator and ultimatum games dissapear, lending some support to the second
hypothesis.
What is also striking about these results is how stable these preferences are among comparison
students (Figure 2.2), and how there is a stark change in this pattern when last semester students
receive job offers. The lack of differential pre-trends helps validate our research design in terms
of reasonable identification. Furthermore, we find that similar effects persist even after controlling
for emotions (Appendix Table 2.13). In sum, compared to the literature on social preferences, we
observe very high levels of altruism. Our results show that resolution of uncertainty of a life event
may change individuals’ willingness to give.
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2.4.3 Time Preferences
A growing body of research in economics studies how time preferences may be different between
the poor and the non-poor (Carvalho et al., 2016; Haushofer et al., 2013; Lawrance, 1991), and
whether time preferences are stable over time (Chuang and Schechter, 2015). Most of this literature
is based on experimental measures of time preferences. An important critique to measuring time
preferences parameters with experimental tasks comes from Dean and Sautmann (2016). Their
‘soft credit constraints’ model suggests that experimental tasks eliciting time preferences measure
the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution (MRS) but do not identify the time preferences pa-
rameters because subjects’ choices are affected by external factors outside of the experiment. In
this model, for example, income shocks decrease the MRS while expenditure shocks increase it. In
our setting, we measure how external factors (including but not limited to income and expenditure)
associated with the transition from college to the labor force affect experimental choices in a time
preferences task.
We look at three main measures calculated from a task adapted from Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012). We find that students on the job market are less impatient after receiving a job offer rela-
tive to their counterparts who are not on the job market. Students who receive a job offer allocate
the full initial endowment to the earlier period in 2 fewer intertemporal choices than comparison
students who allocate the full amount in more than 5 of the 16 intertemporal choices (see middle
column of Table 2.6). While we see a DID coefficient in the after paycheck stage of -0.8, indicating
less impatience when students have already started working, it is not statistically significant unlike
the after-offer coefficient which is significant at the 1% level.
Table 2.6 also shows results for a measure of present bias (column 3) and inconsistency in in-
tertemporal choices (column 1). The measure of present bias enumerates the instances where a
subject allocated a greater amount to the earlier period when the earlier period was a week from
now rather than 5 weeks from now for the same delay length until the later period, i.e., week 1 vs.
week 5 and week 5 vs. week 9. This is then weighted by the interest rate for the later period payoff
in each intertemporal choice, to end up with a percentage of present bias. By the time last-semester
students start working and receive a paycheck, we find an increase in present bias of 12 percentage
points that is significant at the 10% level. Our subjects do not exhibit differences in the number of
non-monotonic choices they make (i.e., allocating more to the sooner period when the interest rate
for delaying increases).
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To contextualize our result, Carvalho et al. (2016) find that before payday, poor individuals in the
U.S. are more present biased when making choices about monetary rewards. We observe the op-
posite behavior for the period before individuals receive their income. The period immediately
before being paid is characterized by the resolution of uncertainty regarding their future income
and the outcome of their college education investment. Our results support the idea that individ-
uals become less focused on the present once they resolve the uncertainty about their near future.
Their choices, however, could also be explained by changes in psychological factors or credit con-
straints. As we reported earlier, individuals feel less tired, depressed, frustrated and worried after
receiving and accepting a job offer (Table 2.4). Although we cannot see their credit constraints
directly because they may have access to credit cards or loans but decide not to take them up, we
see that last-semester students report lower loan-takeup than students in the comparison group in
the after-offer period (Table 2.12).
In Table 2.15, we see that the impatience result holds up after controlling for psychological factors
in the DID regression so changes in emotions are unlikely to be behind the observed decline in
impatience. In terms of credit, we find evidence pointing to a real change in behavior. Despite not
differing from comparison-groups students in the baseline period, results from a triple difference
(DDD) regression (available upon request) show that students who become more impatient are also
those who take up credit cards or loans in the after-offer and after-paycheck periods. For students
who do not adopt these credit instruments, we continue to observe a fall in impatience after they
receive a job-offer.
2.4.4 Risk and Ambiguity Preferences
Conceptually, risk and ambiguity preferences may change as individuals age, in response to shocks
such as economic crises or natural disasters, or by temporary variations in self-control, emotions
or stress Schildberg-Ho¨risch (2018). Given the evidence we present regarding changes in psycho-
logical factors among students transitioning to the labor market (subsection 2.4.1) and that the first
two mechanisms are unlikely to take place in the timeframe of our study, we focus on how the third
mechanism may affect risk and ambiguity aversion measures along the transition from college to
the workforce.8
8Carvalho et al. (2016) propose liquidity constraints and scarcity as potential factors affecting risk aversion before
and after receiving a paycheck. We are unable to test these mechanisms because in our “After paycheck” stage, our
subjects do not only receive a paycheck but are still adapting to their new role as a working person.
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To measure risk aversion, we elicit the preferred gamble from a choice-set of the six proposed in
the Eckel and Grossman (2002) task. We code subjects as risk averse when they pick the first four
or the first three of the six gambles proposed in this task. Inconsistency in risk choices is coded
as an indicator of whether the subject switches more than once in the multiple price list by Tanaka
et al. (2010). The ambiguity aversion variable counts the number of times the ambiguous urn is
chosen out of nine possible choices ranging from the fully visible and the ambiguous urn. For
details on the tasks or the definition of the variables see Section 2.3 and Appendix 2.8.3.
We find that students on the job market appear differentially less risk-averse after receiving a job
offer. Table 2.7 demonstrates that there is a decrease in risk aversion among all students across
rounds, but statistically significantly more so for students who receive a job offer.9 Therefore,
students who have their job uncertainty resolved appear to have a higher propensity to pick riskier
gambles than lower-year students by about 11.1 percentage points. It is worth pointing out that the
majority of students were risk averse at baseline with about 70 percent of students choosing one of
the three least risky gambles to play. There is a statistically significant reduction in risk aversion
among all students by the job offer stage in which the proportion of risk-averse subjects is reduced
to about 50 percent and 38 percent among comparison group and last-semester students, respec-
tively. The DID coefficient has a positive sign in the after paycheck period but it is not significant.
In terms of inconsistencies of risk choices, we see no differences between the comparison group
and last-semester students.10
The ambiguity aversion results show that, at baseline, students chose the ambiguous urn very few
times (less than 4 times on average out of a total of 9 choices) independent of their last-semester or
comparison group status. These preferences remain remarkably stable over time, with there being
a slight trend towards less ambiguity aversion with every period. We observe no differential impact
of being a last-semester student in any period.
To test whether self-control, stress and emotions may drive the results in Appendix Table 2.16
we check how our data conforms with existing theories. The work by Fudenberg, Levine and
9The standard measure of risk aversion in the Eckel and Grossman (2002) task is choosing one of the four most
risk averse gambles which implies a CRRA greater than 0.5. With this measure we do not see parallel trends so we
check an indicator for whether the subject chooses one of the first 3 gambles. The results are qualitatively similar and
we cannot reject parallel trends in the second case.
10The 1132010Tanaka et al. () task allows to compute the Prospect Theory parameters (curvature of the value
function, probability weighting and loss aversion) for students who switch at most once in the multiple price lists. We
do not find any differential effects for last-semester students in these three measures (for details see Appendix Table
2.17.
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coauthors Fudenberg and Levine (2006,0); Fudenberg et al. (2014) posits that when individual
self-control resources are low, the risk-averse short-term self may prevail over the deliberative
risk-neutral long-run self. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) we administered measures exactly
these “dual system” responses. As will be discussed in subsection 2.4.6, we do not find evidence
of any changes in the CRT number of correct answers or time spent in this test, suggesting that
self-control may not be driving the reduction of risk aversion among last-semester students accept-
ing a job offer.
In the case of stress and emotions, the hypothesis that has received most support in psychology is
the affect-infusion model Forgas (1995) which implies that individuals in a happy mood may be
willing to take more risks than those in a sad mood. In subsection 2.4.1 we documented positive
changes in last-semester students’ worry, depression, frustration, and tiredness at the time of ac-
cepting a job offer. We control for these psychological factors in Table 2.16. With the controls in
place, the after-offer result for last-semester students being differentially less risk averse than their
counterparts in lower years vanishes, giving support to the affect infusion model and underlining
the importance of sujective measures of wellbeing and emotions as mediators in economic decision
making.
2.4.5 Self-Perceptions of Financial Status
We find statistically significant effects of receiving a job offer on the self-reported financial health
of last-semester students. In Table 2.8 we show the result of regressions on outcomes such as
whether it is hard to come up with money for an emergency, whether it is hard to cover next week’s
expenses with the money they have today, and whether they are stressed about personal finances.
In the first case, receiving a job offer has a significant and positive effect for last-semester students.
To elaborate, they report finding it hard to come up with money less frequently (20 percentage
points) than the baseline, and when compared to students in lower years. Therefore, in terms of
perception of own wealth, there is a clearly positive effect of merely receiving a job offer, with-
out having yet been paid. There is no statistically significant differential effect for last-semester
students after receivng a paycheck, which is telling of the immense effect that the resolution of
uncertainty alone has on perception of one’s coping ability.
The results for the self-reported measure on it being hard to come up with money in an emergency
holds up to the regression specification with different controls - i.e. last-semester students less
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frequently report this in Round 2 after receiving a job offer. Indeed, after controlling for a dummy
indicating that the subject pays for most of own expenses, there is an additional effect of about -13
percentage points for last-semester students after receiving their paycheck as well.
2.4.6 Cognitive Performance
Corroborating the above pattern of reports of better psychological well-being dissipating by Round
3, we have further evidence that after receiving their paycheck, there are increased responsibilities
as subjects now pay most of their expenses themselves (Table 2.12). We study changes in cognitive
performance by looking at how students perform in tasks such as the Raven’s Matrices, Cognitive
Reflection Test - CRT, Flanker task and the Stroop test (Table 2.9). These increased responsibilities
may be contributing to an increasing cognitive load and we find that after receiving a paycheck,
last-semester students perform differentially worse than lower-year students in the Raven’s Matri-
ces test. We find no differences in performance in any of the other cognitive tasks nor in time to
respond the CRT.
Performance for all students in the Raven’s Matrices task improves over time and this may be
attributable to learning effects. On average, they respond correctly to 4 questions (column 1 in
Table 2.9) at baseline, and lower year students improve their score by 2.5 correct questions, while
last-semester students lag slightly behind at a score below 6 after receiving a paycheck. This is
consistent with the additional responsibilities and changes associated with starting a new job. It
is possible that these changes impose a cognitive load on last-semester students and impairs their
performance in these cognitive tasks.
It is interesting to note that Mani et al. (2013) find changes in Raven’s test performance among
sugarcane farmers before or after receiving payment from harvest while Carvalho et al. (2016) do
not find changes in the cognitive tasks they administer (which do not include the Raven’s test)
when comparing before and after receiving a paycheck. Because it is the only test in which we find
significant differences, it would be interesting to know whether there is something particular about
the Raven’s test that Mani et al. (2013)’s paper and ours find results when aministering it.
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2.5 Effect heterogeneity by socioeconomic background
In this section, we take advantage of the natural variation in socio-economic backgrounds of stu-
dents in our sample. Because their background is not randomized, we cannot make causal infer-
ences in this section, but instead provide suggestive evidence for the correlates of poverty.
We find that while in college, poorer students are likely to experience a larger burden in terms of
psychological well-being and perception of financial stress than richer students. However, we do
not observe differences by socio-economic status (SES) in social preferences, impatience, cogni-
tive measures, or risk preferences. In addition, once students transition to the labor market, any
previously observed variations across students with different SES fall or become negligible, sug-
gesting that obtaining a job equalizes the differences previously observed in college.
Exploring this dimension of heterogeneity adds to the recent literature on poverty, cognition and
economic decision-making by quantifying how more or less affluent students perform in the tasks,
as well as how their performance changes during the college to labor market transition. The current
evidence shows that poor people may respond differently to cognitive and decision-making tasks
than richer people. Mani et al. (2013) show that the poor perform worse in cognitive tasks when
primed for poverty with a hypothetical situation. They also confirm this result with poor farmers
performing the tasks before and after harvest. Similarly, Carvalho et al. (2016) find that subjects
are more present-biased before receiving a paycheck. This effect on time preferences is similar to
when experimental subjects receive a negative income shock in the lab Haushofer et al. (2013).
In each of the graphs in this section we plot the local polynomial smooth of the mean outcome by
tuition level for the group of last-semester students and the comparison group. The plots shown
side by side correspond to the after-offer and after-paycheck stages of the outcome shown in the
figure caption. To have a sense of the statistical significance of the differences between groups
and across tuition levels within the same group we include 83% confidence intervals.11 To have a
reference point, a vertical line highlights the median tuition (600,000 COP or US$200).
Figures 2.3 and 2.5 show one of the measures of psychological well-being (depression) and per-
ceived financial wellbeing as measured by the question asking whether it would be hard to come
1183% confidence intervals are commonly used when comparing two means (http://chris-
said.io/2014/12/01/independent-t-tests-and-the-83-confidence-interval-a-useful-trick-for-eyeballing-your-data/)
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up with a sum of money for an emergency within a week. In general, more affluent students in the
comparison group are better off in terms of psychological well-being and perceived financial stress
than students around the median tuition level. Around 60 to 80 percent of the poorer comparison-
group students report that it would be hard to come up with the equivalent of US$ 1,000 for an
emergency relative to less than 40 percent of the richer students (Figure 2.5). Although the con-
fidence intervals are wider in Figure 2.3 panels, the pattern suggests that depression is highest
among students around the median tuition and lowest for richer students.
Figures 2.3 and 2.5 also show that when students receive and accept an offer (left panel), the mean
of these outcomes goes down substantially relative to the comparison group and there is very little
variation by tuition level. In the hard-to-come-up-with-money measure, the new level for all last-
semester students is similar to the richest students in the comparison group. In the after paycheck
stage, the levels go up again and are not statistically different from the comparison group at most
tuition levels.
To summarize the findings in the social preferences measures, we show the fraction of the 20,000
COP endowment allocated to another student in the dictator game in Figure 2.4. There is no
variation in generosity by student SES and the increase in donations in the after-offer period is
homogeneous across SES levels.
Regarding risk aversion, there is almost no variation by tuition level (see Figure 2.6). Between 40
and 50 percent of poorer and richer students in the comparison group are risk averse. The level of
this measure is slightly lower for last-semester students, specifically for the richest students in the
sample whose risk aversion is lower by about 20 percentage points relative to the poorer students.
That is, students who started out as richer become less risk averse once they receive and accept a
job offer. In the after paycheck period, we see a similar but nuanced pattern.
Performance in the Raven’s test is fairly constant between 5 and 5.5 questions answered correctly
out of 9 for all students in the after offer stage. There is no indication that performance correlates
with SES or with receiving a job offer. After paycheck, performance levels go up to about 6.5 cor-
rect answers for students in the comparison group and around 6 correct answers for last-semester
students but the confidence intervals overlap across most of the support of the tuition variables.
Overall, the findings in this section indicate that most of the results in section 2.4 arise from bigger
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changes in the poorer students’ performance in the experimental tasks. In other words, the average
poor student in college is more likely to experience more financial and psychological stress. How-
ever, by the time students receive and accept a job offer, there is no longer outcome variation by
SES. Perhaps surprisingly, other outcomes such as generosity in the dictator game, are not sensitive
to socioeconomic background but change along the different stages of the transition.
2.6 Conclusion
Our paper highlights significant, yet temporary spikes in behavior and preferences that result while
transitioning from being a college student to a working member of society. We are among the
first to highlight “windows of clarity” that occur between receiving a job-offer and getting the first
paycheck. These “windows of clarity” are associated with a fall in impatience, a rise in altruistic
behavior, and a perception of greater liquidity despite not having received any paycheck. These
findings point towards a policy opportunity with regard to the timing of crucial long-term deci-
sions such as health care choices, pension and life insurance decisions. These choices that are
often made after people begin working and after they have been paid for the first time at their new
jobs, so this evidence suggests a departure from that norm by indicating that they should be made
during these windows of clarity.
Our results are surprising since graduates of this prestigious university, consistently ranked amongst
the top two in the country, are almost certain to find a job and have financial security. Therefore,
in expectation, we should not have noted changes in social or time preferences, cognitive perfor-
mance and other related tasks and decisions when these students received their job offer. However,
our results imply that uncertainty surrounding specificities of the job, such as when they will re-
ceive a job offer and how much it pays, can have substantial behavioral effects. These uncertainties
may be large enough to cause changes in decision-making merely in response to receiving a job
offer, even before being paid for the first time.
We use a difference-in-differences design to study the effect of first transitioning from being a
(last-semester) college student to receiving a job offer, and then the effect of receiving a paycheck,
on decision-making. By having matched lower-year students in the comparison group answer
the same questions as the last-semester students at roughly the same times, we can effectively
compare their answers across rounds to determine differential trends among these final semester
students. Yet, as we are unable to randomly assign the status of being a last semester student,
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we cannot make strong causal claims about the results. However, we do observe parallel trends
among last semester and lower year students, adding credibility to the DID setup. And the patterns
we observe are strongly suggestive of the effects that transitioning to the job market can have on
decision-making behavior measured through experimental tasks.
We find that there is indeed a change in time preferences, altruism, perceptions of financial health
and psychological measures because of merely receiving a job offer. The finding that last-semester
students become differentially more altruistic and less impatient solely in response to a job offer
demonstrates what a strong effect the resolution of this job uncertainty can have. These students
report it now being less hard to come up with money for an emergency even though they have not
been paid in their new jobs just yet. This contradicts the perception that students at a top university
would have no uncertainty about getting a job since without any change in their earnings, their
perception of their status changes significantly. Furthermore, these students report that they are
less worried, tired, depressed and frustrated when they receive their job offer. While this is not
surprising, what is striking is the large effect these emotions have on their decision-making during
the transition, acting as mediators. Without accounting for these feelings, students appear to be-
come less risk-averse on receiving their job offer. However, once we control for these emotions,
these associations become statistically indistinguishable from zero. In other cases, the effect of the
transition is made stronger, like in the case of becoming less impatient when the job uncertainty
is resolved. Often when studying decision-making behavior, such self-reported measures are not
taken into account and this could be affecting the interpretation of results.
After receiving at least one paycheck from their new jobs, all the effects we observed in the after-
job-offer period dissipate and are no longer statistically or substantively significant. Furthermore,
these students perform differentially worse on the Raven’s Matrices-type cognitive test. Finally,
after receiving a paycheck, students report being more frustrated, worried and tired. These results
are consistent with the hypothesis that after actually receiving some income, these students have to
take on many more responsibilities relating to becoming more independent. They may also have
to take care of other family members, adding to their stress levels and generating a decrease in the
bandwidth available to solve problems Mullainathan and Shafir (2013).
It appears that the resolution of uncertainty regarding the details of their job is the crucial factor
that induces changes in the decision-making of students who transition to the labor market. Their
perceptions of their financial health also change positively. However, after starting to work and
being paid, there may be greater cognitive load that comes with having a lot more responsibilities
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that lead to changes in cognitive performance and feelings of worry and tiredness.
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2.7 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Differences in baseline characteristics
Variable Comparison Last-sem.students Observations
Fraction with tuition <600,000 pesos (US$200) 0.54 0.59 363
Female 0.25 0.25 363
Age 22.98 25.07 352
Undergraduate 0.87 0.88 363
Semester in college 6.18 10.44 355
GPA (from 0 to 5) 3.80 3.81 356
Poor 0.36 0.38 363
Residential stratum (1=lowest, 6=highest) 2.85 2.93 362
Employed 0.43 0.65 363
Expected first salary after graduation
(pesos) 2,052,162 1,957,584 363
Expected salary five years after
graduation (pesos) 4,508,649 4,819,663 363
No. of semesters working full time from
start of college 0.32 0.52 363
No. of semesters working part time from
start of college 1.97 2.84 363
No. of semesters in an intership from
start of college 0.09 0.53 363
How hard to find a job after graduation
(1=very hard, 5=very easy) 2.83 2.57 363
Parents live in different household 0.05 0.07 363
Parents pay most expenses 0.72 0.57 363
Notes: Last-semester students are in their final semester in college. Comparison students are in
lower years and selected to match last-semester students in gender, major and economic back-
ground.
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Table 2.2: Summary of research design
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Job search After job offer After pay
Last-semester
students
Send resumes,
job interviews
Receive and
accept offer Cash on hand
Other
students
Normal student life
Timeline April - May, 2016 October, 2016 December, 2016
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Table 2.3: Mean levels and differences between baseline surveys
Baseline 1 level (y11) y12 − y11 p-value
Comparison Last sem. Comparison Last sem. DID
Social preferences
Fraction given to student - dictator 0.331 0.367 -0.022 -0.059 0.394
Fraction given to foundation - dictator 0.553 0.522 -0.084 -0.053 0.537
Fraction given to student - ultimatum 0.438 0.463 -0.002 -0.027 0.965
Financial situation
Hard to come up with money
for emergency 0.592 0.539 0.005 0.058 0.123
Hard to cover expenses 0.234 0.180 -0.036 0.017 0.200
Stressed about personal finances 0.391 0.427 -0.032 -0.068 0.538
Risk and ambiguity aversion
Risk averse 0.832 0.843 -0.034 -0.045 0.035
Extremely risk averse 0.696 0.685 -0.013 -0.003 0.387
Fraction of inconsistent risk choices 0.261 0.230 -0.110 -0.080 0.289
No. times choosing ambiguous urn
(out of 9) 3.793 3.932 -0.018 -0.156 0.722
Time preferences
No. of non-monotonic choices
(out of 16) 2.258 2.305 -0.474 -0.521 0.039
No. times allocating full amount to
sooner period (out of 16) 2.577 2.831 1.165 0.912 0.265
% present biasedness (weighted by
interest rate) 30.073 28.800 -1.214 0.059 0.719
Cognitive tests
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
(correct out of 3) 1.142 1.023 0.180 0.300 0.155
Raven’s matrices (correct out of 9) 4.038 4.130 2.359 2.267 0.612
Stroop test (correct out of 45) 16.837 16.438 1.199 1.599 0.250
Flanker’s test (correct out of 45) 28.453 27.744 1.709 2.417 0.895
Psychological measures
Tired 0.598 0.539 -0.047 0.011 0.550
Frustrated 0.196 0.180 0.100 0.116 0.271
Worried 0.402 0.331 0.069 0.140 0.363
Depressed 0.141 0.157 0.083 0.067 0.428
Notes: Columns 2 and 3 show survey 1 means of the variables in the rows. Columns 4 and 5 show
the first difference of the means in the two baseline periods. Column 6 shows the p-value of the DID
estimate (Col. 5 - Col. 4).
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Table 2.4: Psychological measures
Tired Frustrated Worried Depressed
Baseline 1 0.598*** 0.196*** 0.402*** 0.141***
(0.036) (0.029) (0.036) (0.026)
Baseline 2 0.005 0.141*** 0.136*** 0.098***
(0.045) (0.040) (0.045) (0.037)
After offer -0.163*** 0.087** 0.022 0.098**
(0.052) (0.043) (0.048) (0.039)
After paycheck -0.375*** 0.043 -0.136*** 0.060
(0.047) (0.041) (0.049) (0.041)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. -0.059 -0.016 -0.071 0.016
(0.052) (0.041) (0.051) (0.038)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. -0.039 -0.063 -0.057 -0.042
(0.065) (0.057) (0.063) (0.053)
After offer * Last-sem. -0.174**† -0.132**†† -0.130**† -0.167***†††
(0.069) (0.059) (0.066) (0.051)
After paycheck * Last-sem. 0.175**†† 0.081 0.178**†† 0.000
(0.070) (0.066) (0.073) (0.061)
Observations 1355 1355 1355 1355
No. subjects 362 362 362 362
Controls No No No No
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the outcomes in
the top row. The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the additional effect of
being a last-semester student compared to a comparison student. The coefficients on the four
baseline terms help establish pre-trends, while the coefficients on the after offer and after
paycheck stages are the DID estimates for the corresponding stages relative to baseline 1.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Multiple Inference (Benjamini-Hochberg on after-offer and
after-paycheck DID coefficients): ††† pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
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Table 2.5: Social preferences
Fraction given
to student
- dictator
Fraction given
to foundation
- dictator
Fraction given
to student
- ultimatum
Baseline 1 0.331*** 0.553*** 0.438***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.014)
Baseline 2 -0.052*** -0.076*** -0.015
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014)
After offer 0.012 -0.085*** 0.027
(0.027) (0.030) (0.023)
After paycheck 0.008 -0.076** 0.029
(0.030) (0.030) (0.026)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. 0.036 -0.031 0.025
(0.025) (0.034) (0.019)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. 0.021 0.015 0.001
(0.024) (0.024) (0.020)
After offer * Last-sem. 0.173***††† 0.163***††† 0.124***†††
(0.044) (0.044) (0.037)
After paycheck * Last-sem. -0.135***††† -0.054 -0.121***†††
(0.040) (0.044) (0.034)
Observations 1355 1355 1355
No. subjects 362 362 362
Controls No No No
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the
outcomes in the top row. The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the
additional effect of being a last-semester student compared to a comparison student.
The coefficients on the four baseline terms help establish pre-trends, while the co-
efficients on the after offer and after paycheck stages are the DID estimates for
the corresponding stages relative to baseline 1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Multiple Inference (Benjamini-Hochberg on after-offer and after-paycheck DID co-
efficients): ††† pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
78
Table 2.6: Time preferences (based on 16 choices)
No. of non-
monotonic
choices
No. choices allocating
full amount to
sooner period
% present biased-
ness (weighted by
interest rate)
Baseline 1 1.740*** 2.981*** 30.847***
(0.257) (0.318) (3.812)
Baseline 2 -0.418* 1.358*** -9.176**
(0.251) (0.302) (4.517)
After offer -0.894*** 2.500*** -2.664
(0.279) (0.382) (4.831)
After paycheck -0.997*** 2.117*** -7.596
(0.262) (0.392) (4.854)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. -0.022 0.718 -4.675
(0.410) (0.473) (5.147)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. -0.478 -0.132 9.098
(0.431) (0.497) (6.299)
After offer * Last-sem. 0.033 -1.897***†† -1.857
(0.471) (0.624) (6.857)
After paycheck * Last-sem. -0.135 -0.802 12.489*
(0.424) (0.634) (7.187)
Observations 787 787 787
No. subjects 314 314 314
Controls No No No
Cond. on correct answer
to understading question
Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the outcomes in the
top row. The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the additional effect of being a
last-semester student compared to a comparison student. The coefficients on the four baseline
terms help establish pre-trends, while the coefficients on the after offer and after paycheck stages
are the DID estimates for the corresponding stages relative to baseline 1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Multiple Inference (Benjamini-Hochberg on after-offer and after-paycheck DID coeffi-
cients): ††† pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
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Table 2.7: Risk and ambiguity aversion
Picked one of 4
most risk averse
gambles (of 6)
Picked one of 3
most risk averse
gambles (of 6)
Inconsistent
in risk choices
No. ambiguous
urns chosen
(out of 9)
Baseline 1 0.832*** 0.696*** 0.261*** 3.793***
(0.028) (0.034) (0.033) (0.142)
Baseline 2 0.005 0.011 -0.071** -0.053
(0.030) (0.033) (0.031) (0.150)
After offer -0.234*** -0.196*** -0.125*** 0.433**
(0.041) (0.043) (0.031) (0.178)
After paycheck -0.277*** -0.272*** -0.168*** 0.583***
(0.043) (0.045) (0.032) (0.168)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. 0.011 -0.010 -0.031 0.138
(0.039) (0.049) (0.045) (0.203)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. -0.095** -0.045 -0.047 -0.087
(0.045) (0.052) (0.045) (0.244)
After offer * Last-sem. -0.143** -0.111* -0.031 -0.202
(0.064) (0.066) (0.046) (0.286)
After paycheck * Last-sem. 0.078 0.056 0.016 -0.285
(0.064) (0.069) (0.047) (0.284)
Observations 1355 1355 1355 1232
No. subjects 362 362 362 362
Controls No No No No
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the outcomes in the
top row. The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the additional effect of being a last-
semester student compared to a comparison student. The coefficients on the four baseline terms
help establish pre-trends, while the coefficients on the after offer and after paycheck stages are the
DID estimates for the corresponding stages relative to baseline 1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Multiple Inference (Benjamini-Hochberg on after-offer and after-paycheck DID coefficients): †††
pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
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Table 2.8: Perceived financial status
Hard to come up
with money
Hard to cover
expenses
Stressed about
personal finances
Baseline 1 0.592*** 0.234*** 0.391***
(0.036) (0.031) (0.036)
Baseline 2 0.071** -0.038 -0.065*
(0.032) (0.035) (0.037)
After offer -0.022 0.011 -0.054
(0.041) (0.042) (0.043)
After paycheck -0.049 -0.022 -0.054
(0.040) (0.038) (0.043)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. -0.053 -0.054 0.036
(0.052) (0.043) (0.052)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. -0.071 0.061 0.032
(0.046) (0.047) (0.051)
After offer * Last-sem. -0.200***††† -0.049 -0.096
(0.060) (0.056) (0.063)
After paycheck * Last-sem. -0.038 0.042 0.045
(0.064) (0.057) (0.068)
Observations 1355 1355 1355
No. subjects 362 362 362
Controls No No No
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the outcomes
in the top row. The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the additional effect
of being a last-semester student compared to a comparison student. The coefficients on
the four baseline terms help establish pre-trends, while the coefficients on the after offer
and after paycheck stages are the DID estimates for the corresponding stages relative to
baseline 1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Multiple Inference (Benjamini-Hochberg on
after-offer and after-paycheck DID coefficients): ††† pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
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Table 2.9: Performance in cognitive tests
Raven’s
Test
Numerical
Stroop Test
Flanker
Task
CRT
No. correct
CRT min.
to answer
Baseline 1 4.038*** 16.837*** 28.453*** 1.142*** 2.564***
(0.118) (0.463) (0.735) (0.061) (0.188)
Baseline 2 2.370*** 1.002* 2.125*** 0.175*** 0.902***
(0.138) (0.568) (0.773) (0.062) (0.265)
After offer 1.116*** 1.402** 1.216 0.045 -0.425*
(0.134) (0.608) (0.988) (0.070) (0.227)
After paycheck 2.500*** 2.943*** 3.240*** 0.303*** -0.058
(0.146) (0.587) (0.932) (0.069) (0.225)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. 0.092 -0.399 -0.708 -0.119 0.229
(0.171) (0.714) (1.046) (0.086) (0.324)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. -0.102 0.930 -0.148 0.130 -0.472
(0.200) (0.807) (1.119) (0.091) (0.378)
After offer * Last-sem. 0.049 0.714 1.556 0.038 -0.344
(0.230) (0.958) (1.557) (0.107) (0.363)
After paycheck * Last-sem. -0.604** 0.216 0.311 -0.091 -0.378
(0.234) (0.912) (1.384) (0.104) (0.347)
Observations 1249 1228 1229 1243 1301
No. subjects 362 362 361 362 362
Controls No No No No No
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the outcomes in the
top row. The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the additional effect of being a last-
semester student compared to a comparison student. The coefficients on the four baseline terms
help establish pre-trends, while the coefficients on the after offer and after paycheck stages are the
DID estimates for the corresponding stages relative to baseline 1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Multiple Inference (Benjamini-Hochberg on after-offer and after-paycheck DID coefficients): †††
pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
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Figure 2.1: Patterns in self-reported psychological factors
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Notes: For each outcome we report means and 95% confidence intervals for last-semester (red) and comparison
students (blue). These means are calculated from DID regressions. For the after-offer and after-paycheck stages,
comparison students were asked to complete the same tasks as last-semester students during the same period.
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Figure 2.2: Social Preferences (dictator and ultimatum games)
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Notes: For each outcome we report means and 95% confidence intervals for last-semester (red) and comparison
students (blue). These means are calculated from DID regressions. For the after-offer and after-paycheck stages,
comparison students were asked to complete the same tasks as last-semester students during the same period.
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Figure 2.3: Psychological well-being (depression) by tuition level
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Figure 2.4: Dictator game by tuition level
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means in the after-paycheck stage.
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Figure 2.5: Hard to come up with money for an emergency by tuition level
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Figure 2.6: Risk aversion by tuition level
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Figure 2.7: Raven’s test by tuition level
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2.8 Preference Measures, Attrition, and Mechanisms
2.8.1 Social Preferences
For social preferences we use the dictator and ultimatum games. By introducing these games, we
were interested in seeing whether altruistic behavior changes across the different stages. In the
dictator game, participants were told that they will receive 20,000 pesos for sure. Then, they had
to choose whether to give part of their allocation to another randomly chosen student participating
in the study. If this task would be chosen for payment, the allocation chosen by the student would
be implemented. A second question of this game changes the recipient of the gift from a randomly
chosen student to a foundation that helps kids in need in Bogota. In the ultimatum game, the setup
is the same except that now the subject proposes an allocation to the recipient student which can
be rejected or accepted by the recipient.12
2.8.2 Time Preferences
Time preference is an important dimension of economic decision making that we measure in this
study by adapting the elicitation task presented in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). The idea of the
task is that subjects are given a pre-specified monetary amount and are required to allocate it be-
tween two dates: earlier and later (see appendix 2.8.2.1). A difference between our implementation
of the task relative to Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) is that the allocations are not continuous but
discretized to increase in 1,000 pesos (about 33 dollar cents) intervals. Participants are instructed
to allocate 50,000 pesos (about US$17) between two dates separated by 4 or 9 weeks. The earliest
payment they could receive is one week from the date they respond to the survey because partic-
ipants were responding to the surveys online and that made it impossible to pay them the same
day they finished it. The trade-offs they face are between weeks 1 and 5, 1 and 9, 5 and 9, and 5
and 13. For each of these trade-offs, they made 4 decisions with varying interest rates if money
is allocated to the later date (1, 10, 50, and 100 percent interest rates). When they choose a value
in the earlier date, the amount to be received in the later date was automatically calculated in the
“later” column including interest. In total, in each round they made 16 choices allocating money to
earlier and later dates. We analyze the monetary values assigned to early dates in each of the four
time comparisons. The first decision we study is the number of non-monotonic decisions made by
12The response from the recipient in this game was actually not implemented because participants were not respond-
ing to the survey simultaneously. In practice, whatever amount the participant donated was assigned to a randomly
chosen student.
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a student. Non-monotonocity in this case refers to allocating an increasing amount of money to an
earlier period as the interest rate for the later period payout goes up. We also examine the “impa-
tience” of students by examining how many times out of the 16 choices students allocate the entire
50,000 pesos to the earlier period. We also study a measure of present-biasedness by examining at
each of the four interest rate levels, what the probability is of assigning a greater amount of money
to week 1 vs. week 5 for a delay of 4 weeks and 8 weeks, respectively. These probabilities are then
weighted proportional to the interest rates in order to derive a percentage of “present-biasedness”.
2.8.2.1 Time preferences based on Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)
EARLIER LATER
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in five weeks with a 1% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in five weeks with a 10% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in five weeks with a 50% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in five weeks with a 100% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in nine weeks with a 1% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in nine weeks with a 10% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in nine weeks with a 50% interest
Allocate to be received next week AND to be received in nine weeks with a 100% interest
2.8.3 Risk Preferences
We elicit risk aversion using the Eckel and Grossman (2002) measure (see example and details in
Appendix 2.8.3.1). This method consists of presenting six different gambles, varying the expected
return, the standard deviation, and the implied CRRA range. Subjects are instructed to select one
of the gambles to play. Each gamble has a 50 percent probability of receiving a low payoff and
50 percent probability of receiving a high payoff, except the first one in which both payoffs are
the same. If this task is selected for payment at the end of the survey, the gamble they choose will
actually be played. The expected payoff in gambles 1 to 5 increases linearly with risk. For gambles
5 and 6, the expected payoff is the same but the risk is bigger in gamble 6 as reflected by the higher
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standard deviation. Risk-averse subjects are expected to choose gambles with a lower standard de-
viation, while risk neutral subjects should choose the gamble with higher expected return (gamble
5) and risk-seeking subjects should choose gamble 6 Charness et al. (2013).
To analyze risk choices we use the risk lotteries from Tanaka et al. (2010). This method is in-
tended to capture Prospect Theory parameters through a series of three lotteries which are much
more complex than the Eckel and Grossman (2002) measure.13 The lotteries consist of a given
number of rows and two columns designated A and B. In each row, columns A and B contain two
values each that represent payoffs and their probabilities appear at the top of the table. For each
row subjects have to choose whether they prefer column A or B. In the instance that this task is
randomly chosen for payment at the end of the survey, students are instructed that if one of the
rows is chosen at random, the payment they receive will depend on the probability stated at the
top of the column. The lotteries are designed such that a risk neutral person will choose column A
up to row 6 and column B starting in row 7 (see appendix 2.8.3.2). This is because the expected
payoff of choosing column A is higher for rows 1 to 6 and higher for column B in rows 7 to 14.
Ideally, subjects will switch columns only once but it has been found that if monotonic switching
is not enforced, subjects often switch multiple times especially in populations with low education
Tanaka et al. (2010). Hence, most papers using this method only ask for the row in which the
subject would switch. Because we want to study inconsistencies in choices, we do not enforce
monotonic switching but rather ask for choices in every row. We are interested in seeing whether
making mistakes (switching back and forth from Column A to Column B) changes across the three
stages differentially for those who will find jobs while we control for learning or understanding the
task better with the performance of the group of students in the comparison group.
13The lotteries elicit the three Prospect Theory parameters: risk aversion, loss aversion, and non-linear probability
weighting. Prospect Theory provides a different and more general characterization of risk preferences than Expected
Utility Theory.
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2.8.3.1 Risk lottery based on Eckel and Grossman (2002)
Row no. Column A Column B
(if heads comes out) (if tails comes out)
1 28,000 pesos 28,000 pesos
2 24,000 pesos 36,000 pesos
3 20,000 pesos 44,000 pesos
4 16,000 pesos 52,000 pesos
5 12,000 pesos 60,000 pesos
6 2,000 pesos 70,000 pesos
2.8.3.2 Risk lotteries based on Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010)
Column A Column B Exp. payoff diff.
Row no. If 1 to 3 comes out If 4 to 10 comes out If 1 comes out If 2 to 10 comes out (A - B)
1 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 6,800 pesos 500 pesos 770 pesos
2 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 7,500 pesos 500 pesos 700 pesos
3 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 8,300 pesos 500 pesos 620 pesos
4 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 9,300 pesos 500 pesos 520 pesos
5 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 10,600 pesos 500 pesos 390 pesos
6 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 12,500 pesos 500 pesos 200 pesos
7 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 15,000 pesos 500 pesos -50 pesos
8 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 18500 pesos 500 pesos -400 pesos
9 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 22,000 pesos 500 pesos -750 pesos
10 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 30,000 pesos 500 pesos -1,550 pesos
11 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 40,000 pesos 500 pesos -2,550 pesos
12 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 60,000 pesos 500 pesos -4,550 pesos
13 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 100,000 pesos 500 pesos -8,550 pesos
14 4,000 pesos 1,000 pesos 170,000 pesos 500 pesos -15,550 pesos
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2.8.4 Ambiguity Aversion
Ambiguity aversion, the preference for known risks relative to unknown risks Camerer and Weber
(1992); Ellsberg (1961), is another measure of economic decision making that we analyze. To
implement this measure we use a task based on Tanaka et al. (2014) in which subjects must choose
between a gamble whose outcome objective probabilities are known relative to one in which they
are unknown. In practice, participants are presented with a series of comparisons as in appendix
2.8.4.1. In each of 9 choices, they see two urns filled with 24 blue and red balls and are instructed
that they will receive the monetary reward associated to the urn they choose to play if a red ball is
drawn from that urn. In urn A (left-hand side), there are always 12 red and 12 blue balls completely
visible to participants and the payment in case of drawing a red ball from that urn is 20,000 pesos
(about US$7) in each of the 9 choices. Urn B (right-hand side) is partially covered so that it is
impossible to know the mix of red and blue balls, hence urn B is the ambiguous urn. The occluder
covers 1/4, 1/2 and 3/4 of the urn depending on the choice. In the first three choices, the value of
urn A and B is the same (20,000 pesos) but in subsequent choices, the value of urn B increases to
30,000 (in choices 4-6) and to 40,000 pesos (in choices 7-9) if a red ball is randomly selected. To
analyze ambiguity aversion we create a variable counting the number of times the students choose
the ambiguous urn from a total of 9.
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2.8.4.1 Ambiguity aversion based on Tanaka et al. (2014)
A B A B
A B
2.8.5 Cognitive Performance
In terms of cognition, the bandwidth theory proposed by Mullainathan, Shafir and coauthors im-
plies that scarcity (of time or resources) affects cognitive functioning which may compromise
decision making Mani et al. (2013); Mullainathan and Shafir (2013); Shah et al. (2012). To mea-
sure different dimensions of cognition we use tasks such as a Raven’s matrices-type IQ test, the
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), the Flanker’s test, and the numerical Stroop test.
The IQ test is a version of the Raven’s test in which a pattern must be completed by the participant
by choosing one of the choices given. This test provides a non-verbal measure of fluid intelligence
which, as discussed in Mani et al. (2013), proxies the capacity to solve problems without prior
knowledge. There were 9 questions in total and a time limit of 3 minutes to solve them. The test is
difficult enough that very few people are able to correctly answer all questions in 3 minutes. Upon
completion of the 3 minutes, participants were automatically directed to the next task. The same
questions were given in Baseline 1 and after the job offer, and in Baseline 2 and after their first
paycheck so the participants did not see the questions in at least 5 months.
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The Numerical Stroop Test requires the subject to enter the number of digits displayed to them
without getting distracted by the digit itself. For example if they see “3 3” they must respond “2”
which is the number of objects displayed and not “3” which is the number that may come first to
mind. This test has been used by Mani et al. (2013) and Carvalho et al. (2016) as a measure of
cognitive control which is related to inhibiting inappropriate responses and selecting the appropri-
ate information for processing. Because our surveys are taken online, our version of the Numerical
Stroop Task involves using the keyboard to select the correct number of objects displayed out of
45 in total in 30 seconds. Participants receive 1,000 pesos for each correct answer if this task is
selected for payment at the end of the survey.
In the Flanker Test subjects see a sequence of five arrows pointing to the left or to the right. They
have to press the arrow in the keyboard that corresponds to the direction that the middle arrow in
the sequence is pointing to. This test measures the ability to ignore distracting information and su-
press inappropriate responses. Again they have 30 seconds to correctly respond as many questions
as possible.
The last cognitive measure we study is the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). This test measures the
ability to supress incorrect intuitive and spontaneous answers to give the reflective correct answer
Frederick (2005). The test usually consists of 3 questions (see appendix 2.8.5.1) but we add three
more from Sinayev and Peters (2015) or change the wording of the original three questions so that
it is harder for participants to recognize them from previous rounds.
2.8.5.1 Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
The questions that were asked in Spanish are a translation or adaptation of the following questions:
• A bat and a ball cost $1.10 total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the
ball cost? (Intuitive error: 10; correct: 5)
• If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets? (Intuitive error: 100; correct: 5).
• In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half
of the lake? (Intuitive error: 24; correct: 47)
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• Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many
students are in the class? (Intuitive error: 15, 30; correct: 29)
• A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90.
How much has he made? (Intuitive error: 10; correct: 20)
• Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six months after
he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon,
from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this point Simon
has (a) broken even in the stock market, (b) is ahead of where he began, (c) has lost money.
(Intuitive error: b; correct: c).
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2.8.6 Attrition
In this section we assess the extent of attrition across different rounds and whether it can be pre-
dicted from baseline covariates or baseline outcomes. If attrition happened differentially for stu-
dents with certain characteristics, some of our results in the next section could be driven by selec-
tion into staying in the sample.
For the baseline, surveys 1 and 2, we collected data from 363 participants. The aggregate attrition
rate after receiving a job offer is 16.7 percent and after receiving the first paycheck, it is 21.5 per-
cent. Effective attrition, after making the adjustments in the definition of stages discussed in the
previous section, is 28.9 percent for the after offer period (Round 2) and 24.8 percent for the after
paycheck period (Round 3). We consider these rates to be low among longitudinal studies. For the
econometric analyses we use the sample that contains students who answered all surveys.
As expected, attrition is higher among last-semester students who eventally graduate and find jobs.
Further, students who stay in the sample are more likely to be undergraduates although the sta-
tistical significance of this variable disappears when adjusting for multiple inference testing. The
evidence shows that attrition is not related to baseline covariates except for the variable indicating
whether the student is a last-semester student.
Because comparison group students are more likely to respond to all surveys, we examine whether
outcomes measured at baseline are related to staying in the sample for the comparison and last-
semester students separately. Tables 2.10 and 2.11 show the attrition test results. The dependent
variable in the two tables is an indicator equal to one if the student responds all surveys. We regress
that indicator on all the variables in the rows. Given the large number of regressors, we present
these regressions in two tables. Appendix Table 2.10 shows the risk, time and social preferences
outcomes at baseline. Similarly, Appendix Table 2.11 shows cognitive tests, perceptions on per-
sonal finances and psychological measures. The three columns of results correspond to one of
three samples (all, comparison group, and last-semester students). For statistical significance, we
report the usual tests without adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing (stars) and the tests adjust-
ing using the Benjamini-Hochberg method within column (daggers).
Column 1 of Table 2.10 shows that students who remain in the sample are more likely to make
non-monotonic switches in the risk lottery and less likely to be present-biased than students who
leave the sample. Only the result for the significant correlation in inconsistencies in risk choices
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survives the multiple testing adjustment. Moreover, it is clear that this significant relationship is
driven by last-semester students as can be seen in column 3. In Table 2.11 we do not see any sta-
tistically significant differences in the baseline outcomes between those who stay and those who
attrit (Columns 1 to 3).
Overall, we find that last-semester students are more likely to attrit. Students who remain in the
sample are more likely to make inconsistent choices in the risk lottery and, to some extent, to be
less present biased. However, these correlations with baseline characteristics are not crucial in the
statistical sense.
Table 2.10: Tests for sample attrition (Part 1)
Levels in Baseline 2 Change from Baseline 1 to 2
All Comparison
Last-sem.
Students
All Comparison
Last-sem.
Students
Risk averse 0.095 0.049 -0.005 0.006 -0.042 -0.242**
(0.086) (0.094) (0.131) (0.075) (0.088) (0.110)
CRRA -0.033 -0.021 -0.020 -0.015 -0.028 0.007
(0.024) (0.026) (0.038) (0.020) (0.021) (0.030)
Inconsistent risk 0.205***††† -0.001 0.388***†† 0.017 -0.069 0.092
lottery (0.065) (0.085) (0.109) (0.066) (0.059) (0.103)
Ambiguity averse 0.030 0.075 0.033 -0.031 0.023 -0.023
(0.052) (0.057) (0.087) (0.051) (0.052) (0.081)
Present biased -0.002** -0.002 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Impatient -0.003 -0.002 0.006 -0.005 -0.011 0.003
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012)
Non-monotonic 0.022** 0.008 0.026 0.014 0.001 0.005
choices (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013)
Fraction to student -0.027 0.049 0.131 -0.056 0.186 -0.077
- dictator (0.134) (0.158) (0.181) (0.142) (0.201) (0.204)
Fraction to foundation -0.110 -0.128 -0.192 -0.097 -0.422***†† 0.159
- dictator (0.097) (0.120) (0.136) (0.129) (0.137) (0.173)
Fraction to student 0.090 0.157 -0.046 0.144 0.359 -0.052
- ultimatum (0.175) (0.253) (0.235) (0.169) (0.247) (0.242)
Constant 0.651***†† 0.812*** 0.533 0.583***†† 0.827***†† 0.306***††
(0.198) (0.251) (0.337) (0.047) (0.062) (0.071)
N 352 178 171 317 157 157
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple testing: ††† p<0.01, †† p<0.05, † p<0.1
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Table 2.11: Tests for sample attrition (Part 2)
Levels in Baseline 2 Change from Baseline 1 to 2
All Comparison
Last-sem.
Students
All Comparison
Last-sem.
Students
IQ test (Raven’s) 0.012 0.001 0.026 0.035*** 0.020 0.052**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021)
CRT test 0.008 -0.024 -0.017 -0.023 -0.005 0.008
(0.041) (0.045) (0.059) (0.031) (0.034) (0.053)
Stroop test -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.011**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Flanker test -0.003 0.000 -0.006 -0.004 -0.000 -0.008**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Hard to come up -0.008 -0.018 -0.117 0.022 -0.039 0.025
with money (0.056) (0.066) (0.085) (0.065) (0.069) (0.108)
Hard to cover -0.020 0.064 0.027 -0.040 0.089 -0.097
expenses (0.074) (0.085) (0.108) (0.064) (0.072) (0.103)
Insatisfied HH -0.026 0.002 0.001 -0.035 0.040 -0.050
finances (0.066) (0.068) (0.097) (0.058) (0.059) (0.089)
Stressed personal -0.033 0.047 -0.071 0.025 0.002 -0.035
finances (0.064) (0.079) (0.095) (0.059) (0.049) (0.090)
Inconsistent in the -0.031 -0.031 -0.048 -0.007 -0.039 -0.089
value of money (0.055) (0.065) (0.096) (0.060) (0.066) (0.102)
Happy 0.117* 0.087 0.131 0.094 0.042 0.229***
(0.071) (0.092) (0.101) (0.058) (0.067) (0.086)
Frustrated 0.028 -0.054 0.035 0.017 -0.023 0.089
(0.070) (0.073) (0.133) (0.054) (0.057) (0.085)
Depressed -0.032 -0.063 0.015 -0.041 -0.110* -0.044
(0.074) (0.082) (0.144) (0.057) (0.058) (0.097)
Worried 0.005 -0.039 -0.021 -0.011 0.023 -0.086
(0.061) (0.071) (0.088) (0.050) (0.055) (0.075)
Enjoying myself -0.109* -0.022 -0.215** -0.126** -0.013 -0.182**
(0.066) (0.084) (0.089) (0.052) (0.068) (0.076)
Tired 0.017 -0.001 -0.013 -0.029 0.024 -0.071
(0.058) (0.066) (0.084) (0.050) (0.052) (0.074)
Constant 0.651***†† 0.812***†† 0.533 0.583***†† 0.827***†† 0.306***††
(0.198) (0.251) (0.337) (0.047) (0.062) (0.071)
N 352 178 171 317 157 157
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Multiple testing: ††† p<0.01, †† p<0.05, † p<0.1
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Table 2.12: Credit and expenses
Has a credit card Has a loan
Pays most of
own expenses
Baseline 1 0.158*** 0.266*** 0.207***
(0.027) (0.033) (0.030)
Baseline 2 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
After offer 0.049* 0.058* 0.100***
(0.027) (0.033) (0.029)
After paycheck 0.055** -0.005 0.116***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.034)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. 0.045 0.104** 0.187***
(0.041) (0.049) (0.047)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
After offer * Last-sem. -0.017 -0.222*** ††† 0.081
(0.049) (0.052) (0.057)
After paycheck * Last-sem. -0.005 0.089 0.108**
(0.045) (0.054) (0.053)
Observations 1246 1315 1246
No. subjects 362 362 362
Controls No No No
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the out-
comes in the top row. The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the addi-
tional effect of being a last-semester student compared to a comparison student. The
coefficients on the four baseline terms help establish pre-trends, while the coefficients
on the after offer and after paycheck stages are the DID estimates for the correspond-
ing stages relative to baseline 1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Multiple Infer-
ence (Benjamini-Hochberg on after-offer and after-paycheck DID coefficients): †††
pm<0.01, †† pm<0.05, † pm<0.1
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2.8.7 Other difference-in-differences results adding psychological and inde-
pendence controls
Table 2.13: Social preferences with controls
Fraction given to
student - dictator
Fraction given to
foundation - dictator
Fraction given to
student - ultimatum
Baseline 1 0.389*** 0.328*** 0.602*** 0.556*** 0.486*** 0.435***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.027) (0.023) (0.017) (0.014)
Baseline 2 -0.042** -0.056*** -0.068*** -0.079*** -0.005 -0.018
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
After offer 0.005 -0.088*** -0.092*** -0.163*** 0.024 -0.055***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.030) (0.028) (0.023) (0.019)
After paycheck -0.018 -0.117*** -0.100*** -0.172*** 0.010 -0.072***
(0.029) (0.023) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.022)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. 0.030 0.033 -0.038 -0.029 0.020 0.023
(0.026) (0.026) (0.034) (0.035) (0.019) (0.020)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. 0.014 0.021 0.010 0.015 -0.005 0.001
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020)
After offer * Last-sem. 0.153*** 0.024 0.148*** 0.025 0.105*** -0.008
(0.044) (0.037) (0.045) (0.044) (0.037) (0.030)
After paycheck * Last-sem. -0.115*** -0.013 -0.036 0.046 -0.105*** -0.022
(0.039) (0.035) (0.044) (0.043) (0.033) (0.031)
Observations 1355 1246 1355 1246 1355 1246
No. subjects 362 362 362 362 362 362
Controls:
Psychological factors Yes No Yes No Yes No
Self pays own expenses No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the outcomes in the top
row. The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the additional effect of being a last-semester
student compared to a comparison student. The coefficients on the four baseline terms help establish
pre-trends, while the coefficients on the after offer and after paycheck stages are the DID estimates for
the corresponding stages relative to baseline 1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.14: Perceived financial status with controls
Hard to come up
with money
Hard to cover
expenses
Stressed about
personal finances
Baseline 1 0.459*** 0.616*** 0.141*** 0.233*** 0.255*** 0.391***
(0.041) (0.037) (0.031) (0.032) (0.038) (0.037)
Baseline 2 0.036 0.074** -0.066* -0.037 -0.113*** -0.063*
(0.032) (0.031) (0.037) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037)
After offer -0.020 0.075** 0.007 0.047 -0.068 -0.004
(0.041) (0.038) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045)
After paycheck 0.000 0.066* 0.004 0.017 -0.021 0.009
(0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.043) (0.046)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. -0.036 -0.031 -0.046 -0.055 0.051 0.036
(0.051) (0.053) (0.041) (0.042) (0.051) (0.053)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. -0.053 -0.071 0.075 0.061 0.054 0.032
(0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.053) (0.051)
After offer * Last-sem. -0.150** -0.104* -0.005 -0.026 -0.033 0.013
(0.060) (0.063) (0.055) (0.064) (0.061) (0.071)
After paycheck * Last-sem. -0.087 -0.127** 0.012 0.002 -0.004 -0.018
(0.063) (0.063) (0.056) (0.059) (0.066) (0.070)
Observations 1355 1246 1355 1246 1355 1246
No. subjects 362 362 362 362 362 362
Controls:
Psychological factors Yes No Yes No Yes No
Self pays own expenses No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the outcomes in the
top row. The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the additional effect of being a last-
semester student compared to a comparison student. The coefficients on the four baseline terms help
establish pre-trends, while the coefficients on the after offer and after paycheck stages are the DID
estimates for the corresponding stages relative to baseline 1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.15: Time preferences (based on 16 choices)
No. non-mono-
tonic choices
No. choices allocating
full amount to
sooner period
% present biased-
ness (weighted by
interest rate)
Baseline 1 1.671*** 1.753*** 3.357*** 2.986*** 28.598*** 30.722***
(0.287) (0.259) (0.368) (0.323) (4.091) (3.800)
Baseline 2 -0.412 -0.416* 1.400*** 1.359*** -9.059** -9.198**
(0.255) (0.251) (0.301) (0.302) (4.520) (4.526)
After offer -0.869*** -0.870*** 2.489*** 2.444*** -2.010 -4.145
(0.286) (0.284) (0.388) (0.382) (4.926) (4.730)
After paycheck -0.946*** -0.986*** 1.980*** 2.121*** -6.051 -7.701
(0.277) (0.258) (0.401) (0.399) (4.902) (4.928)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. -0.013 -0.005 0.713 0.725 -4.296 -4.845
(0.411) (0.416) (0.470) (0.485) (5.172) (5.244)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. -0.474 -0.483 -0.190 -0.134 9.172 9.151
(0.434) (0.430) (0.496) (0.495) (6.298) (6.306)
After offer * Last-sem. 0.032 0.035 -2.037*** -1.928*** -1.942 -0.262
(0.472) (0.474) (0.627) (0.621) (6.915) (6.807)
After paycheck * Last-sem. -0.162 -0.131 -0.747 -0.801 11.451 12.455*
(0.430) (0.424) (0.618) (0.634) (7.124) (7.190)
Observations 787 784 787 784 787 784
No. subjects 314 314 314 314 314 314
Controls:
Psychological factors Yes No Yes No Yes No
Self pays own expenses No Yes No Yes No Yes
Cond. on correct answer
to understading question
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the outcomes in the top row.
The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the additional effect of being a last-semester student
compared to a comparison student. The coefficients on the four baseline terms help establish pre-trends,
while the coefficients on the after offer and after paycheck stages are the DID estimates for the correspond-
ing stages relative to baseline 1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.16: Risk and ambiguity aversion with controls
Risk averse
Extremely risk
averse
No. of ambiguous
urns chosen
(out of 9)
Baseline 1 0.788*** 0.842*** 0.661*** 0.697*** 3.855*** 3.834***
(0.033) (0.028) (0.040) (0.035) (0.163) (0.143)
Baseline 2 -0.009 -0.000 -0.000 0.005 -0.040 -0.050
(0.031) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.153) (0.151)
After offer -0.238*** -0.148*** -0.199*** -0.128*** 0.440** 0.480***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.180) (0.179)
After paycheck -0.266*** -0.177*** -0.261*** -0.201*** 0.572*** 0.615***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.047) (0.048) (0.178) (0.172)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. 0.016 0.017 -0.006 -0.013 0.137 0.175
(0.039) (0.040) (0.049) (0.050) (0.203) (0.206)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. -0.088* -0.090** -0.040 -0.039 -0.097 -0.087
(0.046) (0.045) (0.052) (0.051) (0.245) (0.245)
After offer * Last-sem. -0.123* 0.026 -0.097 0.017 -0.229 -0.212
(0.064) (0.067) (0.066) (0.071) (0.291) (0.289)
After paycheck * Last-sem. 0.063 -0.020 0.043 -0.022 -0.279 -0.271
(0.064) (0.064) (0.070) (0.071) (0.286) (0.285)
Observations 1355 1241 1355 1241 1232 1226
No. subjects 362 362 362 362 362 362
Controls:
Psychological factors Yes No Yes No Yes No
Self pays own expenses No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the outcomes in the top row.
The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the additional effect of being a last-semester student
compared to a comparison student. The coefficients on the four baseline terms help establish pre-trends,
while the coefficients on the after offer and after paycheck stages are the DID estimates for the correspond-
ing stages relative to baseline 1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.17: Prospect theory parameters with controls
Curvature of the
value function
Probability
weighting
Loss aversion
Baseline 1 0.320*** 0.317*** 0.739*** 0.739*** 2.353*** 2.373***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.022) (0.023) (0.179) (0.183)
Baseline 2 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.355* -0.361*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) (0.192) (0.191)
After offer -0.096** -0.102*** 0.022 0.025 -0.577*** -0.572***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.028) (0.029) (0.210) (0.210)
After paycheck -0.179*** -0.180*** 0.010 0.010 -0.795*** -0.789***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.197) (0.196)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. 0.040 0.038 -0.007 -0.007 -0.101 -0.085
(0.041) (0.040) (0.029) (0.029) (0.241) (0.243)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. -0.032 -0.031 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.014
(0.047) (0.047) (0.037) (0.037) (0.256) (0.256)
After offer * Last-sem. 0.029 -0.002 -0.046 -0.044 0.129 0.038
(0.055) (0.058) (0.043) (0.045) (0.272) (0.276)
After paycheck * Last-sem. -0.002 0.021 -0.046 -0.048 0.234 0.385
(0.059) (0.056) (0.046) (0.046) (0.277) (0.298)
Observations 857 846 857 846 743 736
No. subjects 326 324 326 324 306 303
Controls:
Psychological factors Yes No Yes No Yes No
Self pays own expenses No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the outcomes in the top row.
The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the additional effect of being a last-semester student
compared to a comparison student. The coefficients on the four baseline terms help establish pre-trends,
while the coefficients on the after offer and after paycheck stages are the DID estimates for the correspond-
ing stages relative to baseline 1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.18: Performance in cognitive tests with controls
Raven’s Test
Numerical
Stroop Test
Flanker Task
Baseline 1 0.320*** 0.309*** 0.739*** 0.740*** 2.353*** 2.219***
(0.030) (0.035) (0.022) (0.023) (0.179) (0.177)
Baseline 2 -0.004 -0.013 -0.003 -0.007 -0.355* -0.374*
(0.033) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028) (0.192) (0.200)
After offer -0.096** -0.103*** 0.022 0.019 -0.577*** -0.566***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.028) (0.029) (0.210) (0.217)
After paycheck -0.179*** -0.181*** 0.010 0.007 -0.795*** -0.705***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.032) (0.032) (0.197) (0.198)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. 0.040 0.043 -0.007 -0.006 -0.101 -0.109
(0.041) (0.041) (0.029) (0.029) (0.241) (0.239)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. -0.032 -0.029 0.010 0.011 0.014 0.058
(0.047) (0.048) (0.037) (0.037) (0.256) (0.258)
After offer * Last-sem. 0.029 0.035 -0.046 -0.048 0.129 0.194
(0.055) (0.056) (0.043) (0.043) (0.272) (0.277)
After paycheck * Last-sem. -0.002 -0.006 -0.046 -0.048 0.234 0.214
(0.059) (0.058) (0.046) (0.046) (0.277) (0.278)
Observations 857 857 857 857 743 743
No. subjects 326 326 326 326 306 306
Controls:
Psychological factors Yes No Yes No Yes No
Self pays own expenses No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the outcomes in the top row.
The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the additional effect of being a last-semester student
compared to a comparison student. The coefficients on the four baseline terms help establish pre-trends,
while the coefficients on the after offer and after paycheck stages are the DID estimates for the correspond-
ing stages relative to baseline 1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.19: Performance in Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) with con-
trols
No. Correct Minutes to answer
Baseline 1 1.135*** 1.158*** 2.567*** 2.592***
(0.071) (0.062) (0.196) (0.194)
Baseline 2 0.163*** 0.175*** 0.914*** 0.902***
(0.063) (0.062) (0.258) (0.265)
After offer 0.033 0.053 -0.401* -0.411*
(0.072) (0.070) (0.225) (0.226)
After paycheck 0.292*** 0.312*** -0.040 -0.043
(0.073) (0.070) (0.222) (0.223)
Baseline 1 * Last-sem. -0.118 -0.105 0.231 0.255
(0.086) (0.087) (0.324) (0.333)
Baseline 2 * Last-sem. 0.134 0.130 -0.475 -0.473
(0.092) (0.091) (0.375) (0.378)
After offer * Last-sem. 0.043 0.058 -0.375 -0.348
(0.108) (0.107) (0.384) (0.381)
After paycheck * Last-sem. -0.093 -0.083 -0.471 -0.449
(0.103) (0.104) (0.349) (0.345)
Observations 1243 1241 1243 1241
No. subjects 362 362 362 362
Controls:
Psychological factors Yes No Yes No
Self pays own expenses No Yes No Yes
Notes: Notes: Each column shows the coefficients of a DID regression for the
outcomes in the top row. The coefficients on the interaction terms demonstrate the
additional effect of being a last-semester student compared to a comparison stu-
dent. The coefficients on the four baseline terms help establish pre-trends, while
the coefficients on the after offer and after paycheck stages are the DID estimates
for the corresponding stages relative to baseline 1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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CHAPTER 3
3
Unbundling the Load: How Electricity
Restructuring Affects the Manufacturing
Sector
The Indian power sector was largely comprised of state-owned, vertically-integrated firms that, for
years, accrued large losses. Between 1998 and 2003, a number of electricity reforms, under the
umbrella of the Electricity Act, were phased in, which sought to make the electricity sector more
competitive and efficient. I use an event-study framework to study the effect of these reforms on the
manufacturing sector, one of the biggest consumers of electricity in India. The reforms affected
manufacturing firms via two main channels: the price per unit of electricity and the quality of
electricity. While many expected states with multiple distributors to benefit consumers, I find that
instead states that ended up with a single distributor supplied more reliable access to energy. Single
distributors found it easier to raise prices, reflecting political realities. In such states, the reforms
increased the amount of electricity consumed by manufacturing firms. Consistent with moving to
a higher price tier, the average price paid by firms increases, and firms re-optimize their production
decisions. Despite a price increase, firms respond to decreased blackouts (greater reliability) by
increasing purchased electricity, worker hours and worker productivity. I find corroborating evi-
dence of greater electrification using luminosity data (satellite night lights) that shows an increase
in light density in these particular states.
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3.1 Introduction
An oft quoted statistic in the case of India is that 240 million people do not have access to the
electrical grid (International Energy Agency, 2015). However, what is arguably more striking is
the fact that even consumers who do have access to the grid, do not receive uninterrupted elec-
tricity, with ‘scheduled’ power cuts being a regular feature of life in India. The 2014 World Bank
Enterprise Survey found that a substantial fraction of surveyed Indian firms reported electricity
outages as their biggest obstacle to production, second only to corruption. These power cuts occur
not only because the generation of electricity in India is low, but because of losses in electricity due
to inefficiencies in bill collections, transmission and distribution. In order to mitigate these leak-
ages, a number of reforms were instituted in the late 90s to transition away from the state-owned,
vertically integrated enterprises that characterized the electricity sector.
In 2003, the Electricity Act sought to unbundle generation from the transmission and distribution
sectors. Additionally, the reforms mandated the establishment of central and state-level regulatory
commissions in a move away from the traditional State Electricity Boards, which lacked trans-
parency in their actions. This Act was followed by a number of reforms that aimed to overhaul the
sector in the long run, but in this paper I focus on the Electricity Acts of 1998 and 2003, and in par-
ticular on the state-wise variation in unbundling of generation from transmission and distribution,
and the establishment of regulatory commissions.
I study the effect of these reforms on manufacturing firms in India, using data from the Annual
Survey of Industries between 1998 and 2012, spanning a major portion of the enactment period
of these reforms. Cropper et al. (2011) show that these reforms were not successful in increasing
thermal power plant efficiency, but they do find evidence of reduced power outages. I use the
outcomes of these manufacturing firms as a litmus test in order to evaluate the efficacy of the
reforms, given that electricity is a major input into manufacturing, and one that is considered a
major constraint to production. The reforms may affect the manufacturing sector via the retail
price of electricity and the quality of the electricity supply. Using the Annual Survey of Industries,
I study the effect of the reforms on the average price-per-unit of electricity, total unit of electricity
purchased, total output, worker productivity and own-generated electricity. I obtain satellite data
on night-time lights as a proxy for electrification (Burlig and Preonas, 2017; Mann et al., 2016;
Min and Golden, 2014), and use it to study the effect on power outages.
I use an event study analysis to estimate the causal effects of the reforms on manufacturing sector
outcomes. I exploit the variation across states in the timing of reforms, and also the terms of reform
implementation, that led to different electricity sector configurations across regions. The reforms
were phased in over a six year period, and the event study framework allows me to identify im-
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pacts with fewer restrictive assumptions than a traditional difference-in-differences design. Unlike
a traditional difference-in-difference where the ‘treatment’ occurs one specific year, the staggered
implementation of reforms allows me to study the impacts free of coincident changes in one partic-
ular year. Year and district fixed effects control for coincident shocks common across all districts,
and time-invariant unobserved characteristics. Indeed, I can test for whether these outcomes had
pre-trends by studying semi-parametric estimates in a graphical format.
I study the effects across different manners of implementation as well. Importantly, different states
split up the three sectors – generation, transmission and distribution – in different manners. Some
partially unbundled the components, whereas others completely unbundled all electricity firms.
Inadvertently, the reforms had a differential impact on manufacturing firms in different states,
based on the way they were implemented. As a result of the reforms, a few states ended up with a
single state-wide electricity distributor, while others ended up with multiple.
I find that in states with one unified distribution network, there was higher consumption of grid-
generated electricity by establishments, as well as lower blackouts and greater reliability of supply.
Manufacturing firms with access to a single distribution utility benefited in terms of increased
worker hours and productivity. It may sound counter-intuitive that less competition from just a
single distributor is good for consumers. Yet, with a single distribution entity for the state, it is
politically and logistically feasible to raise prices and improve electricity reliability, in contrast
with coordinating tariff increases across multiple non-competing utilities. This is also confirmed
by Cropper et al. (2011), who find that the reforms did indeed lead to a reduction in power outages,
and firms were consequently able to expand production. Such unexpected results demonstrate the
unintended effects of reform interpretation and implementation, and highlights the importance of
understanding these varied implications when designing such policies.
This study highlights an understudied aspect of the consequences of electricity restructuring. With-
out separating states by the method of reform implementation, it may appear that the effects on
manufacturing outcomes are very low or non-existent. However, by exploiting descriptive admin-
istrative data which details the variation across states, this paper is able to identify and highlight
an important aspect of the implementation process. State electricity utilities in India widely under-
price their electricity, due to numerous subsidies. Such subsidies can sometimes lead to perverse
incentives, and reduce infrastructure investment and electricity reliability (McRae, 2015). In order
to sustainably supply electricity in the long-run, distribution companies often appeal to regulatory
commissions to raise their prices and increase their revenues. The commercial losses due to un-
paid bills are particularly high in India, making this an important step. However, electricity being
an important issue to voters (Chhibber et al., 2004), there is political pressure to keep prices low
(Chatterjee, 2018).
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In states with multiple distribution companies, the coordination problem arising from political
pressure and the need to keep electricity prices approximately equal across the state, makes it
difficult to get tariff revisions approved by regulatory commissions. On the other hand, a single
distribution would find it easier to negotiate such increases, by avoiding the coordination failures
from multiple distributors. This paper shows that in the Indian context, these tariff increases were
especially beneficial to manufacturing firms, particularly because of the improvement in electricity
reliability. This result was an inadvertent consequence of how state institutions led to a particular
execution of the reforms and underlines the importance of implementation in policy design.
3.2 The Power Sector in India
The Indian power sector was historically known to be characterized by insufficient generating
capacity, inefficient transmission and distribution infrastructure and frequent power blackouts. The
tariff structure that was in place did not allow the costs of these power plants to be covered and
therefore the electricity sector was highly subsidized to keep it operational. The low prices charged
to households and agricultural users of electricity were partially compensated for by charging
higher prices for industrial users. However, often, these industrial consumers would generate their
own electricity to avoid paying these higher tariffs. The future reforms were further precipitated
by the fact that the distribution networks suffered from huge losses in power due to technical
difficulties and theft (Tongia (2003)).
Even though the economic liberalization reforms in 1991 addressed restructuring in the electricity
sector, they did not lead to many positive changes. The aim of these reforms had been to encourage
the entry of independent power producers (IPPs) into the electricity market and make its operations
more competitive and efficient. However, generation, transmission and distribution sectors largely
remained vertically integrated and state owned, and continued to be considered highly inefficient.
Despite these reforms, about a third of the country’s population remained without any access to the
electricity grid, and those who did have access, faced massive power outages. On the supply side,
the power sector was still making losses in the late 1990s, well after the reforms, to the tune of Rs.
250 billion (almost $6 billion), with cost-recovery continuously declining (Pargal and Banerjee
(2014)). In fact, in 2001, the Planning Commission of India oversaw a large scale bailout of the
power sector to uphold their credit worthiness.
Given the unsustainability of these mounting losses, in 1998 and 2003, the Indian government
passed the Electricity Acts in order to consolidate the reforms enacted in the past decade and ad-
dress the issues facing the sector. Eighty-five percent of the state-owned coal-based power plants
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were unbundled from the transmission and distribution sectors. The main aim was to expand gen-
eration capacity and encourage entry of IPPs to reduce costs. While the generation companies
remained state owned, they were now independent from the distribution and transmission compa-
nies and therefore had greater autonomy in their decisions. The EA 2003 was followed by a series
of reforms which aimed to emphasize competition in the power sector, promote rural electrifica-
tion and renewable energy, introduce licensed power trading and move towards a multi-year tariff
framework. Restructuring also involved the setting up of a wholesale market for electricity with
hourly spot markets. Independent System Operators (ISOs) were assigned to the management of
regional transmission grids.
As a part of the EA 2003, apart from unbundling generation companies from the vertically in-
tegrated power firms, independent regulators were made mandatory at the central and state level
(Singh (2006)). This was done to increase the internal accountability of the power utilities and sep-
arate them from the lack of transparency and politically motivated decisions that marked the sector
when it was under the State Electricity Boards (SEBs) that monitored them before the reform. At
the national level, a central electricity regulatory commission (CERC) was set up, while at the state
level, these independent regulators, also called the state electricity regulatory committees (SERCs)
were set up in at least 28 states as of 2013.
Another major goal of these reforms was to modify the tariff structure for end users and genera-
tors. Steps were taken to try and compensate for the subsidized rates offered to agricultural and
household users by charging industry users a higher tariff. The EA also made provisions for choice
at the consumer end by allowing multiple retail licenses (often indistinguishable from distribution
licenses in the Indian context, where these terms are used interchangeably), and even for parallel
distribution lines. This lowers the barrier to entry at the retail end. Private retailers (or distributors)
were also allowed to use the state utility’s distribution lines by paying a wheeling charge, but in
practice retail competition did not really take off except in a few isolated cities.
3.3 Prior Work on Electricity Reforms
In the US, like in India, restructuring occurred at state level, with there being variation in the
timing and extent of various policies. However, in most states that it did occur, it included the
vertical disintegration of the generation, transmission and distribution sectors. This resulted in
either complete separation of these sectors or at the very least limited upward and downward flow
of information.
There is mixed evidence from the work has been done to examine the effect of restructuring in the
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US, particularly on power plant outcomes. A lot of these papers identify the effects of restructuring
by exploiting the variation in the roll-out of reforms across states, or by comparing neighboring
states where one enacted the restructuring and the other did not. Fabrizio et al. (2007) use variation
in the timing and outcomes of state-level restructuring efforts to show there are large medium-run
gains in thermal plant-level efficiency and that market-based incentives and competition play an
important role in promoting technical efficiency. Knittel (2002) suggests that power plants facing
compensation schemes with performance incentives were more efficient than plants compensated
on a traditional cost-plus basis. Davis and Wolfram (2012) find that the selling of nuclear reactors
to independent power producers led to a decrease in forced outages at nuclear power plants and
a corresponding increase in electricity production. Cicala (2015) compares generation firms that
completed divestiture and nearby firms that did not, in order to show that doing away with cost-
of-service regulation led to generating firms making an effort to lower their input costs. Similarly,
Apt (2005) focuses on the effect of encouraging retail competition on prices, and finds no evidence
of lower industry prices in states that restructured the electricity sector. Mansur (2007) also uses
variation in the extent of restructuring across states to show how restructuring of the electricity
wholesale market in Pennsylvania, Maryland and Maryland led to anti-competitive behavior among
large sellers.
In India, Cropper et al. (2011) study the impact of the unbundling of generation on the efficiency
of state-owned power plants in India. Similar to my empirical strategy, they also take advantage of
the variation in the timing of reforms and use a difference-in-differences methodology to estimate
the effect on thermal power plant efficiency. They hypothesize that separating generation from
transmission and distribution should lead to greater responsiveness to price incentives and greater
efficiency in resource allocation within these thermal plants. They expect that would increase plant
availability and reduce forced outages. They study the effect of unbundling using a panel dataset
of thermal power plants from information collected by the Central electricity Authority (CEA) of
India from 1994-2008. After controlling for state-level time trends, year and plant fixed effects,
they find that unbundling led to increased annual plant availability by 4.6 percentage points and
reduced forced power outages in generation firms by 25% in states that had unbundled before 2003.
However, they find that restructuring did not improve thermal efficiency, and they attribute this to
the fact that unbundling had not attracted IPPs into the market to the same extent as in the US.
They state that despite the setting up of SERCs at state level, it appears that conditions are not yet
optimal for IPPs to enter and there is a need for greater separation of the SERCs from state political
processes.
Sen and Jamasb (2012) on the other hand, find that the average plant load factor (PLF) of power
plants goes up substantially in states that unbundled their electricity sector. Cropper et al. (2011)
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find however, that these large effects dissipate on controlling for state and year fixed effects. Sen
and Jamasb (2012) do emphasize repeatedly that the political processes in each state play a major
role in determining the success or failure of deregulation, and that the nature of unbundling in each
state depends qualitatively on this factor. Bacon and John (2002) further stress that unbundling
is not very effective if unaccompanied by a major overhaul of the tariff structure. In India, by
2006 only a third of the states that had unbundled were breaking even (The Energy and Resources
Institute 2009).
Therefore, the evidence from India appears to suggest that while restructuring may have led to
reductions in blackouts, the effect on thermal efficiency of power plants is mixed. In addition, the
effect of restructuring on wholesale and retail price of electricity is unclear. This paper proposes to
study the effect these reforms had on the manufacturing sector in India. The manufacturing sector
is one of the largest paying consumer bases of the electricity sector and would be affected by these
reforms through two main channels: the price of electricity and the quality of the electrical supply
(power outages, voltage fluctuations). In this regard, looking at how the manufacturing sector
reacted to changes caused by restructuring would provide a yardstick of the success or failure
of these reforms. I am able to use self-reported data by manufacturing firms on their electricity
consumption, average price paid, own-generated electricity, total output and labor inputs in order
to assess the effect of the reforms. In the same style as the literature from the U.S., I use variation in
the timing and the extent of restructuring reforms to identify their effect on manufacturing.
Power outages are a major constraint to manufacturing in India. Allcott et al. (2016) study the
effect of electricity shortages on Indian manufacturing firms and find that power shortages cost
the average plant 5 to 10 percent of its revenues. Furthermore, these shortages more severely
affect firms without generators, likely the smaller plants. If the Indian reforms can continue to
reduce power outages, this should affect firm production. With uninterrupted electricity supply it
is also more likely that a firm would re-optimize production, and outcomes such as its total output,
productivity and labor input should also be affected. Alam (2015) finds that power outages lead to
losses equivalent to 6.4% of annual sales. However, firms may still be perceived to not be affected
by blackouts if they are able to adjust their behavior to cope with it. Alam (2015) explains how
rice mills, for instance, unlike steel mills adjust to blackouts by altering their input mix. Therefore,
there is a large degree of heterogeneity across types of firms in how they can cope with these
blackouts. To take this cross-industry heterogeneity into account, I use industry fixed effects in all
my regressions. The limitation of this strategy, however, is that it cannot account for how different
industries will adapt to changes stemming from the reforms.
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3.4 The Possible Consequences of Power Sector Reform
One of the main channels through which electricity reforms may affect the manufacturing sector
is the retail price of electricity for industrial or commercial users. However, the effect on this retail
price is not obvious. There may be a direct effect of restructuring on the retail price, as well as an
indirect effect, through the wholesale price of electricity.
In India, just like in the U.S., the establishment of a competitive wholesale market for electricity
gives rise to the potential for market power. This may be caused by a number of factors such
as the concentration of generation in isolated regions where the import of electricity is limited,
geography-based transmission constraints and the low elasticity of demand for electricity (Boren-
stein et al. (2002); Joskow (1997)). There is evidence from various countries that market power in
generation, following reforms that encouraged privatization and competition, led to huge increases
in the wholesale price of electricity (Borenstein et al., 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2002; Wolfram,
1999). These increases in wholesale price then carry forward into increases in retail prices to
end-use consumers as well.
However, the reforms could also cause a decline in commercial prices for electricity. This could
happen if the privatization and competition encouraged in the generation sector leads to a lowering
of costs, which could then get passed on to consumers through lower prices (Bushnell and Wolfram,
2005; Cicala, 2015; Markiewicz et al., 2004).
Therefore the evidence on the effect of reforms on wholesale prices, in the Indian context is un-
clear. On the one hand, the Indian government delicensed thermal generation, opening up the
sector to private participation and introduced wholesale power trading, after vertically disintegrat-
ing generating units from distribution. This could have the effect of increasing the market power
of some of the generating units, leading to an increase in the wholesale price. Divested generation
plants now have the freedom to sell power on the wholesale market, rather than being forced to
sell downstream within their own firm. On the other hand, this delicensing and entry of private
participation in generation may lead to greater efficiency in electricity production, which may get
passed through to wholesale prices.
As far as retail prices are concerned, once again, the effect of the reforms is ambiguous. Some
states executed the tenets of the reform by completely separating the generation, transmission and
distribution units. Some of these states ended up with a single distribution company after executing
their reform legislation, and some states ended up with multiple distribution companies. In India,
distribution companies are, in most cases, also involved in retailing electricity. In fact, utilities
in most states suffix their names with “discom” in reference to the fact that they also operate at
116
the distribution end. The Electricity Act (EA) 2003 provided for consumer choice in terms of the
utility that supplies power to them. Given that most utilities were also distribution companies, in
order to encourage competition and choice, the Act mandated that any utility could use existing
distribution infrastructure for a minor wheeling fee. The Act also provided for new distribution
infrastructure to be set up in parallel, but there is very low take up of this.
However, this legislation has met with very limited success. One of the biggest reasons for the
lack of separation between the distribution and retail supply of electricity in India is that it is
almost impossible to accurately attribute distribution losses to the distribution and retail suppliers
separately, because several states still have many unmetered consumers. Ideally, technical losses
should be attributed to the distribution network, while commercial losses arising because of faulty
meters and non-metering should be attributed to the retailer. In the absence of advanced metering,
it is hard to encourage competition in the retail sector of electricity (Forum of Regulators (2013)).
There is limited scope for retail prices to fluctuate too much, because they are still controlled by
State Electricity Regulatory Commissions. After the Electricity Act was passed, concerted efforts
were made to charge tariffs that could at least cover all costs, with limited success. Raising tariffs
is politically very unpopular, and several states tariffs still remain too low to cover all costs.
The data that this paper uses on electricity price is derived by calculating the average price per
KWh from self-reported data from manufacturing firms on the total electricity purchased by them
and total amount spent on the purchase. Therefore, this price data, to some extent, masks the effect
of the reforms on wholesale price, as well as the exact tariff set by the electricity retailer. Therefore,
the results I obtain based on reduced-form effects of restructuring on this calculated price can be
considered as suggestive, and further analysis is needed using data on actual wholesale prices and
retail tariffs in order to further study the effect of the electricity reforms on the manufacturing
sector.
However, price is not the only channel through which manufacturing firms may be affected. For
instance, Cropper et al. (2011) find that the reforms reduced the amount of forced outages in the
electricity sector. In 2006, three years after the EA was passed, 35% of establishments surveyed
under the World Bank Enterprise Survey reported electricity as the biggest obstacle to production,
second only to corruption. Furthermore, this survey also reported that the annual losses due to
electrical outages was as much as 6.6% of annual sales. Therefore, if the reforms went on to
reduce forced outages, given that all states had not restructured by 2006, this could increase the
consumption of electricity at the firm level. Firms may scale down own generated electricity and
consume more electricity from the grid. However, because I do not have data on the fall in power
outages, I am unable to examine this mechanism.
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3.5 Data and Variables
My main source of data on manufacturing firms is from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI)
for the years 1998-99 until 2011-12. This data therefore ranges from the period covering the
1998 Electricity Act, through the 2000s which saw the enforcement of several tenets of the 2003
Act.
This dataset consists of several modules, from which I extract the data that is relevant to this
paper. I use data on the number of days a firm is operational, number of worker days, wages,
output produced and inputs to the firms. Among the input data, I make use of the comprehensive
information on electricity consumed.
To study the impact of the restructuring, one of the key variables I look at is the price paid by the
firm for per unit electricity. Since there are a lot of missing values and discrepancies (the price
is reported as zero a few times, even though the total purchase value is a large rupee amount) in
the data across years, I calculate this using other available data. I calculate the rate per unit by
dividing the total purchase amount of electricity by the number of units consumed. When either
one of these variables is missing, I use the reported rate per unit when it is available. In several
cases, quantity of electricity consumed is reported as 0, but the price of electricity is reported. In
these cases, I report these observations as missing with respect to the price of electricity. I lose
about 1% of observations through this step, because of the number of firms who report consuming
no electricity.
According to the data, around a third of the firms surveyed had some electricity generation capacity
and among those who did, they were able to self-generate about 20% of their total electricity
consumption. Clearly, only the large firms have generating capacity, and in fact the mean amount
of electricity generated by them is higher than the full sample mean of electricity consumed.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables I use for this paper. I define two mea-
sures of productivity of workers. I call one of them wage productivity, which is simply the total
wages divided by the total workers days. Similarly, I define output productivity and the total value
of output (sum of finished and semi-finished output value) divided by the total workers days. I
compute worker days by summing across all the different employees across each firm. I perform
the same calculation to arrive at firm level total wages.
Several variables such as the quantity of electricity consumed and generated, total worker days,
value of output and wages have outliers. To deal with this in a uniform way, I winsorize the
data for these variables.1 The calculated per unit prices of electricity I calculate are consistent
1To elaborate, I assign the bottom most percentile of observations for each of these variables, the value of the 1st
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for outcome variables of manufacturing firms (in a year)
Restricted Sample
Variable Obs. Weighted
mean
SD
No. of manufacturing days 436151 219.87 123.74
No. of non-manufacturing days 436151 8.38 38.32
No. of total operational days 436151 245.16 108.96
Quantity of electricity consumed (KWh) (mill.) 399344 0.45 1.28
Price of electricy consumed (Rs. per KWh) 399344 4.85 1.36
Quantity of electricity generated (KWh) (mill.) 139927 0.24 0. 84
Total number of worker days 415134 16080.13 32747.04
Total wages (all employees) (Rs.) (mill.) 415134 4.05 11.6
Value of finished goods (Rs.) (mill.) 294132 6.39 20.5
Worker productivity (wages/worker days) 415134 186.09 368.3
Worker productivity (total output/worker days) 151760 526.57 1934.58
Note: SD - standard deviation of variable. Obs. - number of observations. Dataset restricted to privately-owned,
electricity-intensive manufacturing firms, full-states with more than 1000 observations. Exchange rate approximately
Rs. 66/$
with average annual tariff prices for manufacturing firms reported by the World Bank open data
website.
I get my information on the unbundling status of various states from Pargal and Banerjee (2014). I
have included the details of how various states acted on the reform in the appendix (table A1).
I restrict the dataset to only those firms that are privately owned. This is because there government-
owned firms may get preferential rates, and would not accurately reflect the effect of these reforms.
Furthermore, I restrict the data to include firms from only relatively electricity-intensive manufac-
turing industries (full list in table A2). And finally, I only include states for which the data has
more that 1000 observations (firm-year level).
Finally, I also make use of luminosity data from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s
Operational Linescan System. This data is constructed as an annual average of satellite images of
the earth taken daily between 20:30 and 22:00 local time. The raw data is at a 30 second resolution,
which implies that each pixel in the raw data is roughly one square kilometer. I average over pixels
within an administrative boundary – the smallest of which in this context is the sub-distract. The
raw luminosity data for each pixel is reported as a six-bit integer ranging from 0 to 63. To be
percentile, and do the same for the observations with values above the 99th percentile, by assigning them the value of
the 99th percentile.
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consistent with the literature (Henderson et al., 2012), I create a variable that is the log of the
light-density per capita, where population data is taken from Landscan. Since the average within
a district is never 0, the natural log is taken. This data is usually used in economics as a proxy for
economic activity. In the absence of any data on quality of electricity and blackouts, I use this data
merely as a check to see if it is consistent with my results.
3.6 Empirical Strategy
Using an identification strategy similar to Cicala (2015); Cropper et al. (2011); Markiewicz et al.
(2004), I exploit the variation in timing and the exact nature of the restructuring in various Indian
states in order to find their effect on electricity price and other manufacturing outcomes. I also
use the fact that different states executed the reforms differently. I expand on these different kinds
of restructuring in the data section, and use these variables in order to identify (i) the marginal
effects of separating only generation and distribution from transmission, (ii) separating all three
sectors and setting up a single distribution company, and finally, (iii) setting up multiple distribution
companies.
Given the various ways in which reforms could affect the electricity sector, I use a reduced form
equation to help estimate the net effect of unbundling and the setting up SERCs on various out-
come variables. This would capture the effect on the manufacturing sector regardless of the chan-
nel through which restructuring could affect the manufacturing sector. I conduct an event study
analysis in order to understand the effects of these reforms on the outcomes of interest. These
outcomes include the unit price of electricity, the amount of electricity consumed by a firm, their
own-generated electricity, days worked, total output of the firm, and measures of productivity. I
use the following specification for my event study.
Yfist = γ+
3∑
z=1
[ −1∑
y=−9
δzyUnbundledzs1(t− Ts = y) +
7∑
y=1
δzyUnbundledzs1(t− Ts = y)
]
+ θs + θt + θi + νfist (3.1)
The outcome variable is referred to by Yfist where f specifies the firm level, i specifies the industry
group, s the state and t the year. The variable Unbundledzs refers to the nature of restructuring in
a particular state s. When z = 1, it is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for states where
generation and distribution were separated from the transmission sector. This occurs in all states
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that acted on the reform. When z = 2, it is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for states,
that additional to the separation referenced by z = 1 also separate generation from distribution, i.e.
separate all three sectors, and end up with one state-wide distribution company. When z = 3, it is
an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for states that additional to the steps taken into account
by z = 1 and z = 2 also set up multiple distribution companies, and zero for others. So, for
example, the state of Maharashtra restructured in 2005 (Ts = 2005), and separated all three sectors
(generation, transmission and distribution), resulting in a single state-wide distribution company
(Unbundled1 = 1 and Unbundled2 = 1). Here, when I have a firm level observation at year 2000
(t = 2000) the expression within indicator function in Equation (3.1) is 1 when t − Ts = −5,
Therefore, we would pick up effects of unbundling in the year 2000 and state of Maharashtra
through δ1,−5 and δ2,−5.
Table 3.2: Explanation of indicator variables used in event study
Variables
Features Unbundled1 Unbundled2 Unbundled3
Generation and distribution 1 0 0
separated from transmission
Generation, transmission and distribution 1 1 0
separated, single distribution company
Generation, transmission and distribution 1 1 1
separated, multiple distribution companies
This regression specification also includes state, year and industry fixed effects, as well as a lin-
ear time trend for each state. Given that my data is based on self-reported prices and outcomes
by manufacturing firms, I use these fixed effects to control for year-specific, state-specific and
industry-specific differences. This works with varying degrees of success for the outcome vari-
ables I consider.
The EA 2003 also mandated that each state set up an independent State Electricity Regulatory
Commission (SERC). There is variation in the timing of the set up of these regulatory bodies
across various states, and this does not often coincide with the year they executed restructuring
reforms. I also run the following specification in order to further soak up any variation that may be
due to the set up of the SERC. I include the indicator variable SERCst which takes a value of 1 for
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all years including and after the year y in which a state s sets up the SERC, and 0 otherwise.
Yfist = γ+
3∑
z=1
[ −1∑
y=−9
δzyUnbundledzs1(t− Ts = y) +
7∑
y=1
δzyUnbundledzs1(t− Ts = y)
]
+ SERCst + θs + θt + θi + νfist (3.2)
The final results I present in the next section are created using regressions with Equation (3.2).
There is some possibility of endogeneity in the timing across states, as well as the exact nature
of restructuring in various states. For instance, it may be possible that the states that restructured
earlier were the states which had the greatest increase in propensity to improve efficiency of ther-
mal power plants or reduce outages. Or, it may be true that the states that unbundled first also
had increasing institutional capacity to allow for higher efficiency in generation. The availability
of data limits my ability to address these completely. My results on outages, however, are con-
sistent with those in Allcott et al. (2016); Cropper et al. (2011), who use different identification
strategies.
Given that the source of variation in this data is at state level, I run a robustness check where I
reduce the dataset to state-year level, by averaging the outcomes of interest to state level. I then run
the same regression as above (without industry fixed-effects and linear state time trends), weighted
using the frequency of firms in each state. These results are consistent with the results from the
specification in Equation (3.2), albeit noisier. This is understandable given that there are far fewer
observations when I reduce the dataset to state-year level. The results from these regressions are
included in the appendix (Figures 3.10 and 3.11). I also use this specification to look at luminosity
data as a check to see if it is consistent with my other results (figure in next section).
Yst = γ+
3∑
z=1
[ −1∑
y=−9
δzyUnbundledzs1(t− Ts = y) +
7∑
y=1
δzyUnbundledzs1(t− Ts = y)
]
+ SERCst + θs + θt + νst (3.3)
I try to mitigate concerns of endogenous timing of the reforms as far as possible by controlling for
state fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects and state-time trends. I can reasonably
argue for conditional exogeneity considering that in Figure 3.2, the pre-trends of average electricity
price are similar across all states, after controlling for the above fixed effects. The event study
graphs make it easy to study these pre-reform trends in order to determine the validity of this
design. Since there are no differential pre-reform trends, we should expect that in the absence of
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the reform, the trends would be parallel across regions, conditional on the controls.
I also consider an alternative model for the event study, which forces there to be no differential pre-
trends for the different types of restructuring. Imposing the condition that there are no pre-reform
trends is a very strong restriction, given that I do not see clear evidence in the data that there are no
pre-trends, particularly for the outcome variables other than electricity price. However, I use the
results from this specification only to test whether the effect of a particular type of restructuring is
jointly different from 0 for all the post-treatment years. I use the following specification for this
model:
Yfist = γ+
3∑
z=1
[
7∑
y=1
δzyUnbundledzs1(t− Ts = y)
]
+ SERCst + θs + θt + θi + νfist (3.4)
I show results using the above specification in the Appendix. I use these results only to check
whether there is a significant aggregate effect of restructuring on the outcomes of interest.
3.7 Results
In this section, I present the results of the event study analysis using Equation (3.2). In Figure 3.1,
I study the effect of restructuring on the intensive margin of electricity consumption. While, there
there is some weak evidence of pre-reform trends, the figure still demonstrates a trend break after
restructuring.
The line representing complete separation, with one distribution company (coefficients ofUnbundled2:
δ2y) shows the additional effect of completely separating the three sectors over merely separating
generation and distribution from transmission. Therefore, the total effect of complete separation
can be calculated by adding the coefficients of Unbundled1 and Unbundled2 (δ1y + δ2y). The total
effect in the case of this kind of complete separation with one distribution appears to be positive.
The net effect of complete separation with multiple distribution companies on electricity purchase
appears to be zero (adding the coefficients of Unbundled1, Unbundled2 and Unbundled3: δ1y +
δ2y + δ3y). The line representing the baseline level of restructuring, i.e. only separating generation
and distribution from transmission (δ1y) stops two years after the treatment year. This is because
only 4 states had this limited level of structuring, and the last year available in the data for these
states is a maximum of two years after restructuring.
Similarly, in the case of the unit price of electricity in Figure 3.2, the net effect of complete sep-
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Figure 3.1: The effect of restructuring on
electricity purchase (intensive margin)
Figure 3.2: The effect of restructuring on
electricity price
Note: Dataset restricted to privately-owned, electricity-intensive manufacturing firms, full-states with
more than 1000 observations.The graphs plot coefficients from regressions following Equation (3.2). The
left hand panel shows the results from a regression with 507,224 firm level observations, while the right
hand side panel shows results from a regression run on 507,942 observations. For confidence intervals,
please see Figures 3.12 and 3.13 in the Appendix. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
aration with one distribution company is positive, while there is no net effect of any other type
of restructuring. These results indicate that in states where there was complete separation with
one distribution company, manufacturing firms increased their consumption of electricity. This is
consistent with prices increasing in these states if higher consumption levels pushed these firms
to higher tiers of the price tariff, raising the average price per unit of electricity consumed due to
increasing block price tariffs. I have included the confidence intervals for the additional effect of
Unbundled2 (where generation, transmission and distribution are separated, and one distribution
company is set up) in Figures 3.12 and 3.13. These effects are significantly different from zero, in
the post-periods.
However, it is unclear why such a strong effect may only be observed in states that completely
unbundled all three sectors, but formed only a single distribution company rather than more. One
possible reason is that there was a differential improvement in the quality of the electricity supply
(reduced blackouts) in states that passed this specific legislation. This could plausibly result in
firms purchasing more electricity if it is more reliable than before. This may further lead to re-
optimization of other inputs within the firm in such states. Given that a high proportion of firms
state that electricity blackouts are a major constraint to their production, an improvement in the
quality of electricity supply may well lead to such behavior. Figure 3.3 supports this hypothesis.
It shows an increase in lights density in states completely unbundled all three sectors, and formed
only a single distribution company. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that blackouts
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Figure 3.3: The effect of restructuring on luminosity (satellite data)
Note: This graph uses satellite nighttime light density data as a proxy for electricity consumption. I use
228 observations to run a regression following Equation (3.3), and the coefficients are plotted in this graph.
For confidence intervals, please refer to Figure 3.14 in the Appendix. Standard errors clustered at the state
level.
may be differentially falling in these states. However, it may merely be reflective of increased
economic activity in these states, which also strengthens the findings in Figure 3.1 where there is an
increase in electricity consumption among manufacturing firms, likely increasing their economic
activity.
This does not rule out the fact that price tariffs may have also gone up for all firms. If so, this would
be consistent with Figures 3.4 and 3.5.2 While some firms may respond to reduced blackouts by
increasing electricity purchase, even if average electricity price tariffs increase to some extent, there
may be smaller firms who respond more to the price of electricity, as opposed to the quality. For
these firms, a reduction in electricity purchases, as well as an increase in own-generated electricity
is plausible.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 indicate a decline in the purchase of electricity on the extensive margin, as
well as an increase in own-generated electricity on the extensive margin in those states that have
complete separation of the three electricity sectors, with one distribution company. This would
be consistent with small firms stopping electricity purchases when prices go up, and generating
their own electricity. Once again, the net effects of restructuring for states that enacted other
2Figures A5 and A6 include the confidence intervals for the coefficients of Unbundled2
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Figure 3.4: The effect of restructuring on
electricity purchase (extensive margin)
Figure 3.5: The effect of restructuring on the
probability of using a generator
Note: Dataset restricted to privately-owned, electricity-intensive manufacturing firms, full-states with
more than 1000 observations.The graphs plot coefficients from regressions following Equation (3.2). The
left hand panel shows the results from a regression with 514,724 firm level observations, while the right
hand side panel shows results from a regression run on 520,184 observations. For confidence intervals,
please see Figures 3.15 and 3.16 in the Appendix. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
interpretations of the reforms appear to be zero.
The results in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 3 appear to lend credence to the idea that larger firms for whom
the quality of electricity is a major factor, increase their electricity consumption, and re-optimize
production. These figures show that the days spent on non-manufacturing activity (these are man-
ufacturing firms) falls, while the total worker days rises. Once again, this occurs only in states
with complete unbundling and one distribution company. This may be interpreted as evidence that
these manufacturing firms also increase their labor input in addition to electricity purchases. This
is consistent with the observation that blackouts were a major constraint to their production, since
they may have had to shut down production on days when there was no power. However, if the
electricity supply improved in quality, there would be more days during which their workers would
be able to perform their duties, particularly if they are electricity intensive firms.
This hypothesized re-optimization by larger firms is borne out in the Figures 3.8 and 3.9 as well,
where an increase in electricity purchases, and subsequent increase in worker days is accompanied
by an increase in the total output as well as output productivity (units of output per worker day)4.
Again, this occurs only for firms in states where there is a single distribution company, and com-
plete separation of generation, transmission and distribution. This increased economic activity is
consistent with the findings on the lights data in Figure 3.3.
3Figures A7 and A8 include the confidence intervals for the coefficients of Unbundled2
4Figures A9 and A10 include the confidence intervals for the coefficients of Unbundled2
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Figure 3.6: The effect of restructuring on
non-manufacturing days
Figure 3.7: The effect of restructuring on to-
tal worker days
Note: Dataset restricted to privately-owned, electricity-intensive manufacturing firms, full-states with
more than 1000 observations.The graphs plot coefficients from regressions following Equation (3.2). The
left hand panel shows the results from a regression with 80,750 firm level observations, while the right
hand side panel shows results from a regression run on 506,734 observations. For confidence intervals,
please see Figures 3.17 and 3.18 in the Appendix. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
The above hypothesis would explain these results, but it is still not clear why these patterns would
differentially occur only in states with a single distribution company. Why would they not occur,
for instance, with states with multiple distribution companies, but with the same separation of the
three sectors? One explanation may owe itself to the peculiarities of the Indian experience with
restructuring. As mentioned before, there is a lot of political opposition to raising electricity prices
in India. However, continuing not to raise tariffs even in the presence of net losses perpetuates a
cycle of poor quality electricity and frequent blackouts. It may be possible that in states with only
one distribution company, a hike in electricity tariffs, at least to cover all costs, is administratively
easier to pass and justify. With multiple distribution companies, with varying levels of overhead
and therefore costs, it may be harder to explain price tariff increases in one distribution area versus
another. Therefore, such states may be constrained by one or two distribution companies having
very low costs, and therefore being able operate even with lower tariffs. However, having different
tariffs in different parts of the same state may be politically less palatable. Unfortunately, due to
lack of data on quality of electricity, distribution company data, wholesale and retail price tariffs,
this remains conjecture.
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Figure 3.8: The effect of restructuring on to-
tal output
Figure 3.9: The effect of restructuring on to-
tal output productivity
Note: Dataset restricted to privately-owned, electricity-intensive manufacturing firms, full-states with
more than 1000 observations.The graphs plot coefficients from regressions following Equation (3.2). The
left hand panel shows the results from a regression with 382,953 firm level observations, while the right
hand side panel shows results from a regression run on 186,652 observations. For confidence intervals,
please see Figures 3.19 and 3.20 in the Appendix. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
3.8 Conclusion
The Indian experience with restructuring appears to have mixed results. Given the data limitations
faced in this analysis, it is difficult to study the detailed effects of restructuring on wholesale
and retail prices, as well as the incidence of blackouts and voltage fluctuations. However, in
spite of using a calculated measure of the average price of electricity, the data reveals interesting
patterns.
Nineteen out of thirty-two states and union territories experienced some form of restructuring in
the electricity sector. Some of these states separated their generation and distribution sectors from
the transmission sectors. A few states completely unbundled generation, transmission and dis-
tribution, ending up with a single distribution company, while other set up multiple distribution
companies. The main motivation behind all these types of restructuring was to encourage more
private participation and competition in generation and electricity retail, while reducing inefficien-
cies in electricity production and recovering costs of production.
This paper uses manufacturing sector outcomes as a means of evaluating the performance of the
electricity reforms. The manufacturing sector is one of the largest paying consumers of electricity
in India, and would therefore stand to be affected if the reforms affects the price and quality of
electricity. In the absence of specific data on wholesale and retail prices or electricity, as well
as information on blackouts, I use the derived average price of electricity in order to evaluate
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the reforms. However, even after using this approximated price, which masks the effect of the
reforms on wholesale and retail tariffs, I find that in states that completely unbundled generation,
transmission and distribution (only one distribution company) there is evidence of an increase in
electricity purchases on the intensive margin. This is accompanied by higher average prices of
electricity, possibly because an increase in electricity consumption pushes firms to a higher tier of
an increasing block pricing tariff. Firms in these states also experience a rise in total output, as well
as productivity. I find that in these states, there is also a differential increase in luminosity, which
I interpret as a proxy for economic activity. In this context, however, while it does not necessarily
imply a fall in blackouts, it at least does not contradict the hypothesis that there may have been a
differential improvement in electricity quality in these states, via reduced blackouts.
However the results also indicate that there is a fall in electricity purchase on the extensive margin,
along with an increase in firms that generate their own power. This may be because tariffs may
have gone up in these states, deterring some smaller firms, that do not need high amounts of
electricity. However, there may be an improvement in quality of electricity, in terms of fewer
blackouts, which may explain what is observed with firms that increase electricity purchased. This
may be interpreted as evidence that blackouts may be a bigger constraint for such firms, than the
price.
One possible hypothesis to explain these results could be that it is administratively and politically
easier to pass a tariff increase when there is one distribution company. However, with multiple
distribution companies, with varying cost structures, and therefore varying break-even average
prices, it may be harder for state legislators to justify different prices in different parts of the same
state. However, in order to properly examine this hypothesis, comprehensive data on the quality
of electricity, distribution company data, wholesale and retail price tariffs, political environments
in different states, is needed. Gaining a better understanding of what caused differential effects in
some states would be useful in designing future reform policy. Better reforms not only benefit the
electricity sector, but also large consumers of electricity like manufacturing firms.
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3.9 Additional Tables and Figures
Table 3.3: Different styles of restructuring in various states
States
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Tamil Nadu Maharashtra Andhra Pradesh
Punjab Meghalaya Delhi
Himachal Pradesh Uttaranchal Gujarat
Assam Haryana
West Bengal Karnataka
Chattisgarh Madhya Pradesh
Orissa
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
Type 1 Generation and distribution separated from transmission
Type 2 Generation, transmission and distribution separated, single distribution company
Type 3 Generation, transmission and distribution separated, multiple distribution companies
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Table 3.4: Electricity intensive manufacturing industries included in the data
List of included manufacturing industries
Manufacture Of Food Products And Beverages
Manufacture Of Textiles
Manufacture Of Wood And Of Products Of Wood And Cork,Except Furniture
Manufacture Of Articles Of Straw And Plating Materials
Manufacture Of Paper And Paper Products
Manufacture Of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And Nuclear Fuel
Manufacture Of Chemicals And Chemical Products
Manufacture Of Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products
Manufacture Of Basic Metals
Manufacture Of Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Equipments
Manufacture Of Machinery And Equipment
Manufacture Of Electrical Machinery And Apparatus
Manufacture Of Other Transport Equipment
Manufacture Of Furniture
Manufacture Of Office, Accounting And Computing Machinery
Manufacture Of Radio, Television And Communication Equipment And Apparatus
Manufacture Of Medical, Precision And Optical Instruments, Watches And Clocks
Manufacture Of Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi-Trailers
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Figure 3.10: The effect of restructuring on
electricity purchase on the intensive margin,
for state-year level data
Figure 3.11: The effect of restructuring on
average electricity price, for state-year level
data
Note: Dataset restricted to privately-owned, electricity-intensive manufacturing firms, full-states with
more than 1000 observations.The coefficients are reported from Equation (3.3)
Figure 3.12: The effect of restructuring on
electricity purchase (intensive margin)
Figure 3.13: The effect of restructuring on
electricity price
Note: Standard errors clustered at the state level. Dataset restricted to privately-owned, electricity-
intensive manufacturing firms, full-states with more than 1000 observations.The coefficients are reported
from Equation (3.2)
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Figure 3.14: The effect of restructuring on luminosity (satellite data)
Note: Standard errors clustered at the state level. This graph uses satellite nighttime light density data as
a proxy for electricity consumption. I use 228 observations to run a regression following Equation (3.3),
and the coefficients are plotted in this graph.
Figure 3.15: The effect of restructuring on
electricity purchase (extensive margin)
Figure 3.16: The effect of restructuring on
the probability of using a generator
Note: Standard errors clustered at the state level. Dataset restricted to privately-owned, electricity-
intensive manufacturing firms, full-states with more than 1000 observations.The coefficients are reported
from Equation (3.2)
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Figure 3.17: The effect of restructuring on
non-manufacturing days
Figure 3.18: The effect of restructuring on
total worker days
Note: Standard errors clustered at the state level. Dataset restricted to privately-owned, electricity-
intensive manufacturing firms, full-states with more than 1000 observations.The coefficients are reported
from Equation (3.2)
Figure 3.19: The effect of restructuring on
total output
Figure 3.20: The effect of restructuring on
total output productivity
Note: Standard errors clustered at the state level. Dataset restricted to privately-owned, electricity-
intensive manufacturing firms, full-states with more than 1000 observations.The coefficients are reported
from Equation (3.2)
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Figure 3.21: The effect of restructuring
on electricity purchase (intensive margin) -
Model with 0 pre-trends
Figure 3.22: The effect of restructuring on
electricity price - Model with 0 pre-trends
Note: Dataset restricted to privately-owned, electricity-intensive manufacturing firms, full-states with
more than 1000 observations.The coefficients are reported from Equation (3.4)
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